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Starting from the background of the modernisation/dependency 
debate, the author examines traditional top-down and bottom- 
up approaches to regional planning. The major findings of 
this document are that South African regional policy has 
been dominated by political rather than economic criteria. 
Furthermore, the evidence indicates that regional policy has 
shown particularly poor results, and will continue to do so. 
The author finds that neither top-down nor bottom-up 
approaches constitute a comprehensive approach to regional 
development in Southern Africa. The suggested outcome is a 
combination of the two approaches. The bottom-up school's 
major contribution is seen to be the promotion of rural 
development and community based decision making. The 
Transkei case study however highlights the importance of a 
simultaneous urbanisation policy to allow agriculture in 
Transkei to become viable. Transkei's relative disadvantage 
in attracting industry requires that the emphasis falls on 
the existing metropolitan and secondary cities to 
accommodate rapid urbanisation. Implicit from this is that 
the South African government abandon the political ideal of 
apartheid and concentrate on a more economically efficient 
industrial location policy, whilst simultaneously providing 
substantial support for rural development policies, 
optimally within a more conducive institutional environment.
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Ch. 1. INTRODUCTION
Sarly development planning theories and their 
associated regional planning policies were primarily 
based on economic theories. The major thrust of 
these theories lay in the assumption of 1 trickle 
down1 or 'spread' effects both in interpersonal 
income and regional terms. In the latter regard, 
Hirschmann (1958, 83) views regional inequality as 
inevitable. He writes that "there can be little 
doubt that an economy, to lift itself to higher 
income levels, must and will first develop within 
itself one of several regional centres of economic 
strength.1 This in the course of the development 
process means that international and interregional 
inequality of growth is an inevitable concomitant 
and condition of growth itself. However, in terms 
of the widely accepted Kuznet’s (1955) view, this 
inequality would peak in the middle stages of 
development and then decline thereafter; {El Shakhs, 
1980). In this way, a lessening of spatial and 
aspatial inequality would occur. (See fig. 1).
Diagram 1 The Kuznets Curve
Level of Income 
Inequality
Develop
Experience has shown however, that the 'growth' 
orientated strategies have not achieved the desired 
results. In addition, it has been argued that 
"traditional regional policy instruments have 
essentially only accentuated existing market 
trends", that is, there has been a further 
strengthening o£ the existing core areas (Stohr and 
Todtling, 3 978, 86). Although in some cases
targeted national economic growth rates were
achieved, it became clear that income inequality, 
disease, malnutrition, illiteracy, poverty and 
unemployment had reached proportions as never before 
in human history.
Thus the feeling was that the trickle-down type 
approach encouraged growth without development;
development being seen as involving an increase in 
output, and a better distribution of this output, 
through greater participation of the poor.
As a reaction to trickle-down policies, and their 
increasingly apparent failure, a number of changes 
in development economics theory occurred. New 
schools of thought that arose included the
'redistribution with 'basic needs' and more
recently a regional planning school of thought
dominated by the works 3" MB Stohr (Stohr & Taylor, 
1981s Stohr & Todtling; 1978: Stohr 6 Todtling,
1976: Stohr, 1981) aimed at development from below.3-
Taylor (1979, 4), writes on Stohr,
In this dissertation the terms "Development Prom Below Strategies" and "Bottom-up strategies" are used synonomously,
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the author argues convincingly that the 
conceptual bases of current development 
practices are neavily reliant on neo-classical economics strongly concencrateti on large scale, vertically organised, institution-basedprocesses to the neglect of non-market and 
informal processes, and a strong emphasis on economic process to the exclusion of processes 
of a social and political nature. The empirical evidence they consider, suggests that the overall result of existing policies has been a widening, rather than a narrowing, of disparities, and that growth centre/hinterland 
spread effects have generally been small and limited in geographical extent.
Prom their analysis of case studies, • r and 
Taylor conclude that in the context: of p jies for 
broad spatial development, it is difficult to 
justify growth centre policies for lagging areas.
The results of their analysis suggest that regional 
policy must concentrate on the following issues:
a. levels of decision making, primarily on a 
terv-corial and community basis.
b« che ..tobilizacion of individuals, social groups 
and territorially organised small communities 
for the achievement of common benefits in 
social, economic and political terms. (The 
emphasis here is thf: economically less
developed social groups yive clear priority to 
their own self dettu'rtined standards and 
subordinate external ^oonomic and other 
interactions to these susiviards).
c. the channeling of aoonotlc, social and political 
backwash effects, to facilitate greater spatial 
equity of living conditions. To this end -
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1. greater attention should be paid to non- 
market and non-institution based activities 
and to the requirements of small-scale
.human and environmental relations?
2. one must facilitate the shifting of 
decision-making powers from today's mainly 
functional (vertical) structure towards a 
(horizontal) territorially based structure;
3. policies must be adapted to specific 
historical, institutional and political 
conditions in each country or region.
1.1 OBJECTIVES
The objectives of this dissertation are firstly, to 
analyse the major theoretical underpinnings of the 
top-down strategies with specific regard to the 
development of growth centre theories. Secondly, 
the historical development of South African regional 
strategy is traced, providing insight into the 
dominance of political criteria over economic 
criteria by the South African Government. Thirdly, 
the current successes and failings of irhe South 
African strategy to date are analyzed. Specific 
areas of concern include job creation, costs of job 
creation and generation of self-sustaining economies 
in the homelands.
The fourth objective is to outline the major aims, 
objectives and criteria for implementation of 
1bottom-up1 strategies. Special consideration will 
be placed on the issues (points a, b and c) 
summarised on the previous page and on the nature of 
policies used in the past to achieve bottom-up
grovth. The Ei£th objective is to consider the 
effect of a bottom-up strategy on a specific region 
in South Africa. Transkei will be used as a case 
study, and particular attention will be placed on 
evaluating the impact of a bottom strategy to policy 
and decision making, interregional relationships, 
and employment creation in both urban and rural
Tha sixth objective, taking bcth bottom-up and top- 
down strategies, is to identify any areas of 
interface between the two approaches which could 
advantageously be used simultaneously, to the 
advantage of Transikeian development.
Finally, in terms of the above analysis, planning 
implications will be discussed on the basis of a 
regional planning approach in South Africa, with 
specific emphasis being placed on planning 
implications for the Transkei.
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Ch, 2. TOP-DOWN & BOTTQM-CJP DEVELOPMENT PARADIGMS
2.1 INTRODUCTION
The term ’development1 has in the past been 
used/understood by development planners/economists 
to mean different things, and the effectiveness of 
development policies has been measured in different 
ways. The term 'development1 has often been used 
synonomously with 'growth’ and measured in terms of 
an increase in a country's gross domestic product. 
More recently, however, the term development has 
been seen as involving the promotion of peoples' 
'well being', success of policies being measured in 
terms of both material and non-material aspects such 
as healthful diets, medical care, labour 
opportunities, housing and political freedom. The 
more recent concern focuses on issues of equality 
and inequality, or the unequal access of people to a 
society's resources (both material and non- 
material) .
Problems of unequal development are experienced at a 
number of levels. These levels include the 
international level (between the advanced 
industrialized countries and the third world 
countries), within countries (between rich 
minorities and poor majorities within a specific 
country), and structural differences between 
different sectors (between mining sectors and 
agricultural sectors). Finally spatial differences 
occur in so far as ' who gets what resources and 
where?'. Fair (1982,3) explains,
The differences in levels of development between regions can be explained not only in terms of their different resource endowments or their
favourable or unfavourable locations, but also in terms of their place in the political and 
economic system of the nation in which they are enmeshed and the international system to which 
the nation itself is tied.
There are two main paradigms that currently dominate 
thinking about development - they are the 
modernization (or diffusionist) paradigm and the 
dependency paradigm.
These two paradigms embody fundamentally different 
perspectives as regards what causes 
underdevelopment. The main bone of contention 
between the two paradigms is "does the centre as a 
source of innovation and economic activity diffuse 
benefits to a less developed peripnery or does it 
drain the periphery of its wealth and manpower? is 
the centre, a country's metropolitan core, a 
generative or parasitic agent in the 
development/underdevelopment process". (Pair, 1982, 
4)
Before discussing cop-down development strategies it 
is helpful to locate the strategies within the 
debate between the modernization and the dependency 
paradigms.
THE MODERNISATION PARADIGM
The underlying philosophy of this paradigm is that 
if underdeveloped countries are to progress to the 
same level of development as the first world 
countries then they should adopt the same western 
values, production systems, technologies and 
administration systems.
Rostov's (1960) theory of the 'stages of growth' is 
a classic example of the modernisation school. 
Rostov envisaged countries as passing through a 
number of stages of development frcm traditional 
society to a stage of 'high mass consumption’ which 
characterises the most advanced countries and their 
economies.
Rostov assumed that all countries begin from a 
common baseline and undergo unilinear transformation 
along a development continuum of economic and social 
change. The theory uses growth as the major 
measuring indice, that is growth of GDP and 
development are used synonymously. It is assumed 
that a diffusion of growth will occur from the more 
developed to the less developed areas, thus 
eradicating poverty from an economy. Implicit here 
is that workers from the traditional sector would 
move to the modern sector, obtain higher incomes and 
thus achieve a higher standard of living. In the 
same way at an international scale, by following a 
modernisation approach, less developed countries 
would catch up with the more developed countries. 
This was to be achieved by the growth of the 
manufacturing industry and the gradual replacement 
of imported goods by locally made goods (Fair, 1982, 
8 ).
Friedmann (1966) translated Rostov's model into 
spatial terms. Friedmann concentrated on nodes, 
networks and surfaces. Nodes were seen as the focus 
of human activity - they were arranged 
hierarchically. Networks were concerned with the 
lines of communication and movement which connect 
the nodes to one another. Surfaces were produced by 
human activity around a node such as trade areas, 
and urban spheres of influence.
Together these elements give rise to spatial 
patterns. Some initial trigger, for example 
colonial settlement, would set off development in a 
particular locality. Once development began, the 
process would tend to be cumulative causing an 
agglomeration or nodal pattern of activity. Thus 
the pa1: tern of economic activity is spatially 
uneven. This leads to the emergence of a core and a 
periphery where the core tends to dominate 
(economically, politically and socially).
The modernisation paradigm assumes that this growth 
could be diffused to the less developed regions. 
This would be achieved by spread effects from the 
core to the periphery, via purchases from, and 
investments made in the hinterlam' 1 also by the 
absorbtion of unemployed persons : ore.
The most important trickling down effects are generated by purchases and investments placed in the hinterlands by the growth points ... the latter may also raise the productivity of labour and per capita consumption in the hinterlands by absorbing some of their disguised unemployment (Hansen, 1982, 17).
Within the modernisation paradigm, the policy of 
implementing ‘growth centres' is seen as a means of 
reducing inequalities in the space economy. (The 
theoretical workings of 'growth centre' policy 
follow later in this chapter.) The major 
theoretical underpinnings of growth centres, rests 
on the assumptions that firstly, concentration of 
investment will achieve economies of scale. 
Secondlyr the assumption that economic growth will 
diffuse down the urb^n hierarchy and thirdly, the 
assumption that economic growth will diffuse into 
those areas surrounding the growth centres.
The major criticisms of the top-down approach, are 
expanded in later sections of this document. As 
such, they will only be noted at this stage as a 
means of providing some background to the dependency 
theorists critique that follows this section. The 
most commonly noted areas of criticism centre on the 
failure to achieve trickle-down effects (Stohr and 
Todtling, 1S78); the widening, rather than the 
narrowing of disparties betwe* ) regions (El Shakhs, 
1980); the poor rates of job creation achieved by 
top-down strategies (Friedmann and Sullivan, 1975); 
and finally the increased dependency of the 
peripheral economies on the core areas (Dos Santos, 
1970).
THE DEPENDENCY CRITIQUE
The concept of 1 dependency‘ evolved in Latin America 
during the 1960's and was originally used to 
describe the relations between the South American 
countries and the More Developed Countries (MDC's). 
It has since found favour in some writings about 
Africa and Asia. The rise in popularity of the 
dependency paradigm can be largely attributed to the 
failure of top-down strategies to demonstrate the 
benefits of spread or trickle-down effects.
There is no unified body of thought which 
characterises dependency. The various formulations 
of dependency, include those based on Frank's (1966, 
1967) "development of underdevelopment", dos 
Santos's (1968, 1970) "new dependency", and
Cardoso's (1972, 1973) dependent capitalist
development and dependency as a result of 
imperialism. Chilcote (1984) emphasises that there
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ls a differing emphasis by different advocates of 
'dependency'. Opinions on what is central to the 
'dependency' debate vary.
the literature on dependency moves in many directions, and critics set forth a multitude of positions. Some critics attack the nationalist 
inclinations of some advocates of dependency who oppose outside influence. Many argue that attention to external considerations of dependency avoids considerations of the internal class struggle, and others believe that dependency obscures the analysis of imperialism (Chilcots, 1984, 297).
Tomlinson (1981), in his analysis cf the varied 
approaches to dependency found that there were two 
central themes that emerged from the literature. 
These themes relate to "external trade dependency" 
and less development countries (LDC's) "class 
structures'' in terms of their position in the
international capitalist economy.
External trade dependence refers to a LDC's reliance 
on external sources of demand for economic growth. 
Dos Santos (1970, 231) defined dependency as
characterising a situation in which the economic 
development of a certain country "is cond'tioned by 
the development and expansion of another economy to 
which the former is subjected." This dependence can 
take the form of a LDC being reliant on a MDC for
the demand for, and the price of its primary
exports. If the LDC exports secondary -goods, the 
LOG can become dependent on MDC technology, spare 
parts, management and acce.ss to MDC markets.
Tomlinson (1981, 20) indicates that the more common 
dependence is on one or a few primary exports
resulting in an LDC becoming vulnerable to price
fluctuations and external demand for their products. 
Chilcote (1984, 307) further expands this
phenomenon, referring to
fluctuations in the balance of payments, which in 
dependent countries often leads to deficits caused by trading in a highly monopolised international market, the repatriation of foreign profits, and 
the need to rely on foreign capital aid.
The impact of this dependence on fluctuation of 
demand and of prioe results in the LDC becoming 
dependent on the expansion of an external economy 
for their own expansion.
Marxist analysis makes a central contribution to 
dependency theory in terms of class structures in
Class structure is particularly relevant if one views economic and policy change as being propagated by specific classes in their struggle with other classes to accummulate wealth. 
(Tomlinson, 1981, 20)
The external dominance of a nation's economy hinders 
the formation of an indigenous industrial
bourgeoisie in the LDCs. External contrpl of the 
national economy determines the areas and priorities 
of economic growth in the dependent economy, thus 
limiting local initiative and capital from 
indigenous entrepreneurs. The means of ensuring co­
operation from the LDC is attained by the formation 
of a compliant managerial bourgeoisie, whose role is 
to ensure stable and protected conditions of 
production for the Multi National Corporations 
(MNC's), for example by giving them the internal 
market as part of an import substitution industrial 
strategy (Sklar, 1979). The managerial bourgeoisie
usually derive their incomes from high paying jobs
in the state apparatus. The state in turn is
generally supported by the MDC's and their country 
of origin by means of technical and economic aid. 
The relationship between the MNC's and the
managerial bourgeoisie is self perpetuating as
Cardoso (1973) explains
development benefits all classes associated with international capital ... but it undermines national interests that are not linked to the multinational corporations, such as local entrepreneurs (Cited in Chilcote, 1984, 303).
Valensuela and Valensuela (1979, 550) support the
above opinion, and go on to add that there is in 
fact co-operation between the managerial bourgeoisie 
and foreign investors.
Such persons often pursue their interests by means of economic partnership or collaboration with 
foreign investors ... the managerial bourgeoisie has a pronounced tendency to coalesce with 
bourgeoise elements at comparable levels of control in foreign countries.
Thus, because the MNC's provide support for the 
managerial bourgeoisie, it is in the interest of 
this class to ensure that policy, both political and 
economic, serves to further the interests of the 
MNC's. The net result of this dependent situation, 
is that the LDC's become underdeveloped.
[As] the structure of dependency deepens, [this] leads dependent countries to underdevelopment, and aggravates the problems of the people as those countries conform to an international and internal structure strongly influenced by the role of multi-national corporations as well as by the international commodity and capital markets (Chilcote, 1984, 307) .
Although dfci^ -.ndency theories have most often been 
formulated nations as the base level of
analysis (Tomlinson, 1981, 19), the theories do have 
regional application. At the regional- level urban 
metropoles or cities are seen as centres of 
domination. These centres are usually viewed as 
offshoots of colonialism and are considered as 
operating in the service of international 
capitalism. The promotion of growth centres, viewed 
by the modernisation theorists as a means of 
stimulating the diffusion of growth, are viewed by 
the dependency theorists as an instrument used to 
drain the periphery of their resources rather than 
being concerned with developing the less developed 
areas. Thus growth centres are an instrument for 
"... the mindless pursuit of economic growth 
regardless of the social cost" (Richardson 1978 
cited in Fair, 1982, 22).
The most important criticism of dependency theory 
relates to the way in which its advocates have 
concentrated mainly on criticising modernisation 
theory, and explaining why modernisation theory is 
responsible for the lack of progress made by 
development attempts, without offering any real 
alternatives as to how changes could be implemented. 
As such, the dependency debate's only real 
contribution to tha generation of planning 
strategies lies in its ability to isolate the 
shortfalls of past top-down or modernisation 
strategies, and to draw attention to the continuing 
plight of those ’classes' who, because they are not 
politically or economically powerful enough to be 
involved in the planning of their own development, 
have been ignored by the bourgeoisie who have tended 
to be more concerned with furthering their own 
political and economic aims.
Browett (1980) summarises the dependency schools 
contribution as follows:
What we are left with, is a barren analytic 
approach which can explain what has happened in the past ... but which, as yet, offers few, if any, insights as to how changes can be implemented 
in the structures it has interpreted. In brief, 
it provides an understanding of the basic structural causes of the contradictions within capitalism but does little to generate proposals for their elimination (Cited in Fair, 1982, 34).
Because of the dependency theories' failure to 
provide any alternative to past top-down strategies, 
and whilst accepting that top-down strategies had in 
fact failed to live up to expectations, a number of 
reformist approaches within the modernisation school 
were introduced. These included basic needs, the 
redistribution with growth concepts and bottom-up 
theory, the purpose of this chapter is to contrast 
with top-down theory the theoretical underpinnings 
and practicability of the bottom-up approaches which 
gained increasing interest through their apparent 
emphasis on rural and regional development and 
community participation in development planning.
TOP-DOWN DEVELOPMENT STRATEGIES
INTRODUCTION
From the early 1950's, until very recently, the 
'top-down' development paradigm has dominated 
spatial planning theory in the development of the 
less developed countries (LDC's). The results of 
top-down strategies are summarised in the following 
chapters. The purpose of this section is to outline 
the theoretical traditions nderpinning the top-down 
school, and to provide a brief summary of the
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effects of top-down spatial policies so that they 
can, at a later stage, be compared with the bottom- 
up school.
The dominant foundation of the top-down theory is 
that "development (w. ether spontaneous or induced) 
in a relatively few dynamic sectors and geographic 
clusters will, it is to be hoped, spread over time 
to the rest of the spatial system" (HANSEN, 
1981,15). There are two dominant traditions - neo­
classical theory and the cumulative causation 
theories. The former's importance lies in the 
viewing of spatial inequality as an aspect of the 
development process, which will decline as 
development proceeds. It therefore serves as an 
arguement against the need for regional policy. The 
latter, however, see regional inequality as a 
response to spatial cumulative causation processes, 
and argue for regional policy.
THE NEO-CLASSICAL REGIONAL GROWTH THEORY
The neo-classical model explains trends in spatial 
inequality through reference to autonomous economic
In terms of neo-classical economic theory
interregional disparities and interactions are 
basically conditioned by regional differences in access to production factors and to markets core regions are characterised by scarcity of 
natural resources and of labour whilst peripheral areas usually have a scarcity of capital and technology.
Core regions should therefore have high returns for natural resources and labour, while peripheral areas should have high returns for capital and technology (Richardson, 1969. cited in Stohr and Todtling, 1978, 96).
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Again in terms of neo-classical economic assumptions 
relating to the mobility of factors of production, 
Richardson (1969) goes on to add that factors are 
expected to move from areas of low return to areas 
of high return.
Natural resources and labour should therefore flow from peripheral areas to core regions, while capital and technology would be expected to flow in the opposite direction from core regions to the periphery. These flows would increase factor supply in areas of scarcity and reduce it in areas of abundance, whereby factor prices would be expected to equalize over space. As a consequence, income should also equalize over space (Stohr and Todtling, 1978, 96).
Thus, capital and labour are assumed to move to 
areas of greatest return, which are assumed to be 
where they are most scarce {Tomlinson, 1981), In 
the same way, given the above assumptions, and 
because capital will be scarce in peripheral areas, 
and since labour will be attracted to core areas to 
realize higher wages, "the labour flow will be 
expected to restrain wage increases in the core and 
to bid up wages in the periphery as the shortage 
develops there" (Tomlinson, 1981, 14-15). This,
coupled with a capital flow to the periphery, should 
in turn promote its development.
The neo-classical model is criticised on two major 
aspects. First, the assumption that all production 
factors would tend towards spatial equilibrium of 
supply and demand was not always the case in 
practice.
Such a tendency is counteracted by different degrees of mobility and heterogeneity of factors, and by increased factor returns due to
the unequal spatial distribution of external and 
scale economies (Stohr & Todtlingf 1978, 96-97).
What the above means is that capital concentrates in 
the core due to its agglomeration economies 
available there.
Second, in terms of the movement of labour and 
capital, evidence suggests that the processes 
involved are far more complex.
Although labour in aggregate terms moves from (usually low wage) peripheral areas to (high wage) core regions, this movement should not be considered in aggregate terms, but should be disaggregated, since migration is highly 
selective. Migrants from peripheral to core areas usually come from the more mobile and more productive population strata (i.e. the potential high-wage earners) of peripheral areas (Stohr s 
TodfcUag, 1978, 97).
The effect of the above phenomenon is two-fold. The 
production potential of the peripheral area is 
lessened, and the average wage levels of the 
periphery also decline,
UNBALANCED GROWTH
Unbalanced growth has three notable advocates; 
namely Perroux (1955), Myrdal (1957) and Hirschmann 
(1958). Unbalanced growth is important because it 
contextualises later regional policies. Hirschmann 
(1958) and Myrdal (1957) pointed to problems with 
the seeming inevitability of trickle down or spread 
processes. Perroux (1955) provides the origins of 
the much applied growth centre theory.
Perroux (1955) initiated the unbalanced growth 
debate with the formulation of the 'growth pole' 
concept (pole de croissance). Perroux based his 
theory largely on the concept o6 external economies 
and industrial dependencies together vith 
Schumpeter's theory of innovations. The growth pole 
was described specifically in terms of an abstract 
economic space.
In contrast to the balanced growth approach, 
"Perroux maintained that analysis of sustained 
growth of total production should concentrate on the 
process by which various activities appear, grow in 
importance and in some cases disappear" (Hansen, 
1981,19). Perroux (1955) emphasised polarised or 
unequal growth. He suggested that growth did not 
appear everywhere at the same time? rather it 
manifests itself in points or 'poles' of growth, 
with variable intensities, and it spreads by 
different channels and with variable terminal 
effects for the economy as a whole.
The fundamental concepts that arise from the growth 
pole theory are that poles are firms or industries 
(or groups of industries) from which growth and 
change is initiated. The growth effects of the 
poles can be transmitted by forces between poles, 
with growth being directly related to the activity 
of the poles themselves and to the economic activity 
between them. One firm or industry becomes dominant 
over many when the percentage flow of goods from the 
'dependent' industry to the 'dominant' industry is 
greater than the percentage flow from the 'dominant' 
to the 'dependent' industry or firm. Thirdly, the 
bigger the industry, the greater is its sphere of 
influence/dominance over the other industries that
sell to it. Finally, a firm or industry is said to 
be propulsive when it has great size; has a high 
level of interaction with many other firms, and has 
a high degree of dominance.
Hirschmann (1958) had a similar focus when he 
advocated that. development strategies should 
concentrate on relatively few sectors. These 
sectors should be determined by measuring the 
backward and forward linkage effects in terms of 
input and output maxima. Growth was seen to be 
transferred from the leading sectors of the economy 
to the followers, from one firm to another. 
Hirschman identified both polarisation and trickle- 
down processes including the benefits of 
agglomeration and associated external economies, 
which included polarisation and trickle-down 
processes via inter-regional trade and capital 
investment to underdeveloped regions. He also 
asserted that it is better to enhance the growth of 
existing poles, and argued that spread would occur 
because Of the use of the less developed area as a 
resource base, and because of subsequent investments 
in these peripheral regions.
Myrdal's (.1957) work on cumulative causation was 
published at about the same time as Hirschmann' s 
(1958). Although developed apart from Hirschmann, 
Myrdal's theory contained a number of conceptual 
similarities that coincide with those of Hirschmann. 
He suggested that once a centre started growing, 
internal and external economies would further its 
growth 'cumulatively*, at the expense of other 
areas. Capital was seen to flow to the growth 
centres because of the agglomeration economies 
available there, and because that was where the
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market is. This resulted in increased incomes and 
demands resulting in further investment. The
peripheral areas are maintained at a disadvantage 
because savings flow to the core from the
hinterlands. 'Spread' effects were seen as positive 
and in opposition to the above backwash effects, as 
are factors such as increased outlets for the 
hinterland's products and raw materials. finally 
there are certain noa-economic factors chat favour 
the core areas.
These are caused by inadequacies of thehinterlands ... Their inability to support adequate health and education facilities, their generally conservative outlook - related to the acceptance of more primitive forms of tradition 
and religion - are all detrimental to the experimental and rational orientation of an economically progressive society (Hansen, 1981, 18) .
Friedmann (1972) further developed the diffusionist 
idea. He attempted to formulate a systematic and 
comprehensive centre-hinterland development model. 
Friedmann stated that development occurs as a result 
of innovation. This development originates in only
a small number of points. These 'points' are
located at the 'point' of highest potential 
interaction within a communication field. 
Innovations diffuse from the core areas to areas of 
lower potential interaction, while peripheral 
regions are dependent on the core regions and their 
development is largely determined by institutions in 
the core. Peripheral regions are dependent on core 
regions by virtue of market relations as well as 
administrative organisation.
GROWTH CENTRE THEORY
Growth centra policies for regional development have 
been the major means of implementing regional top- 
down strategies. A growth centre is seen as being 
large, relatively rapidly growing, highly 
interlinked and with linkages occurring locally. 
The original concept clearly stems from Perroux's 
growth pole theory. Whereas growth poles, as 
defined by Perroux, existed in a purely economic 
space or a theoretically open economy, growth 
centres are the geographical application of a growth 
pole. As mentioned earlier, growth centre theory is 
heavily influenced by the works of Hirschman (1958), 
Myrdal (1957)/ Friedmann (1972) and Richardson 
(1969).
There are three prominent principles that provide 
the backbone to growth centre policy. Firstly, the 
concentration ce, investment in centres will achieve 
economies of scale and thereby facilitate the 
centres' sustained economic growth. Secondly, 
economic activity diffuses down the urban hierarchy. 
Growth centres, by filling in the gaps in the urban 
hierarchy, speed up the diffusion of innovation, 
thus promoting growth. Thirdly, spatially there arc 
optimal locations for growth centres at which 
maximum growth can be achieved.
The above three points are therefore concerned with 
the existence of agglomeration economies, the 
diffusion of growth and the subsequent spread 
effects of development to the growth centre's 
hinterlands.
"Agglomeration economies are those economies available to firms, that bring about their
location in close proximity to one another and cause an agglomeration of people and economic activity” (Nourse, 1968 cited in Tomlinson, 
1981, 214).
Tomlinson (1981, 214-5) describes the factors that 
characterise the existence of agglomeration
economies as being of four types namely transfer 
economies, scale economies, localization economies 
and urbanisation economies.
1'ransfer economies result in ' savings in
transportation costs because of firme locating in 
close proximity to one another. Scale economies are 
mobile - the increased management expertise 
available to the firm, and immobile - those 
economies which are achieved only with adjacent
location. It is immobile scale economies which 
create spatial agglomeration.. Localization
economies (external to the firm but internal to the 
industry) include the availability of a large 
skilled labour pool, the development of markets for 
raw materials with resultant savings in coats, and 
the facilitation of research. Finally, urbanisation 
economies are characterised by a large and flexible 
labour force, high level of public services, 
commercial and financial services.
Important to note, however, is that although the 
above factors contribute to the existence of
agglomeration economies, what the theory does not 
explain is, how growth is initiated at any
particular location and the optimum size of new 
growth centres that will result in agglomerations. 
It does not give any indication of size and the 
relationship between size and growth rate.
Because of this 'incomplete' theory, present 
thinking in relation to policy making is that one 
should minimise the number of unknowns until a 
better understanding of growth initiation has been 
gained. Therefore investment should be concentrated 
on existing agglomeration economies and proposed 
growth centres should already have a number of 
existing external economies - to implement 'new 
town' type strategies involves inefficient use of 
resources and involves planning with too many 
unknowns (Richardson, 1978. Rondinelli, 1983).
With regards to the role of diffusion of innovation, 
this "as seen to be a function of social 
communication, and a process of learning, accepting 
and decision making. The city was seen to serve an 
important role through its high level of 
communication, education and training. Innovations 
were seen as jumping between larger centres and from 
centres at higher levels to centres at lower levels. 
In terms of the barriers to channels of 
communication, the most important constraining 
factor is the distance between nodes.
Growth centres contribute to the process of diffusion because of three supposed effects of such centres. These are that they remove threshold limitations ... that they reduce the 
time it takes for Innovations to diffuse; and that they increase accessibility which affects especially household exposure to, and adoption of, new innovations (Tomlinson, 1981, 125).
In attempting to diffuse growth to the rural areas, 
the emphasis is placed on the use of the urban 
hierarchy as a carrier of growth, to bridge the gap 
between the greater cities and smaller villages.
The role of the growth centres is therefore, to take 
agglomeration economies to the periphery and is so 
doing to link the periphery into the diffusion 
network.
Myvdal (1957) and Hirschmann (1958) indicate that 
the spatial interaction between growing and 
stagnating regions limits growth. A growing centre 
will attract labour, capital and commodities, but 
these inflows have backwash effects resulting in the 
loss of skilled workers and locally generated 
capital in other regions, i^.thermore, it was also 
felt that economic growth was usually propagated 
along the major transport routes linking the most 
important centres together (similar to Friedmann's 
(1966) 'networks').
THE EFFECT OF TOP-DOWN SPATIAL POLICIES
Borrowing from Stohr and Todtling (1978) it is 
evident that the growth orientated policies have had 
some unexpected side effects. Thea. effects can be 
grouped under quantitative and/or qualitative 
aspects.
When considering the quantitative aspects (job 
creation, reduction of unemployment, income 
disparities, net out-migration) the following 
results are evident. Firstly, spatial development 
policies have for the most part been only partially 
successful in changing spatial inequalities in 
material living levels. (Stohr and Todtling, 1978, 
90). The evidence suggests that where there was 
success at the inter-regional level, this was 
usually accompanied by an increase in disparities at 
the intra-regional level. Secondly, in terms of the
use of concentrated investment in specific growth 
centres, the spread effects down the urban hierarchy 
have been very small with the backwash of benefits 
to the core regions having been much larger than was 
anticipated. The increased income in lower order 
centres or rural areas created strong income 
multiplier effects in higher order ‘.owns, but not 
the other way round. Thus there was a lack of 
spread effects to the lower urban hierarchy. 
Thirdly, the effects of improved inter-regional 
accessibility were more beneficial to the existing 
core areas, with benefits to the periphery being 
only marginal. Fourthly, the impact of financial 
investment incentives has offered more attraction to 
capital intensive branch plant industry, which 
offered only limited benefit to local employment 
creation.
As regards the qualitative aspects of development 
(relating to the question of which sectors are 
promoted in the peripheral areas, the levels of 
technology that are used, the control/ownership 
relations of plans and the organisational 
characteristics of plants) Stohr & Todtling (1978) 
suggest that the following results are evident. 
Firstly, regarding technology levels, mainly capital 
intensive industries are boosted. There has been 
little contribution to employment because of the 
capital intensive nature of production; there 
appears to be no active policy promoting sectors 
with high intra-regional multiplier effects. 
Secondly, regarding control and ownership of 
industries, mainly 'branch plants' are evident - the 
reason being that they find it easier to bridge 
large distances. Job creation from these branch 
plants is of relatively low skill level. Further,
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the evidence collected suggests that branch plants 
are the first places where employment is reduced 
during macro-economic fluctuations. It is unlikely, 
however, that this argument would be as valid in 
terms of the South African regional planning 
strategy, because the incentives offered are so 
profitable, that industry can still make profits 
even whilst producing no goods (Wellings and Slack, 
1986, 15).
The policies discussed have to a greater or lesser 
extent been partially successful in their 
quantitative aspects such as the number of jobs 
created, the amount of investment, the level of 
regional unemployment and net out-migration.
In terras of the qualitative aspects, relating to the 
causes of poverty and the structural aspects of 
spatial disparities, there has been only marginal 
impact. This factor has in Itself resulted in the 
shifting of disparities from one level to another, 
rather than the elimination of the problems, there 
has been a shifting of the problem from the inter­
regional level, to the intra-regional level.
A general criticism offered against this type of 
modernisation economic approach is that far too much 
emphasis has been placed on economic, quantitative 
considerations. This economic consideration has 
dominated to such an extent that actual development 
issues of the more qualitative nature have been 
ignored. Thus a new emphasis has been created.
The challenges to regional development planning in the LDC’s thus lie primarily in the ability simultaneously to expand the economy and 
equitably distribute its resources in an effort
to hasten the spatial transition process (El Shakhs, 1980, 139).
The above quote shows a new orientation to 
development planning - the assumption that spread 
effects are a function of growth would seem to have 
only limited validity. Clearly economic growth is 
not enough to promote 'development' per se. If 
development is seen as an increase in output and a 
better distribution of that output co the region as 
a whole, redistributional policies are going to be 
needed, and the issue of poverty must be tackled 
head on. Seers (1977 cited in Taylor, 1979, 9), 
advocates that the new paradigm should have as its 
primary focus objective, social development with 
focus on specific human needs and not only economic 
growth. Thus planning policies should fit
ecological constraints, priorities should be given 
to rural development and to the prevention of 
poverty in the areas where it is most widely 
experienced.
The peripheral economy should attempt to move away 
from its dependence on the core region's markets, 
the core region's institutions, core based decision­
making. Rather, there should be a concentrated 
effort to mobilize the periphery's potential (mostly 
in the provision of labour) in a manner that can 
best benefit the periphery. A prerequisite for such 
a change in attitude away from supporting the core, 
would seem to be the devolution of decision-making 
power to the peripheral areas.
In summary then, the shortcomings of the 'top-down' 
approach necessitate a new approach with a framework 
that tackles the structures (institutional.
cultural) in the peripheral areas; which concentrate 
on the peripheral needs and problems and which 
motivate a dynamic regional economy.
2-3 BOTTOM-OP STRATEGIES
INTRODUCTION
The bottom-up school aimed to counter the negative 
effects of top-down jlann.ing, a major area of 
concern being the apparent failure of 'trickle down1 
from the urban to rural areas. The solution to this 
problem was not seen to be as simple as 
redistributing national income. The bottom-up 
school concentrates rather on the promotion of self 
sufficiency, the promotion of more rural job
opportunities, the more effective utilization of a 
LDC's natural and human resources, the provision of 
a minimal level of health facilities and education 
for all. Thus ...
Instead of optimising selected factor components, (top-down) thus creaming off the
human and natural resources of favoured segments, the basic objective is the full development of a region's natural resources and human skills, initially for 'basic needs' of all strata and then for other development objectives (Stohr, 1981, 43).
The dominant theoretical underpinnings of the 
bottom-up school clearly take cognisance of the 
dependency paradigm and its criticisms of thf 
capitalist approach to development. The perceived 
success of the Chinese approach to development has 
also boosted support for a change away from a 
modernisation approach. A proje's success should 
be Measured not in terms of its profitability, but
in terms of its contribution to the local people's
quality of life, especially the impact on the rural 
poor. Critical to a project's success is the 
fullest use of local labour and low levels of 
capital intensive technology (Ayazi et al, 1978).
The development (in the widest sense) of the rural 
poor is viewed as a central issue within the botfcom- 
up approach. As such, institutional arrangements 
should support the rural masses.
It is rightly argued that centre down organisation never allowed planning to reach the grass roocs level. Ir.rcead it strengthenedsemi-feudal class relations, placed thecommanding heights of the economy in fewer hands, further strengthened. structural ridgidities ~ spatial, sectoral and others - and 
kept millions of people out of the modern production system - and made the rich richer, the poor poorer (Misra & Nafcraj 1981, 276).
Cognisance needs to be taken of the social and 
political processes affecting the population's 
lives, and institutional arrangements need to 
reflect this concern (Ayazi et al, 1978). Bottom- 
up policies promote the transformation of existing, 
or the creation of new, institutions to promote 
development in line with self-determined objectives 
as opposed to foreign or far removed institutions 
imposing their values. For this reason, recommended 
planning areas are of a very small scale (Weaver, 
1981) - the emphasis is on -small interactive
villages, co-operatives and communes. At this level 
it is felt that independent peasant . based 
organisations can be formed which promote co- 
o&arative/collective participation in the management 
of development work (Almeyra, 1978).
The above is a very notable move away from past top- 
down strategies which involved outside institutions 
imposing development priorities and policies on the 
local communities. For these economies, agriculture 
is seen as the propulsive Industry, and the primary
aim of development is to provide employment for all. 
Only once the whole labour force is active, are more 
labour saving modes of production considered. As 
these units accumulate members, so their decision­
making powers increase. Finally, as more jobs 
become available in the rural areas than in the 
urban areas, the dominance of the urban centre will 
lessen. The rural areas will also benefit more as 
the profits derived from surplus production are re­
invested locally (in health, education, physical and 
service infrastructure). This is not to imply, 
however, that the bottom-up approach is limited to 
rural development. The use of bottom-up strategies 
within a third world context, where the majority of 
population is rural, would however, result in the 
greatest emphasis falling on ru;a.' development.
REQUIREMENTS FOR IMPLEMENTING A BOTTOM-UP STRATEGY
The decentralization of decision making is a major 
focus of the bottom-up approach to regional planning 
and effective local level representation is a pre­
requisite for efficient implementation of projects 
(Stohr, 1981). There is within the bottom-up school 
a definite trend away from today's centralized 
(functional and vertical) levels, towards a more 
(horizontally) territorially based level of 
decision-making structures.
The 'road' to development is not seen as necessarily 
following in the footsteps of the more advanced 
regions. It is suggested by the bottom-up school 
that if the periphery follows the core's decision­
making, and acts in support of the core's decisions, 
the periphery can become trapped in supporting the 
core in an unequal relationship. This dependency
relationship is seen not only in regional terms, 
that is between the urban areas and their 
hinterlands, but also on a national and 
international level. Hebbert {1984, 136 ) writes:
In practice the theoretical underpinnings of neo-regionalism seem to derive from a version' of dependency theory, and particularly from its 
conception of the world trading system as an exploitative hierarchy in which the core­periphery relations operating on a global scale are mirrored in the internal organisation of dependent countries.
Once trapped within such a ‘dependent’ position, it 
becomes very difficult for the periphery to break 
the relationship. The reason for this is that 
having followed the core's decisions, peripheral 
development increasingly becomes integrated with 
that of the core. To break off such a relationship 
without having the capacity to continue with the 
current activity and without having the necessary 
maans to achieve self-sufficiency, would be 
detrimental to the economy of the dependent country.
The periphery is at a distinct disadvantage because 
it provides only the basic resources to the core, 
such as unskilled labour and raw materials. The 
core in turn, uses its capital, knowledge and 
technology to process and to market the final goods. 
The problem that arises from these trade relations, 
is that the core has invariably paid unfairly low 
prices for the peripheral resources (Rondinelli, 
1986), and very little of the profits derived from 
the periphery's resources are reinvested back into 
the periphery. Rather, the trend is for profits to 
be re-invested in the core, thus strengthening its 
position relative to the periphery. Politically and
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relationship is seen not only in regional terms, 
that is between the urban areas and their 
hinterlands, but also on a national and 
international level. Hebbert (1984, 136 ) writes:
In practice the theoretical underpinnings of 
neo-regionalism seem to derive from a version' of dependency theory, and particularly from its conception of the world trading system as an exploitative hierarchy in which the core­periphery relations operating on a global scale are mirrored in the internal organisation of dependent countries.
Once trapped within such a 'dependent' position, it 
becomes very difficult for the periphery to break 
the relationship. The reason for this is that 
having followed the core's decisions, peripheral 
development increasingly becomes integrated with 
that of the core. To break off such a relationship 
without having the capacity to continue with the 
current activity and without having the necessary 
means to achieve self-sufficiency, would be 
detrimental to the economy of the dependent country.
The periphery is at a distinct disadvantage because 
it provides only the basic resources to the core, 
such as unskilled labour and raw materials. The 
core in turn, uses its capital, knowledge and 
technology to process and to market the final goods. 
The problem that arises from these trade relations, 
is that the core has invariably paid unfairly low 
prices for the peripheral resources (Rondinelli, 
13(56), and very little of the profits derived from 
the periphery's resources are reinvested back into 
the periphery. Rather, the trend is for profits to 
be re-invested in the core, thus strengthening its 
position relative to the periphery. Politically and
socially, Cor the periphery to jeopardise any job 
creation in circumstances where people live in 
extreme poverty is unfavourable and unrealistic; 
however, the bottom-up school does advocate that one 
should attempt to avoid the situation in the first 
place. By attempting to mobilize a region's natural 
and human resources internally, one can minimize 
dependence.
This is not to say that development from below 
advocates a policy of regional autarchy - rather, 
the policies should aim at channeling today's widely 
uncontrolled economic, social and political backwash 
effects to facilitate greater spatial equity of 
living conditions (Sfcohr, 1981). Clearly,
traditional market forces have not, at least in the 
short run, managed to create the equilibriating and 
optimizing mechanisms attributed to them by neo­
classical economics.
Thus to summarize the question of decision-making 
powers, the 'bottom-up' school of thought takes the 
stance that the eventual reversal of polarization 
trends is contingent on achieving an equitable 
social and spatial distribution of political power.
To this end, the modernization policies adopted in 
the core regions, ought not to be simply 
transplanted into the rural areas (Hendry, 1978). 
As opposed to the use of core-based high-technology, 
and capital intensive policies, the existing 
regional situation should be considered, and the 
existing needs and potentials of the region should 
be evaluated (Hendry, 1978). Decisions on the use 
of the periphery's resources should be taken by the 
local population in these areas (Almeyra, 1983). To
make such regionally sensitive decisions would 
require decision-making powers bo lie in the 
relevant region itself. In this way., one could 
avoid the situation where the core's goals dominate 
the rural area's development policies.
Closely linked to the decentralization of decision­
making is the necessity of a convincing policy by 
central government to promote rural development. To 
this end, it is essential that the relevant 
government give legal recognition to the 
establishment of communes/co-operatives/integrated 
villages, thus making the establishment of such 
units easier (Ayazi et al, 1976). IS these grass 
roots level units are to be successful, vital too is 
that local government organisations and commune 
services are established within a region. A good 
example of such action is the Chinese approach to 
regional planning (Gray, 1984). The central focus 
of the Chinese plan is firstly the provision of 
basic needs; secondly, to ensure that the 
population has productive work; thirdly the 
provision of essential commodities and medical, 
health and education facilities. Planning occurs 
within a well defined national framework for local 
control of decisions regarding use of resources, 
planning for production, infrastructural 
improvements, work distribution and employment of 
surpluses (Wu and Ip, 1981). In this way, those 
involved in production are directly responsible for 
the quality of their work. In addition to this 
devolution of power, national policies constantly 
support the rural sector by numerous methods 
including the reduction of agricultural taxes, price 
support mechanisms, bonuses for extra production and 
so on (Wu and Ip, 1981). In terms of urban versus
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rural development and the role of industry, the 
Government promotes the development of small scale 
industries that are supportive cE agriculture. 
Industry "may be engaged in the production of 
inputs, such as introgeneous fertilizers for 
improvement of agriculture, in the repair of 
agricultural machinery or in processing of 
agricultural products (Mu & Ip, 1981, 176).
Another major issue requiring government 
intervention, relates to the question of land tenure 
and the effective utilization of a country's natural 
resources. Past top-down strategies are blamed for 
having resulted in land being unevenly held and not 
intensively used (Hendry, 1978). At independence 
for instance, Mozambique had modernised farming 
covering an area of 2.5 million hectares. However, 
it was found that 1.5 million hectares of this land 
was only utilized to about 20 per cent of its full 
capacity (Almeyra, 1978, 37). To implement a
bottom-up strategy, it is vital that the full 
potential of the land is realized. For this to 
occur the land must be put into production and under 
the bottom-up approach this production would be 
labour intensive employing the rural masses. Thus 
the land would need be redistributed. The methods 
of redistributing the land has varied from country 
to country. Kenya, Zimbabwe and India have had a 
policy of buying back formal sector owned land and 
then dividing up the land for peasant farming. In 
some socialist countries like Yugoslavia private 
land, owned by absentee landlords, was confiscated 
and then developed into co-operatives.
El Shakhs (1980) indicates that there is a change in 
attitude required by government as regards national
planning and the integration or core and peripheral 
economies. Under the top-down approach, the issue 
of integrating the core and peripheral areas into 
the same economy was seen as a way of encouraging 
economic growth/development of the peripheral 
economy. The ’distance function1 (between the core 
and the periphery? was seen as a negative concept - 
distance was seen as an obstacle to economic 
integration and in turn to the ultimate goal o£ 
spatial equilibrium. The 'bottom-up' proponents 
argue, however, that the 'distance function' should 
be seen as a positive concept - it stimulates a 
spatially disaggregated interaction and decision­
making system.
On this issue El Shakhs (1980, 146) writes;
Increased spatial interaction, urban industrial development, and integration among such units (regions or countries) tend to accentuate their initial disparities an# reinforce development dependencies favouring those relatively advantaged units. This process has frequently been intensified by external or internal colonization policies, increased flows of labour and capital, economies of scale and of 
agglomeration, and a 'cumulative causation1 process of concentration. Spatial systems thus enter a process of dependent development and integration focused on their emerging core regions.
IMPLEMENTING BOTTOM-UP POLICIES
The theory of 'bottom-up' strategies and related 
policies is often very muddled and remains largely 
untested in practice (Hebbeet, 1984). To determine 
the nature of implementation policies one can dr<lw 
on the available information relating to Kibbutzim,
socialist co-operatives or integrated villages. The 
dominant theme throughout is the use of policies to 
slow down urbanisation and to reduce urban-rural 
wage differentials through upgrading the peripheral 
areas and a devolution of decision-making powers. 
(The important policy emphases are underlined for 
clarity.)
The nature of bottom up policies varies - they can 
operate from the supply side and the demand side.
The supply side policies are mainly involved with 
the control of regional resources (Stohr and 
Todtling, 1978). The bottom-up school places great 
emphasis on the full utilization of local resources 
and local technology before the use of imported 
skills and technology (Ayazi et al, 1978). 
Integrated resource mobilization of rural resources 
is more important than economic profitability. The 
reason for this stance is that during a downturn in 
the economy, the peripheral economy is invariably 
more seriously affected, The fact that employment 
was previously contingent on core needs/demands 
results in unemployment in the periphery. For this 
reason 'bottom-up' theory advocates mobilizing 
regional resources for regional demand, so that a 
collapse in external demand will not have such harsh 
effects on the local economy. In the same way, 
technology levels need not necessarily compete with 
those levels in the core areas. This competition 
results in the peripheral areas having to use 
capital intensive technology thus limiting the 
capacity to provide regional employment 
opportunities through labour intensive employment. 
Furthermore, projects must attempt to promote self 
sufficiency amongst communities. To this end each
planning unit (communis/ co-operative or integrated 
village) must concentrate on producing necessities 
using local technology and the fullest employment of 
local labour as is possible (Stohr, 1981).
In terms of natural resource use/ policies could 
range from regional ownership of natural resources 
to communal control of the processing methods, waste 
disposal and the distribution of profits (Almeyra, 
1983). The objective is to ensure that the 
decisions affecting the economy and quality of life 
in the periphery, are taken by people resident in 
the periphery. In this way, the situation where the 
core dominates the periphery and where core needs 
determine the nature of the economy, can be avoided. 
The policy implemented in China has been to allow 
local control of surpluses generated in agriculture 
and small scale industry in the rural areas.
Local control of production, ... and the development of small scale industries in China are all structured to provide the generation of rural surpluses as well as their rentention in the same local unit for the use and benefit of the local population (Wu & Ip, 1981, 176),
These policies, by stimulating regional control of 
the natural resources, will prevent the core area 
exploiting the peripheral natural resources to their 
own benefit, and which invariably results in too 
much concentration on certain sectors .usually raw 
material provision) and a general lack of diversity 
in the regional economy. Thus, when those specific 
raw materials are no longer needed, or the natural 
resource has been depleted, the regional economy has 
very little to sustain it, and the economy 
collapses. This, in turn, result?, in numerous other 
development problems, the most obvious of which are
unemployment and out-migration. Thus, in terms of 
natural resource use, the core area's demand for 
natural resources tends to have short-term benefits, 
and at best, limited development value. It is 
important within the 'bottom-up' school to develop 
rather l ,ar more diversified economy based on the 
production of as many of the region's resources as 
possible (Otohr, 1981). In this way, demand for the 
product sb--*d be long-term thus guaranteeing the 
supplier a rket. In the same way, by developing 
as wide a range of resources as possible, a general 
collapse of an economy can be avoided, which can be 
the result when only a few primary sectors, based on 
core needs are developed.
With respect to employment, the emphr :is is on the 
promotion of rural development {Chopra, 1982b). 
From the literature it is evident that rural 
development is seen as the main policy involved in 
the generation of more employment opportunities. 
The literature {F.ondinelli, 1986? Bell, 1986)
mentions a number of case studies illustrating how 
past rural development initiatives have failed to 
interest the targeted communities or to produce 
positive results. The main criticisms of past
schemes ave varied, but there is consensus that
major problems centred around a lack of local 
involvement in decision making (Rondinelli, 1986); a 
lack of understanding of new initiatives implemented 
by top-down policy makers? the introduction of 
foreign and complex technology? a lack of 
understanding by decision-makers of the relevant 
communities' needs, aspirations and culture (Frazer, 
1981); a lack of participation and interest by the 
target communities in the implementation of
projects; a lack of flexibility in planning
approaches (Ayazi et al, 1978)? an apparent lack of 
conviction by the relevant governments of the 
opportunities and benefits to be gained from rural 
development, (Rondinelli, 1986) reflected by 
insufficient funding and central government 
legislation? and finally a dominant emphasis on 
industrialization and urban development in place of 
rural development (Stohr, 1981).
Countries (India, China, Algeria, Yugoslavia) have 
responded to the above mentioned criticisms in a 
number of w&ys. To the problem of a lack of 
involvement by the local communities in decision­
making, policies encouraging tti3 decentralization of 
decision-making powers are most common:
policies and programmes affecting agrarian and rural system should be formulated and implemented with the full understanding and participation of all rural people, including 
ycuth, and their own organisations at all levels, and that development efforts should be responsible to the varying needs of different groups of the rural poor (Aremo, 1983, 15).
Implementation has shown varying degrees of power 
devolution down to the commune/integrated 
vilLs-r-eyeo-eperative level. In China, deciiiion- 
makii'.tg powers are decentralized down to the commune 
level where an elected body - the Revolutionary 
Committee - has the role of implementing and co- 
ordi-azicing state policy and the representation of 
the Iseal community's viewpoints (Mu and Ip, 1981). 
Responsibilities are wide ranging, from population 
registration, to the control of migration, to 
ensuring that local conditions from below are also 
reflected in policy decisions. To ensure that there 
is a good understanding of the type and nature of 
problems experienced in the rural areas, cadres from
the urban areas have to spend time at the grass 
roots level by doing manual labour and living in the 
rural areas for a specified time,
In Algeria the -situation is similar with the central 
government channelling finances to the communes. 
Finances allocated to the communes ara managed by 
the commune authorities on the basis of local 
decisions {Sutton, 2981, 363-4). In Yugoslavia
state owned farms are considered 1 social property' 
or ‘agrokombinats1. These are,
administered directly by the workers, who make decisions independently (though in accord with the general plans of the Republics and the federal Government) concerning the life on the enterprise ... The workers form homogeneous groups ... these organisations decide about work relations and the results obtained, that is to say, about the utilization and distribution of income after deduction of management expenses and investments (Almeyra, 1983 27-29).
Indications from the literature are that this policy 
has been very successful. Food production has 
increased significantly, and the standard of living 
equally so. Furthermore, because of the wide 
ranging successes the Government has been able to 
concentrate more on historically less developed 
regions.
The attack on problems relating to the 
implementation of new technologies and more modern 
farming practices, is two pronged. Firstly, the 
decentralization of decision making power has 
brought planning back to the grass roots level, 
resulting in local communities deciding to use 
methods they are familiar with, or can most easily 
adapt to (Weaver, 1981) . Secondly, there is a
general consensus that labour saving techniques and 
modern methods are not advisable. Rather, attention 
in project design must be given to,
directing greater attention towards the creation 
of gainful employment as a basic aim of rural development, even when this may lead to a reduction in productivity gains or involve the promotion of apparently unsophisticated technology (Ayazi et al 1978, 47).
That the relevant Government is firm in its 
conviction about the promotion of rural development 
(as opposed to urban/industrial development) is 
reflected in the opportioning of funds and the 
provision of services to the rural areas 
(Rondinelli, 1986).
India's views on the rural versus the industrial 
sector can bs traced back to Gandhi, who expressed 
the desire that local communities take the full 
responsibility for development using local and 
regional resources to the fullest extent. Vital 
too, was that each individual had the chance1 to 
develop to his or her personal best. To this end 
Gandhi felt that industrial growth was a negative 
aspect.
I do not want to accept something when I see that its effects outweigh whatever good it brings with it. I want the dumb millions in our land to be healthy and happy ... there are too many idle hands (Gandhi, 1952 cited in Misra and Natraj 1981, 277).
From the literature it would appear that Gandhi's 
views are extremist. The bottom-up school does not 
totally exclude industrial growth, and nor does 
development planning in India reflect such strong
condemnation of urban/industrial growth. However, 
clear from India's sixth plan (1980-85) is the 
dedication of Government policy towards promoting 
rural development. Misra and Natraj (1981/ 275)
indicate that planning in India is adopting a more 
bottom-up approach than in the past.
The accent is shifting from sectoral growth to a judicious blanding of growth and distribution; from centralized planning to multi-level, if not decentralized; from expenditure-oriented to physical-achievement-orientated; from abureaucratic *.nd mechanistic approach to popular participation? and from economic development to human development.
Vital too, was 
infrastructure.
provision
The new programme also took care of other infrastructural needs like extension services, technical guidance, supply of inputs, marketing and development of local skills (Padmanabhan,1983, 19).
Similar concern for the provision of service 
infrastructure was shown in Algerian planning 
(Sutton, 1981, 365) and in China. In China,
distributing facilities were organised into a 
nationwide network - the All China Supply and 
Marketing Co-operatives. Through this co-operative, 
contracts were made with work teams (the basic unit 
for agricultural production in China) to supply the 
co-operative. The co-operative in turn supplied the 
day to day goods to the local people. "These co­
operatives thus served as a central exchange for 
goods between urban and rural areas by bringing 
goods to the villages and supplying produce to the 
cities" (Mu and Ip, 1981, 171).
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The Chinese government also ensures the provision of 
credit facilties and short and long term loans at 
low or interest free rates.
In terms of education and training, the orientation 
is towards levels commensurate with local neeis and 
aspirations. The type of training need not be 
identical to that offered in the core areas {Higgs 
and Moore, I960). Bearing in mind the aim o£ the 
'bottom-up' school of diversifying the regional 
economy, and of mobilizing the widest possible range 
of natural and human resources, educgtion must be 
directed .towards the ceqional needs (Galli, 1981). 
It is very unlikely that these will be similar to 
those of the core, because the core has attained a 
far more mechanised, technology-orientated level of 
development. An ' obvious example of such an 
application would be to train people to become 
agricultural experts as opposed to computer 
programmers.
The most commonly discussed demand side policies 
(those policies involving the guidance of regional 
preference patterns) relate to the degree of intra- 
regional interactions, communication and transport 
integration (Stohr and Todtling, 1978, 9). The need 
Cor the above mentioned type of policy is emphasized 
in an attempt to promote the diversification of 
regional economies.
Stohr and Todtling (1978) advocate the use of 
selective spatial closure to inhibit transfers (to 
and from a region) which reduce their potential for 
self reliant development. In this way the overall 
efficiency of all production factors of a less 
developed region could be increased in an integrated
fashion. By internalizing the production and 
marketing of commodities, it £s thought that the 
local economy could be boosted. Subsequent 
development impulses such as the establishment of 
agro-based industry, the demand for services and 
infrastructure, would be expected to flow upward 
from the local, to the regional, to the national 
level (atohr and Todtling, 1978).
Integral to rural development is the economic 
protection of regional and local industries (usually 
agro-based) by way of credi. and marketing 
subsidies; "late land reform supplemented by
price supp-' restructuring of land taxes in
favour of jasant farmer, and agricultural
subsidies; the creation of independent peasant 
based organisations promoting collective 
participation and increased institutional access to 
income generating assets; the provision of minimum 
public services; the devolution of state
bureaucratic functions to increase participator/ 
democracy and local level decision-making regarding 
local and regional matters (Lo and Salih, 1981, 
143). The result of the abovementioned points would 
be the assumed increase in overall efficiency of all 
production factors. (Notably absent from the 
literature, is any explanation as regards who, or 
what institution, will finance the suggested 
subsidies.) Further, development impulses would b® 
initiated internally and urban or service centres 
would not dominate the periphery to the extent they 
have in the past. Rather, centres would correspond 
to the region's needs, their major function being as 
marketing centres, for the collection and sale of 
surplus production. In addition, these centres 
would provide various provisions for the local
inhabitants including fertilizers/ farming 
equipment, clothing and processed foodstuffs such as 
salt, sugar -and cooking oil.
As previously mentioned, development impulses would 
be expected to flow upward from the local, to the 
regional and then to the national level. Thus urban 
centres would develop as a function of their 
respective hinterlands demands and not the reverse. 
The implications of the above policies are seen to 
be the reduced dependence on imported necessities, 
on equipment and expertise, and the increased 
national ownership and control of subsoil assets and 
improvement of the national capacity for negotiating 
with transnational corporations.
THEORETICAL POTENTIAL OF BOTTOM-CJP STRATEGIES
At a theoretical level, the most outstanding benefit 
of a bottom-up strategy is the manner in which it 
directly tackles rural development, an aspect only 
indirectly tackled in the past by top-down 
theorists. In past top-down strategies rural areas 
have experienced very little benefit and in some 
instances have even shown a tendency towards 
increased poverty (Stohr and Todtling, 1978).
The policy of the promotion of agriculture has the 
advantage of being labour intensive, (although it is 
also labour displacing) thus giving employment 
opportunities to the rural masses whilst at the same 
time being more cost effective in terms of job 
creation then urban development. Increased emphasis 
is placed on the provision of basic needs facilities 
(El Shakhs, 1980), in the rura areas including 
health, physical infrastructure end education which
have definite benefits for the rural poor in terms 
of social implications/ access to markets and human 
development. The emphasis on human development has 
the advantage that it is a long term investment/ 
enabling the population to be employed in more 
varied capacities/, and equipping them to help 
themselves. At a practical level/ however, Hebbert 
(1984) argues that the emphasis on rural development 
has not materialized;
decentralized models of government ... have not 
been particularly distinguished in their rural bias or redistributive achievements. (Hebbert,1984, 142)
The theoretical underpinning of the bottom-up 
school's prediction that decentralization of 
decision-making would promote greater emphasis on 
rural development, lies in the assumption that local 
control of local resources would lead to the 
promotion of rural development. Implicit too is the 
assumption that decentralized government would be 
far more sympathetic to public participation in 
decision making. Hebbert rejects this arguement;
Too often it transpires that decentralized institutions are just as likely to entrench the power of counterelites as to open up new avenues of participation (Hebbert, 1984, 141).
Hebbert goes on to suggest that, in terms of the 
local control of local resources arguement, regional 
governments are often too close to the wealthy 
minorities on whose political support, social esteem 
or commercial collaboration they depend. Referring 
to the Yugoslavs case, Hebbert illustrates that 
regions compete within any poltical system, The 
evidence he provides (1984, 143) shows that regional
differences amongst the Yugoslavian Republics has 
Increased since decentralizing administrations. The 
cause for this increased regional inequality is that 
regions differ in their ability to make use of 
autonomy. Hebbert (1984, 143-144) explains that
fiscal decentralization is more advantageous to 
prosperous regions which are able to generate 
internal resources. Further, decentralization 
limits the amount of resources available for central 
redistribution to the less favourable regions. In 
terms of the administrative capability of the 
various regions, experts and administrators are a 
scarce resource, and particularly so in the third 
world countries. Finally, Hebbert explains that 
decentralization or any move toward federalism opens 
up a field of political competition between 
regions - political competition that invariably 
benefits the historically strong regions.
In economic planning terms the emphasis is primarily 
on increased food production for local demand, thus 
enabling a country to become more self-sufficient 
and avoid wasting income derived ffrcm exports on 
importing basic food stuffs. Industry is seen as 
evolving in response to agricultural demand, and 
will concentrate on processing local production and 
manufacturing goods required for rural production 
(fertilizers, clothing, housing materials and 
farming equipment) and consumption goods (salt, 
sugar, cooking oil, soap and matches).
Industry will not be promoted if it is a drain on 
the economy or if it relies on the use of skills not 
readily available. By using appropriate technology, 
local labour can be used, and the import of mire 
expensive highly trained personnel can be avoided.
The bottom-up school's prio1 •vies for economic 
development as mentioned above, have however been 
criticized in respect of the promotion of 'selective 
spatial closure1, a term coined by Stohr (1981). 
Weaver (1981) has emphasized that "the exploitative 
nature of the core periphery relations must be ended 
by a conscious choice to use regional resources for 
regional purposes" (1981, "95). It is in terms of 
this arguement that Stohr (1981) recommends 
regionally initiated controls "to inhibit transfers 
to and from regions which reduce their potentital 
for self reliant development" (1981, 45).
Hebbert (1984) argues, however, that this type of 
strategy "is one generally thought too challenging 
even for nation-states" (1984, 136), and that the 
"frontiers of even the smallest, most open economy 
define a significant system of economic
interdependence" (1984, 138).
In terms of institutional changes, the emphasis is
on local level participation in decision-making to
avoid the situation which existed in past '.op-down 
strategies where urban interests were promoted at 
the expense of the rural poor (Rondinelli, 1986). 
In line with this decentralization of power, is a 
more sympathetic allocation of central government 
funds to the rural areas, thus providing a much 
needed capital input for rural development. To 
assist rural development, use is made of price 
controls (to prevent unfair terms of trade), and 
access to low interest loans, and credit facilities 
is improved. Furthermore, rural contributions to
the GDP will be locally invested to provide more 
facilities in the rural areas.
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Without, wishing to 'labour’ previously made points, 
it is important to consider the above theoretical 
benefits of those institutional changes in terms of 
the previously made criticism, namely that in 
practice regionally decentralized government has not 
shown a particularly noteworthy emphasis on rural 
development. Secondly, the bottom-up theorists do 
not considsr adequately the prospects of the 
relatively disadvantaged regions.
It is also worthwhile to consider the motiviation of 
the bottom-up school's advocation of decentralized 
government, because it explains to an extent why 
bottom-up theorists have so marked a pre-occupation 
with regional control of decision-making. In part 
the motiviation centres around the argument that 
core regions have been exploiting peripheral 
regions, and that the peripheral regions are 
institutionally incaoable of halting this unfair 
relationship. Thus there is a strong emphasis on 
regions turning in on themselves and reverting to a 
more self-sufficient path of economic development.
There is, however, a second major debate which 
provides motivation for decentralized government, 
and that is the contention that the nation state is 
in long term decline as a political institution, and 
that regional government is in ascendency (Hebbert,
1984, 137). Friedmann and Weaver (1979) referred to 
the ’world historical forces' of globalism and 
regionalism. This argument, operating at an 
international and national level suggests that 
"internationalisation of transactions leads to 
decreased resources for central control, and in turn 
to increased regional protest" (Hebbert, 1984,
137). Hebbert, however, argues that the role of the 
hard shell nation state is likely to be hardened 
rather than softened by the world economic crisis. 
Furthermore, Hebbert suggests that historical 
precedent supports his hypothesis.
Therefore, although the bottom-up approach clearly 
tackles some of the major problems previously 
experienced by past planning strategies, they do, 
however, have a number of practical problems as 
regards implementation.
A major problem relates to the implicit assumption 
that rural development can function without 
urbanization as a prerequisite. The bottom-up 
priorities presuppose that there is access to land 
for the rural population, and that sufficient land 
exists for each family to partake in viable farming. 
This _; not the case in many LDC's. If there are 
land access problems, or an overpopulation of the 
rural areas to a degree that makes viable farming 
impossible, then a prerequisite for rural 
development is the removal of surplus population 
from the rural areas. Such a situation would 
require active urbanization policies to reduce rural 
overpopulation.
With respect to decision-making processes, bottom-up 
theorists fail to tackle the issue of implementing 
such a policy (Hebbert, 1986). That the rural 
communities should have decision-making powers is 
frequently stated, but how or why the existing 
centralized bureaucracy is going to implement such a 
policy is not discussed. Questionable too, is 
whether one needs only local level decision-making. 
Central government functions such as the national
budgeting procedure, requires centralized planning. 
Furthermore, the decentralization of planning and 
administration presupposes that there are sufficient 
suitably skilled personnel in the rural areas to 
implement planning policy at the local level. The 
number of planning and administrative organisations 
required to implement policy at the grass roots 
level would be phenomenal and very expensive to 
implement and finance. With boch skilled personnel 
and sapital beiag in short supply in LDC's 
(Rondinelli, 1986) this is clearly a problem area.
So too can the proposals as .regar-ds the provision of 
village services in the rural areas bs criticised, 
as such provision is very costly and not explained, 
is where financing should come from. This leads one 
back to the question of urbanisation. One of 
urbanisations strongest features at least at the 
theoretical level, is its ability to generate its 
own finance for much of its physical and service 
infrastructure. In the third world situation 
howevsr, this tends not to be the case where the 
national economies are generally weak. However, 
urban growth still has the advantage in that the 
provision of services in an urban area tends to be 
more easily implemented because 3f its compact 
spatial arrangement. The compact spatial
arra> --f9nt reduces costs of provision and the cost 
to fn- user because of economies of scale and 
location. Access to services is also easier in the 
urban areas, which allows a greater number of people 
to use them. Finally, urban employment is generally 
better paid, profit margins for producers are higher 
and productivity per unit of labour is higher. 
These factors together with effective production 
techniques in the urban areas also prv.ide income
for the central government through taxes. If the 
political will exists, some of this finance can be 
re-invested in the financing of rural development 
(Dewar et al, 1984a).
The above point leads onto a final issue that is not 
given adequate consideration by the bottom-up 
theoristsr that is, what is the priority to be 
adopted in the case of a country wishing to embark 
on a bottom-up strategy as regards industry that is 
capital intensive but very profitable? Although 
providing only limited job creation, such industry 
does contribute to the national economy through 
taxes and an increase in the GDP. Bottom-up 
policies indicate that such industry is not to be 
promoted, but this can be interpreted as "killing 
the goose that lays the golden egg" in the sense 
that such industry, by providing the national 
economy with excess funds which can be re-invested 
in the rural areas, is a benefit to rural 
development (Lee, ,1981).
2.4 DEVELOPMENT FROM THE BOTTOM AND/OR THE TOP
It is the opinion of the author that bottom-up and 
top-down strategies, if implemented separately in a 
LOG are not satisfactory planning strategies. This 
is not to say they have nothing to offer to a 
development strategy, rather that they both ignore 
important aspects of development. Top-down
strategies, although having shown results in terms 
of Increased GDP have tended to concentrate on urban 
and industrial development whilst ignoring to a 
large extent the plight of the rural poor 
(Rondinelli, 1986). Bottom-up strategies on the 
other hand are far more sympathetic to the issues of
rural development and the upliftment of the rural 
poor. However, bottom-up theorists are too radical 
in their efforts because they tend to ignore the 
necessity of urbanisation in the third world 
context. The most obvious example illustrating the 
short sightedness of the bottom-up approach, is the 
instance of a LDC which has an overpopulation 
problem so severe that rural development and, more 
specifically, the agricultural sector cannot become 
effective. The cause may be that there simply is 
not sufficient land available to support a 
completely rural development orientated strategy. 
An .effective urbanisation strategy could in this 
instance result in surplus rural population being 
absorbed into the urban economy, thus reducing the 
population density in the rural areas and thus 
alleviating land pressure problems.
The bottom-up theorists (Stohr & Todtling, 1978: 
Stohr, 1981) were very effective in highlighting the 
inadequacies of the top-down approach - owever they 
seem to be guilty of what is probably the worst 
mistake. In the same way that top-down approaches 
were not comprehensive enough to tackle both urban 
and rural development and as a result only really 
tackled the urban problem, the bottom-up approach 
is very similar in this respect. They tackle rural 
development without giving sufficient consideration 
to the role and importance of urban development. 
More specifically, the bottom-up approach ignores 
the situation where urbanisation is a prerequisite 
for the success of a rural development strategy.
The role of urbanisation can be seen as a means of 
absorbing rural surplus population and of increasing 
a country's GDP through secondary and tertiary
activities (Dewar et al, 1984a). The role of rural 
development is to provide employment for the 
greatest: .part of the rural population possible and 
at the same time ensuring that the resources found 
in the rural areas are used to gain the maximum 
benefit for the national economy, and in so doing 
making the rural areas economically more profitable. 
The role of rural areas are not only to produce food 
for a subsistence economy (although this might 
initially be the primary concern) but also to 
provide inputs for the urban manufacturing economy. 
The urban areas rely on rural produce for their 
manufacturing industry, and the,rural areas rely on 
the urban areas for a market for their produce 
(Bratton, 1986: Sinha, 1984). Thus both economies
are interlinked, which underlines the importance of 
a national development strategy which takes 
cognisance of both urban and rural development.
Past experience (Rondinelli, 1986) has shown 
however, and the dependency theorists have indicated 
this very clearly (Sklar, 1979, Chilcote, 1984) ,
that the trade relations between urban and rural 
areas have in certain instances been very unfair, 
with the urban areas gaining unfair benefit. This 
exploitation of the rural areas has most commonly 
taken the form of viewing the agricultural sector, 
as a source of cheap food for urban workers, and so 
restraining pressure on wages, and as a means of 
generating capital, from exports, for 
industrialization.
Many economists saw agriculture as a sector to be 'squeezed' to obtain the resources needed for urban industrial development, and thus agriculture received a relatively small share of national investment. (Rondinelli, 1986, 234-235).
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The abuse of these trade relations does not, 
however, justify the condemnation of urbanisation 
that has been forthcoming c om the dependency 
theorists. What it does highlight however, is that 
pricing policies and controls need careful attention 
in a development strategy to prevent unequal terms 
of trade and to protect the rural producer (Sinha, 
1984).
An aspect closely linked to the point above relates 
to the s,;:ientation of a country's production towards 
external demand. There are a number of faults with 
this, the most obvious being that in order for the 
LDC to compete in international trade,- it has to 
produce its goods as cheaply as possible. Maasdorp 
(1984, 226-227) found in his survey of Durban
industrialists, that capital intensive methods often 
had advantages over labour intensive methods in some 
industries, in enabling industrialists to compete 
effectively in export markets. Thus labour 
intensive production can be more expensive than 
capital intensive production, but by adopting 
capital intensive production, however, one reduces 
the amount of employment created and reduces the 
size of the internal market/industrial potential. 
Another result is the promotion of structural 
underdevelopment which results from a country 
relying on revenue from its expott1-' to purchase its 
basic food supply. Fluctuations in demand for its 
exports can result is food shortages and starvation. 
It is preferable for a country to concentrate 
firstly on producing a sufficient quantity and 
variety of crops for its own consumption and then to 
concentrate on the export of surplus crops and the 
further processing of rural resources for 
international demand.
An issue which receives almost as much emphasis as 
the urban versus rural development debate, is that 
of decision-making, and the decentralization of 
decision-making powers. The institutional
arrangements of a country are critical to a 
country's planning because the powers that be, 
ultimately decide who gets what and where. 
Centralized decision-making has the theoretical 
advantage in that it facilitates efficient co­
ordination in policy implementation. In practice, 
however, Rondinelli (1986) suggests that central 
government technical ministries have shown little 
knowledge or interest in the spatial dimensions of 
regional development. Furthermore, Rondinelli adds 
that, "central administration often has been 
unresponsive to local need, is unduly complex, and 
inordinatelly slow" (Rondinelli, 1986, 257).
It would appear then that Rondinelli (1986) and
Hebbert (1984) have isolated problems affecting both 
centralized and decentralized decision-making 
structures. Hebbert is, however, not opposed to the 
idea of decentralized decision-making, but stresses 
that bottom-up theorists have not paid adequate 
attention to the manner in which such changes should 
be implemented. Heobert suggests that the most 
effective means of implementing such change is in a 
step-by-step fashion with the modernisation process 
and with simultaneous use of policies related to
nation-building, market integration, demographic
mobility and technological diffusion. Furthermore, 
Hebbert (1984) is adar-v'-*- that a political system 
that consists only . ’itorial parties cannot
function effect! that a degree of
centralization is st. ' vessary to ensure that the
historically stronger regions do not simply become 
even more dominant. Decentralized decision-making 
has the advantage of allowing a greater section of 
the population to voice their opinion, thus being 
more representative of the population as a whole, 
and as such, whilst bearing the previously made 
criticism in mind, it is imperative that attention 
be given to "strengthening the administrative and 
financial capacity of local governments and 
organisations to initiate regional development 
projects” (Rondinelli, 1986, 258).
Under past top-down strategies, the .rural population 
has been largely ignored, or has had planning 
projects imposed on them without prior or sufficient 
consultation. This has resulted in discontent with 
top-down approaches and a great deal of suspicion of 
new planning approaches or policies aimed to benefit 
the rural population. To a great extent the failure 
of past projects has been as a result of a lack of 
understanding of local level needs, desires and 
aspirations, implemented by often caring but 
paternalistic planners (Aremo, 1983).
Emphasis has alsr- '^ een placed on promoting urban 
development throu-ji1: the use of rural resources with 
limited benefits accruing to 'the rural areas. To 
offset the existing feelings of mistrust and to gain 
better insight into the needs, desires and 
aspirations o£ the local population, it is necessary 
that rural communities are ihcluded in planning for 
their development. To ensure that they are not 
merely advisory, it is vital that there is a 
decentralization of decision-making powers to the 
local level {Rondinelli, 1986). The
decentralization of decision-making also avoids the
situation where the urban elite gain control of a 
country's development priorities and control 
development to suit their own purposes. However, 
the decentralization of decision-making should not 
be looked at too radically. Bottom-up theorists 
have tended to ignore issues of national planning, 
tending to over-emphasise community based planning 
and decision-making (Hebbert, 1984). What has been 
ignored is how the transition will be made from an 
existing LDC with top-down decision-making towards 
the use of bottom-up decision-making. Specifically, 
no motivation is suggested for pursv ig existing 
centralized governments to decent • • ze. The 
promotion of mini national ism is v .ely to gain 
favour with centralized government if this creates 
new power bases for potential alternative government 
(Hebbert, 1984, 146).
Some top-down decision-making will be necessary to 
co-ordinate local level decision-making. In some 
instances some territories will be better off than 
others, and the weaker ones will need more 
k Mtance. This has to be controlled at the 
ri. . onal and national planning level, requiring a 
degree of centralized control. The allocation of 
the state budget, pricing controls and marketing 
strategies all require a level of control - control 
that co-ordinates the local level decision-making. 
It should also be recognised that decentralizing 
decision-making and the administrative affairs to 
the local level, pte: .proses that education and 
skill levels exist at uv, U-cal level to co-ordinate 
local, regional and fir..?,My national planning. This 
is clearly not the cas* in most LDC1s where skilled 
and highly trained manpower is in short supply (This 
feature is highlighted in the case study that
follows). Therefore, £or the purpose of defining a 
suitable institutional framework, for intervention, 
a degree of decentralization of dscision-making to 
the local level as regaids the rural development 
priorities (including types of technology, range of 
crops, land tenure arrangements), is important, but 
one cannot simply hand over control of an economy to 
the local level (Hebbert, 1984). Regional and 
national planning require a degree of centralized 
decision-making to guide the national economy, for 
example by executing a redistributive function, to 
protect weaker regions.
Between the bottom-up and top-down approaches a far 
greater number o£ development issues can be directly 
tackled. In fact for a development strategy to be 
successful/ the author shares the sentiments of 
Rondinelli (1986) and Penouil (1981) in that both 
bottom-up and top-down strategies must be used 
together. The simultaneous use of both approaches 
must not be viewed as a means of 1copping-out' or of 
'sitting on the fence' because of a lack of any 
other alternative, Both approaches have demostrated 
their benefits and both show glaring inadequacies. 
Most of the criticism has been against the 
modernisation or top-down approaches/ and some more 
radical critics may well argue that as a development 
effort, top-down strategies have failed so badly, 
that they do not warrant consideration. However, in 
the authors opinion, the usefulness of the top-down 
approaches was inititially overrated in the sense 
that it was expected to tackle all development 
problems. This is a naive expectation: Top-down
policy clearly concentrates on urban growth and the 
benefits of this growth accrue for the most part to 
the urban dwellers. Top-down policy pays very
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little attention to rural development 'per se'. The 
urbanisation process does, however, have one major 
benefit for .the rural areaa - by absorbing surplus 
rural population off the land, and by lessening land 
pressure problems it enables a rural development 
strategy to be implemented more successfully (Dewar 
et al, 1984a). A rural development strategy offers 
direct attention to the rural poor, and the 
development of rural resources.
BACKGROUND TO SOOTH AFRICAN REGIONAL PLANNING
THE SPATIAL MANIFESTATION OF GROWTH IN SOUTH
The study of space economy (1 space economy1 refers 
to the geographical or spatial pattern of economic 
development, or the manner in which the economy 
becomes spatially manifest) is important in terms of 
the South African situation because the country is 
characterised by a highly unequal distribution of 
economic activity and welfare betwean the core 
areas, the inner periphery and the outer-periphery. 
These phenomena have serious implications for 
regional planning in Southern Africa.
Regional policy in South Africa must be seen in the context of capital accumulation characterised by severely uneven development. The country's largest agglomeration, the Pretoria-Witwatersrand-Vereeniging complex (PWV) has emerged historically as the chief repository of physical and social infrastructure and as the most concentrated site of capital accumulation in Southern Africa ... the core areas as a 
whole - the PWV, Cape Town, Durban-Pinetown, .plus -minor metropolitan areas like East .London, Pietermaritzburg and Bloemfontein - generated 
fully 72 per cent of the Gross Geographic Product (GGP) in 1955, a figure that remained high at 65,8 in 1975 (Fair, 1975, 52).
Tomlinson (in conversation) supports Fair (1975) in 
indicating that whilst 20 per cent of South Africa's 
population live in the PWV area, they contribute 43 
per cent of the Gross Domestic Product, whilst the 
homelands, comprising 38 per cent of SA's population 
contribute only 4,3 per cent of the GDP.
The South African space economy has 'nodes' of 
population and development, which are interconnected 
by lines of communication and movement channels. 
These channels or 'networks' allow the flow of 
capital, goods and services via roads, railways and 
telecommunications. The 'surfaces' that have arisen 
are created by human activity and are manifested as 
1 trade areas' and 'urban spheres of influence'.
The diagram below shows the South African space 
economy in graphical terms.
DIAGRAM 2
THE SPATIAL MANIFESTATION OF GROWTH IN SOUTHERN 
AFRICA
|~~1 INTERMEDIATE PERIPHERY
SOURCE: Board, Davies and Fair, 1970
THE INNER PERIPHERY
The inner -peripheral areas are character is’ed by 
well-developed networks which link them to the core 
areas. Such networks include road, rail, air and 
telecommunication services. The diagrams included 
below illustrate the dominance of the major nodes in 
Soufcr.ern ftffric*.
DIAGRAMS 3, 4, 5, 6
/PLUME OF RAIL FREIGHTVOLUME OF ROAD TRAFFIC
TRUNK TELEPHONE TRAFFICDOMESTIC AIRLINE TRAFFIC
SOURCE: Board, Davies and Fair, 1970
In a similar way, the core and inner peripheral 
areas dominate the economic activity in the region. 
Fair (1982) emphasized that the inner periphery 
displays a well-graded system of metropolitan 
centres, characterised by a high growth rate and 
development potential.
These inner peripheral areas of South Africa show 
marked contrasts in levels of economic development 
compared to the less developed areas. The inner 
peripheral areas are characterised by large scale, 
sophisticated manufacturing, construction and 
service sectors, as well as mining and large-scale 
commercial agricultural sectors. Most secondary and 
tertiary activities are also located close to the 
main metropolitan core areas. The diagrams below 
show how manufacturing and • cial activities
have become centred around t. -ant nodes and
networks.
DIAGRAMS 7 & 8
MANUFACTURING S  \
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THE INTERMEDIATE PERIPHERY
Prom the ’previous diagram (pg. 63) showing the South 
African space economy, it should be noted that those" 
areas shown as intermediate' peripheral economic 
space, include most of the commercial farming 
activities and mining activities within the Southern 
African economy. These intermediate areas have a 
fairly good provision of basic infrastructure and a 
range of service centres, hich are closely linked 
to the core.
The outer periphery, consisting predominantly of the 
homelands (Maasdorp, 1964), by contrast, does not 
have such a wide range of centres as the 
intermediate periphery. Economic activity is 
generally small scale, with largely subsistence
agriculture being predominant. Simkins (1984, 142) 
indicates that more than 80 per cent of households 
in the outer periphery earned less than the minimum 
living level of income in 1980.
The output of the outer-periphery is generally low 
and is heavily dependent on income earned in the
more developed sector through labour migration and 
remittances. In terms of the outer peripheral 
areas, per capita GDP was R202 (1980), but per
capita GNP is R547. Income from migrants and
commuters accounts for almost two thirds of the per 
capita GNP (DBSA, 1984).
Ligthelm (1984, 544-5), using the Transkei as an
example, summarises the ty p r /S  of conditions found in 
these outer peripheral areas:
'TVZn.f
the quality of human resources and their access to basic services is also very poor. Some 
examples in Transkei are: almost a third of therural population (which is in the most cases more than 90 per cent o£ the population) has 
received no training; infant mortality is 130 per 1 000 births, which is amongst the highest in the world; the average distance to clinics in rural areas is 7 km; rural households spend on the average 3,5 hours car day collecting water, while the per capita censunpticn of vs?ier is only 10,8 litres compared with a hygienic norm of between 20 and 50 litres; food shortages are a general occurrence and almost a fifth of all children between six months and two years show signs of the four moat important nutritional diseases; and serious housing shortages are encountered, particularly in urban
3.2 DEVELOPMENT 0? THE SOUTH AFRICAN REGIONAL 
PLANNING POLICY
The existing space economy in Southern Africa is not 
only the result of natural resource distribution. 
Numerous other factors have been involved including 
political, social and economic factors.
the pattern of regional inequality, which exists in South Africa today, is not a pattern which has always existed, nor can it be a "tributed in "toto" to inherent and immutable variations in natural resources. The roots of regional inequality are to be found in the inter­relationships between inherent resource attributes and the material conditions ofproduction and distribution, a relationshipwhich is in a constant state of transformation (Dewar et al, 1984a, 9).
The background to the existing South African 
strategy can best be analysed by looking at planning 
policy, and the role politics and economics have 
played in South African planning policy over the
The very first attempts at the promotion of 
development can in fact, be traced back to the 19th 
century. After the Second British Occupation and 
the arrival of the 1820 setlers, the 'modernisation' 
of the rural areas became an issue. Priorities 
included the establishment of district towns, 
military posts, trade centres, improved farming 
methods, and the expansion of the public service 
including administration, education, health, 
banking, transport and postal services. It is 
notable that very few attempts were made to improve 
living conditions in .those areas occupied by blacks.
THE MINING REVOLUTION (1866 - 1918)
The major impact of the mining revolution in South 
Africa was the very rapid economic growth. This 
economic growth had significant spatial implications 
in the form of the rapid urbanisation of both blacks 
and whites.
The growth of the mining sector and the resultant rapid inflow of people to the mining areas gave rise to the development of a number of large towns and stimulated a variety of 
manufacturing and commercial activities which were located in those towns or at the major sea ports handling the trade to and from the mining 
areas (DBSA, 1984, 40).
Thus, the mining activities and related service 
activities created agglomeration forces and there 
was a concentration of economic activity. Economic 
activity in the urban areas centred on the mining 
activity. However "the market for agricultural 
goods, a by-product of the mining settlements and 
ports, stimulated both white and black farmers and
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put them into competition with each other" (Dewar et 
al, 1984a, 11).
The mining sector had only a limited capacity to 
stimulate service-industry job opportunities for 
whites. It was not long before unemployment among 
the whites became a problem. These 'poor whites' 
were largely the rural poor who had moved to the 
urban areas to raise their standard of living. With 
the unemployment problem, the 'whites' became 
resentful of the blacks who were continuing to 
urbanise. The blacks, it was thought, were 
exacerbating the unemployment problems of the whites 
because of their willingness to work for lower
Partly as a result of this conflict, the 1913 Land 
Act was passed, Tks atejor purpose of this Act was to 
prevent blacks from owning land in prescribed white 
areas, and to set aside 13 per cent of the total 
land area for black ownership (Dewar et al, 1984a, 
13). The effect of this act was to drive blacks 
into wage labour. Because of the small percentage 
of land given to the blacks, the Reserves became 
overburdened.
Land was overgrazed and its fertility diminished? crop yields began to fall on poorer and smaller arable plots? the great majority of households relied in part on remitted migrant wages for existence and reproduction (Beinart & Bundy, 1978, 294).
Clearly the overpopulation of the Reserves was a 
major issue in their resultant underdevelopment. In 
terms of this problem, the Native Land Commission 
(1916) was instituted to investigate the quality of 
life in these territories. The Commission
reconu.: ivsd that additional land be purchased for 
the Res, •.v£s because of this overpopulation. These 
recommendii1-ions were not, however, acted upon until 
1936.
Agricultural conditions in the reserves continued to 
deteriorate, and in 1929 the Native Agricultural and 
Lands Branch in the Department of Native Affairs was 
established to assist Reserve agriculture. The 
emphasis of this organization tended to be mainly on 
soil conservation rather than including the Reserves 
in other government programmes for agricultural 
development, and as a rw^ult little was achieved as 
regards the stimulation of agriculture in the 
Reserves. Concern about this deteriorating
situation was subsequently expressed by the Native 
Economic Commission of 1932.
1936 - 1948
It was only in 1936 with the Native Land and Trust 
Act that the recommendations of the Native Land 
Commission were accepted by parliament and there was 
a release of land for black settlement and a 
recognition of the need for the development of the 
outer peripheral areas. The amount of land granted 
however, was one million hectares less than the 1916 
proposals.
The overcrowding of the Reserves and the rapid 
economic growth of the core areas during the post 
war boom, further encouraged blacks to urbanize. 
This factor was seen by the existing government as a 
problem, and as a result the Government thought it 
especially necessary to curtail the rapid inflow of 
black people to the urban areas and to improve the
socio-economic conditions of the outer peripheral
In an effort to contain the urbanisation problem, an 
investigation by the Pagan Commission was instituted 
in 1946. The report of the Pagan Commision { 1948) 
criticized the migrant labour system, and suggested 
that Blacks be regarded as a permanent urban 
phenomenon, living under family conditions in the 
urban araas. Also mentioned in the report was the 
belief that rural urban migration could be slowed 
down by the creation of industries in the Reserves.
1948 - 1979:
The Nationalist Government which was elected to 
power in 1948, further developed the idea of racial 
segregation. Elected on a racial segregation 
ticket, the Nationalist Government rejected the 
suggestion of the Pagan Commission that Blacks be 
regarded as permanent uran residents. Furthermore, 
whereas the Pagan Commission had suggested reducing 
rural urban migration, the Government intended 
reversing the flow.
1948 (and the coming to power of the Nationalist Government) saw a change in state policy from one of controlled allocation of migrant labour to an all-out attempt to stem the f]ow of blacks to the white urban areas and to displace black urbanisation to the Homelands (Dewar et al, 
1984a, 15).
The Government thought that the 'Homelands1 
(previously called ’Reserves') were the simplest 
means of resettling the blacks in areas separate 
from the white areas and appointed the Tomlinson 
Commission (1950) to investigate the development of
these areas. In 1954 the report of the Commission 
was issued - its suggestion was that a choice must 
be made between Integration and segregation. The 
Commission's ov ion was that segregation was
preferable.
A scheme of industrial decentralization was
suggested as the major instrument to stimulate the 
development of the outer periphery. The Commission 
considered whether industry should be decentralized 
to the Reserves themselves or to 1 border areas'. 
The aim of using a border area to locate industry 
was to allow the commuting of black labour to a work 
place in 'white' South Africa, thus avoiding airect 
investment into the Reserves. The Government in its 
White Paper (1956) rejected the idea of investing in 
the Reserves themselves, opting rather for the
border industry concept. The Commission had also
suggested agricultural reforms in the Reserves, and 
that the Reserves be developed into economically 
viable units to stem the flow of workseekers to the 
white areas. These suggestions of agricultural and 
economic reform were also rejected by the Government 
in the 1956 White Paper, although various of its 
recommendations were subsequently acted on.
The border areas identified by the Government for 
investment included Rosslyn, Hammasdale, Newcastle, 
Ladysmith, Pietersburg, Berlin, Brits and 
Rustenburg. rhe major instruments used to implement 
the decentralization scheme were positive measures 
aimed at attracting job opportunities to 
decentralized areas, the control of industrial 
development, and the control of migration of blacks 
to the existing core areas.
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Although bhe broad concept offered by the Cotmnission 
was welcomed by the Government, many of the policies 
.and proposals fo,r ensuring a separate development 
were rejected.
The Tomlinson proposals were never fully 
implemented: political factors prevented theallocation of the massive resources needed to establish urban based industry... (Dewar et al, 1984a, 26).
Since the Tomlinson Commission report, and until 
recently, the focus of regional policies in Southern 
Africa has been on the decentralization of economic 
activity and the development of the outer periphery. 
The desirability of developing the outer periphery 
was emphasised by the Viljoen Commission, 1956, 
which argued against the social costs of further 
concentration. Decentralization was also seen to 
have certain political advantages.
The Viljoen commission (1958) ... advocateddecentralization on the grounds that further urbanisation of the African population would increase the likelihood of political subversion (Wellings and Black, 1966, 11).
By 1968 the 1 border area1 concept had failed to 
induce growth by 'spill over1 in the homelands. 
The success of the ' border area' concept is aptly 
summed up by Mailings and Black (1986, 2).
... The border area's were never more than marginally successful in attracting investment and tneir impact upon development within the bantustans proved negligible.
The Government therefore, in a radical departure 
from its previous stance, agreed in 1968, to 
encourage decentralization to the homelands 
(Maasdorp, 1982, 239).
At the same time, (1968) the Government instituted 
the Physical Planning Act No. -88 o£ 1967 through 
which controls were instituted over the further 
zoning and use of industrial land in the 
metropolitan areas of the PWV, Port Elizabeth- 
Uitenhage, Bloemfontein and Cape Town. In terms of 
the Act restrictions were placed on the proclamation 
of industrial land (section 2) and the extension of 
existing factories (section 3). In terms of 
extensions. Bell (1973, 242) quotes statements
indicating that "no permission (to extend) will be 
granted to any industrialists if there is any 
increase in the Bantu labour". The aim was partly 
to ensure that there was no further increase in the 
number of blacks employed in the metropolitan areas. 
An additional purpose of this Act was to force 
industrialists to locate in the outer periphery, and 
as a means of regulating the employment of Africans 
in che urban areas.
Reaction to this act included "consternation, 
confusion and protest" (Mailings and Black, 1986, 
3). Using official statistics, Gottschalk (1977, 
57) found that there were 3,1 jobs vetoed for 
African workers in 1968 for every job created. 
Furthermore, 9,2 jobs were blocked for every one job 
created for African workers during the first five 
years of the industrial decentralization strategy. 
Tomlinson and Addleson (1984) added that a further 
result of the Act was a rapid increase in the price 
of industrial land in the metropolitan areas.
Largely because of these negative responses to the 
Act, the Government agreed in the 1971 White Paper 
to confine section 2 controls to the PWV and to lift
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section 3 controls on industries defined as 
'locality bound' or labour intensive with respect to 
white .workers- Despite this softening of Government 
policy, between 1968 and 1978, rejections under 
sections two and three stil? affected respectively 
about 220 000 and 100 000 jobs (Mailings and Black, 
1968, 4).
Prior to 1975 the industrial decentralization policy 
had focussed on border areas and the homelands, to 
the exclusion of the rest of the country. This 
situation was significantly changed with the 
introduction of the National Physical Development 
Plan (NPDP). The NPDP involved the establishment of 
thirty eight planning regions, and the designation 
of growth points. (From this point onwards, 
reference is made to Industrial Development points, 
which is the current term used by the SA 
government.) The NPDP excluded metropolitan areas 
and the homelands. The motivation behind the NPDP 
however, remained very much orientated towards the 
promotion of separate development.
It harps on old refrains - the social costs of excessive population concentration, and white depopulation of the platteland. The objective is to attain a more even geographic distribution of population, efficiency and equity considerations being borne in mind within the limits of separate development policy (Maasdorp, 1982, 244).
Maasdorp (1982, 224) goes on to add that the NPDP 
could be criticized in many respects, the most 
glaring being the lack of evidence provided as 
regards the social costs of concentration in the 
existing metropolitan areas, the exaggeration of 
interregional income differences, the failure to 
examine the causes of platteland depopulation, and
the failure to realize that the real problem is not 
an inter-regional but an inter-racial income gap.
The NPDP's success was not marked and the industrial 
decentralization policy continued to show poor 
results, particularly with regard to job creation. 
McCarthy (1982, 238) indicates that between 1960 and 
1980, 150 000 jobs in total were created in the
border areas and the homelands compared to the
115 000 new annual entrants to the labour market in 
these areas, which was totally inadequate. Green 
and Hirsch (1982a, 43-44) provide similar evidence 
in their analysis of job creation in the Ciskei 
between 1970 and 1980. "When well over 100 000 
people were relocated to the Ciskei, barely more
than 3 000 industrial jobs were created in that
region."
THE 1982 REGIONAL. PLANNING STRATEGY
The 1982 White paper revealed some significant 
modifications to the past industrial 
decentralization strategy. Firstly, regional
planning was to be conducted according to economic 
boundaries Governing the whole of South Africa, 
including the 1Indepenent and Self Governing 
States'. South Africa was divided into eight 
functional regions. These economic regions
transcended political boundaries. The Government 
still, however placed highest priority on industrial 
decentralization within the homelands. This 
emphasis was reflected by the xevel of incentives 
offered in homeland locations. Secondly, the stated 
intention was to focus incentives on a more limited 
number of points. Priority for investment was to be 
determined by market forces. Thirdly, the incentive
package was improved by providing long term 
assistance for investors, plus the use of short term 
cash payments .to investors to avoid cash flow 
problems. Fourthly, the importance of the
metropolitan regions to economic growth and job
creation was recognized, and it was not intended to 
limit unneccessarily their economic growth. To this 
end, direct controls are being replaced by indirect 
fiscal disincentives. These s\r<? the Croeser levies 
on employment and turnover, which are being used to
finance the Regional Service Councils (RSC's).
Finally, the role ot the private sector in the 
development of Southern Africa became a priority. 
To serve this purpose, the Development Bank of 
Southern Africa was established in 1983 to mobilize 
funds from the private financial sector.
Several types of Industrial Development Points 
(IDP’s) were distinguished, each type of point 
having a different priority. Five different types 
of points were identified. These included:
1. Metro areas - in these areas, "conditions for
existing agglomerations make establishment of
industry most favourable."
2. Deconcentration Points - "points adjacent to 
metropolitan areas to which industrial growth 
could be deconcentrated."
3. Industrial Development Points - "points where
alternative agglomeration advantages could be 
created to counterbalance the existing
metropolitan areas."
4. Other industrial points - "points with less 
potential to develop as counterbalances and/or
where the development needs are not as large as 
in other areas."
5. 'Ad hoc'-cases - "exceptional cases where the 
relevant decentralization authorities may decide 
to grant certain incentives on merit."
The regions, deconcentration points and development 
points have not been listed in order of priority for 
allocations under the incentive scheme. As a 
general principle, the industrial development points 
receive highest priority (Maasdorp, 1935, 226).
POLICY DEFICIENCIES OF THE 1982 PROPOSALS
Numerous weaknesses of the 1982 policies are 
mentioned in the literature. Drawing on the works 
of Zille {1983a and 1983b), Maasdorp (1585), 
McCarthy (198?) Addleson and Tomlinson {1985) 
Wellings and Black (1986) and Kok (1986) the major 
weaknesses include the following. Firstly, at a 
theoretical level, the new policy has not addressed 
itself to the question of how many growth centres 
the economy can sustain, or more specifically, how 
much government-assisted decentralization the 
economy can sustain. The selection of a possible 44 
IDP's and 12 deconcentration points 
(Decentralization Board 1984, 21-25) would seem to 
indicate that "the same mistake is being made as in 
the past, and the degree of dispersion may be 
substantial" (Maasdorp, 1985, 225). The 'limited
number' of areas which have the greatest potential 
for success have not been identified. Thus although 
official policy has indicated that only a few 
centres will receive priority (Wellings and Black, 
1986, 4), the Government is still plagued by the
problem of attaining viable homeland development. 
Simon Brand, at the time economic advisor to the 
Prime Minister., explains the predicament faced by 
the Government, Whilst agreeing that far too many 
development points had been identified for the 
decentralization strategy, he explains that,
... everyone wants to be on the list. If one just chose the six most favourable areas, they would all be in white areas. All the black states want to have places like that (development points) as well (cited in Zille 1983b, 66).
Obvious from the above, is that sound economic 
principles, must, in the South African policy, come 
second to the attainment of homeland development. 
This pre-occupation with separate development is the 
second major problem with the 1982 policies.
It operates within an important ideological constraint, that is, the imperative of 'homeland' development sets the limits for the identification of regions. The ten homelands are divided amoung seven regions each of which requires at least one growth centre, and this is more than one might regard as optimal, given the past experience not only in South Africa but abroad (Maasdorp, 1985, ,224).
The third major problem, is one that has continued 
to plague Government policy since the initial stages 
of the industrial decentralization programme. The 
1982 policy again refers to the problems of over­
concentration experienced in the metropolitan 
regions, but these problems are not defined and are 
not proved. To a degree, it can be argued that the 
official policy has softened in this respect since 
the White Paper recognizes the metropolitan area's 
important economic contribution, and the aim was not 
to 'unnecessarily limit' industrial growth.
However, limits continued to be placed on the PWV 
and the Durban-Pinefcown regions. The costs incurred 
by these limitations .are carried by the taxpayer in 
subsidising decentralization.
The cost implications of decentralization is the 
fourth area of criticism. This aspect is further 
discussed in the following section concerned with 
the rsaults of regional policy in South Africa. At 
this stage, however, Tomlinson (in conversation) 
mentions calculations to the effect that the direct 
subsidy cost now exceeds R1 000 million. In 
addition, Wellings and Black -(1986) report.that the 
cost of creating decentralized jobs is about four 
times the cost of equivalent jobs in the city. 
Furthermore, they go on to report that their surveys 
have revealed that
the provision of incentives is the most important factor influencing industrialists's decisions to invest at growth points (Wellings and Black, 1986, 14).
On the effect of incentives to industrialists1s 
decisions to decentralize. Bell (1984) has argued 
that thei introduction of incentives has merely re­
inforced an existing trend, and that a substantial 
proportion of those industries that have 
decentralized would have done so spontaneously. 
This issue is elaborated upon in the following 
chapter, but if one accepts that Bell is even 
partially correct, then the cost per job in enticing 
those industrialist who otherwise would not have 
decentralized to the new growth centres would be 
even higher.
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Fifthly, the cost of job creation in the new growth 
centres has been exacerbated by the selection of 
sites for decentralization which have in some 
instances had no existing infrastructure. Besides 
the fact that initial investment in basic and 
service infrastructure is considerable, the 
effectiveness of this investment has been diminished 
because of the manner in which investment has had to 
be dispersed over a large numer of points. Maasdorp
(1985) and Addleson and Tomlinson (1985) make 
reference to the problems expressed by the 
industrialists as regards the locations selected by 
,.bhe Government. The major complaints include the 
lack of physical infrastructure and social services, 
a shortage of skilled and managerial labour, and the 
increasing "real cost of labour" (Maasdorp, 1985, 
227 ) .
THE WHITE PAPER ON URBANISATION
On the 26 March 1985 the State President requested 
the President's Council to adv.je him on ways in 
which the process of urbanisation could best be 
ordered in such a manner "... as best to counter the 
present social, economic and physical problems 
resulting from rapid urbanisation" (White Paper, 
1986, 2).
One of the most significant results of this report 
was a change in Government policy regarding the 
priorities for urban investment. The new emphasis 
is now placed on the stimulation of certain 
metropolitan areas and large towns and not so much 
on the promotion of remote border areas. Paragraph
6.10.5 of the White Paper states that
recognition should be granted to the key role played by the various metropolitan core areas 
(including in particular, the central business districts of Johannesburg, Durban and Cape Town) as first-order centres in a broad metropolitan, regional and national context. These areas 
should continue to be actively and qualitatively extended and promoted.
The new emphasis is on deconcentration as opposed to 
decentralization, with industrial growth being 
located at dispersed points 50 km or so from the 
cities. Priority is given to those cities located 
along the currently identified development axes 
"particularly those which are advantageously located 
in relation to the Self-Governing National States 
and the Independent States ..." (White Paper, 1986, 
31).
A further major aspect highlighted in the 1986 White 
Paper is the issue of rural development. Paragraph 
6.13 states that;
The Government acknowledges that rural development is an important element of ordered urbanisation, ... and should not be seen in isolation (White Paper, 1986, 30).
The IDP's are given priority in the pursuance of 
rural development. The stated intention is that the 
number of centres which are to be developed should 
be limited in order to ensure that the cummulative 
advantages of concentrated decentralization are 
achieved (paragraph 6.13.8). There has been a 
definite shift away from the creation of 'new' 
growth centres as a means of employment. Paragraph
6.13.6 states that:
the rural development strategy should mainly be orientated towards the purposeful development of existing towns into vital centres where the full
spectrum of economic, social and administrative 
services are offered in order to provide employment opportunities for people who cannot be absorbed by the •primary sector (White Paper, 
1986, 31).
The urbanization White Paper is commendable in the 
sense that greater emphasis is to be placed on the 
development of urban areas that have a natural 
ability to generate employment and growth. Relaced 
to the above is the move towards deconcentracion 
rather than decentralization. This can be 
interpreted as acknowledgement by Government that 
metropolitan and secondary cities are the most 
likely vocations for industrial expansion 
(Rondinelli, 1983). Equally important has been 
Governments acknowledgement that there must be an 
active pursual of rural development in conjunction 
with urban development. However, the most negative 
aspect of Governments policy only became evident 
some time after the urbanisation White Paper. In 
July 1986 (Business Day, July 28) it became evident 
that citizens of TBVC states will not be allowed to 
work anywhere they choose in South Africa. The 
result of this must surely be, than the government 
will continue to promote the creation of separate 
economies, both urban and rural in the outer 
periphery. The implications of such a strategy have 
been spelled out throughout the history of South 
Africa's industrial decentralization programme.
TOP-DOWN STRATEGIES IN SA; THEORY VS PRACTICE
To analyse top-down regional planning policy in 
South Africa, analysis must concentrate on the 
nature of the implementation of the growth pole or 
centre theory. In this section, the fundamental 
criteria of growth centre strategies will be
compared with the South African implementation of 
decentralization.
Firstly, in terms of the theory, a 'growth centre1 
should be an existing, growing centre which 
naturally attracts labour, capital and commodities. 
Within the context of the South African strategy 
there is a different emphasis entirely - the 
designated growth centres in Southern Africa are 
chosen in terms of a 1 lack, of development'. 
Further, the centres do not have the natural ability 
to attract labour. Rather, owing to high population 
increases and unemployment, the demand is for the 
provision of jobs. The implications of such a 
policy are that by attempting to form r.ew 
agglomerations where currently none (or few) exist, 
the strategy is more likely to fail, and secondly by 
choosing the areas with the highest demand for jobs, 
emphasis was on the outer peripheral economic space. 
In these areas, the market potential for investment 
is lowest.
It has been argued (Bell, 1984, 16) that the private 
sector will decentralize to make use of the cheap 
homeland labour. Wellings and Black (1986) however 
find strong evidence to suggest that the Government 
incentives are the main attraction to industry.
Tomlinson and Addleson (1984) question the 
presumption that labour is, in fact, cheaper in the 
homelands.
If one pays x producing 10 units a month R100 per month, and y producing 25 units a month R200, y is the cheaper labourer. Industrialists in the homelands actually complain of the low productivity of homeland labour which lacks an "industrial culture" (Tomlinson 6 Addleson, 1984, 15).
Secondly, a prospective growth centre should have an 
existing well-defined .physical, social and service 
infrastructure. In this respect again, the South 
African strategy differs markedly from that of the 
theory. Many prospective centres in the South
African strategy are very small and in some
instances are even 1 new towns'.
The implications of this policy in terms of South 
Africa are, the considerable cost of providing the 
necessary basic service and physical infrastructure. 
It is certainly questionable whether it would be 
more advisable to share infrastructure and to avoid 
duplication. In addition by following a "new town" 
approach, and bearing in mind the current lack of 
knowledge of agglomeration economies and how such an 
economy is created, it is in no way guaranteed that 
the infrastructure that is provided, at great cost, 
will in fact be fully utilized.
Thirdly, the theory indicates that a prospective
'growth centre' should have an existing well- 
developed communications infrastructure - it should 
be integrated into the major networks. Because of 
the location of 5 y,-fth centres within the outer 
periphery in the South African strategy, the 
'centres' are usually far removed from the major 
communications and goods networks. The implication 
of such physical location of growth centres within 
the Southern African context are that the 'centres' 
are not adequately connected to the markets of the 
country. Not only is the basic communication 
infrastructure lacking, but the existence of goods, 
capital and information flows (which are a vital
part of commerce and industry) are minimal.
However, in this respect there has been a slight
change in government policy. The 1982 White Paper 
and the 1986 'White Paper on urbanisation both 
indicate that the <?c.’eminent will now promote arban 
growth in line more with economic criteria, namely 
in centres which exhibit natural or greatest growth 
potential. However, the subsequent indications £rom 
Government that the TBVC states will remain areas 
subject to influx control, implies that the
pursuance of urban growth within these countries 
will continue. In this context, the above criticism 
therefore remains valid.
Fourthly, a prospective growth centre should exist 
as part of the upper urban hierarchy of towns such 
as Bloemfontein and East London. The South African 
policy which concentrates on areas with a demand
for, but an existing lack of, development, results
in centres being located almost exclusively in the 
outer periphery. Thus towns in the South African 
concept are predominantly very low-order 
hierarchical towns. Within the South African 
strategy, the high-order towns are, in fact, given 
the lower-order priorities.
The implications of the clear contradiction of the 
theory are that, by choosing low-order towns, the 
agglomeration potential of these centres is severely 
limited. This, in turn, must i.uiit the potential of 
the contre to become self-sufficient. Further, by 
choosing low-order towns, the centres are spatially 
very distant from the major markets and suffer 
accordingly m  terms of integration into the 
country's economy.
Fifthly, in terms of numbers of growth centres, the 
theory indicated that concentration of investment 
should b'e the priority ('Richardson, 1978). In what 
was an over-ambitious move, the South African policy 
opted for the promotion of development in a large 
number of points spread over a wide area. The 
number of centres is a function of the unemployment 
and potential job demand in =he periphery.
The wide spread of 1 centres1 spatially, is largely a 
politically-induced factor. Because of the
fragmented nature of the homelands, many centres 
have to "be created over a wide area of the country. 
The implications of this change from the theory are 
that a vast amount of money has to be spent on 
duplicating infrastructure at many points in the 
Southern African economy. In addition, the amount 
of money available for rural development and 
industrial decentralization is limited. Thus very 
little concentration of investment can occur in so 
many centres. This factor limits the potential for 
any of the centres to become self-sufficient or even 
attractive to investment,
CONCLUSION
The South African space economy is characterised by 
nodes of development and large areas of under­
development- The dominant nodes include the PWV, 
Cape Town, Durban, Pietermaritzburg and 
Bloemfontein, while the outer-periphery/ 
underdeveloped areas are predominantly the 
Independent and Self-Governing States,
Inherent growth potential is highest in the inner 
peripheral and core areas, whilst it is lowest in 
the outer peripheral areas.
Since the 18201s there have been policies aimed at 
the development of the rural areas of Southern 
Africa. It was, however, with the advent of the 
mining revolution that the rural problem also became 
a Black/White problem.
It was the urbanisation of Slacks and Whites that 
resulted in conflict and competition for urban-based 
jobs. Because of rural poverty and urban 
opportunity, this conflict was exacerbated by a very 
high degree of rural-urban migration. The
competition for urban-based jobs resulted in the 
1 feeling', and eventually fat- policy, that Whites 
should live in the urban areas and that the Blacks 
should live in the outer-periphery or 'reserves'.
It was not long befc-e these 'reserves' with their 
inherently low potential for development and their 
very high populations, became problem areas. The 
immediate result was that urban areas became the 
targets for Black in-migration. This was
immediately seen as a problem by the Government 
which was attempting to halt Black .urbanisation, or 
at least trying to keep it down to a level where 
jobs could be provided. Thus it became the priority 
for the Government to generate employment 
opportunities for the Black population in the outer 
periphery. It was thought that the creation of 
employment would halt the migration of Blacks to the 
urban areas.
So, after making the official choice of separate 
development, according to the findings of the 
Tomlinson Commission, a policy of industrial 
decentralization was instituted by the Government.
Initially this industrial development would be 
stimulated in the South African 1 border areas' only/ 
but as a result of the failure of growth to spill 
over the borders (into the 'homelands') investment 
was then allowed in the ’homeland areas' themselves. 
Again, however, the results have been far less 
spectacular than was envisaged, and the Government 
in the White Paper (1982) emphasised that sectors 
other than industry are also to receive attention. 
Furthermore, because of the high costs in providing 
infrastructure, fewer points will be developed as 
IDP’s, and more cognizance is to be taken of market 
factors in locating 'growth centres'.
A notable positive trend is that the South African 
Government has, in the 1982 and 1986 White Papers, 
shown an increased awareness of the necessity to 
promote development in higher order towns which have 
greater potential for self sustaining growth.
However, a number of discrepancies from the original 
theory continue to be part of the South African 
strategy, namely the choice of centres in the outer 
periphery; the choice of centres in terms of areas 
lacking natural development potential, and the 
choice of towns which are part of the lower urban 
hierarchy. (This is a result of the above two 
points). These problems are particularly relevant 
with regard to the TBVC states, which remain 
hindered by influx conlrol.
I- 9 1 -
Ch. 4. THE RESDLTS OF A TOP-DOWN APPROACH IN SOUTHERN 
AFRICA
4.1 THE AIMS OF SOUTH AFRICAN REGIONAL POLICY
The major aim of the South African regional economic 
policy, as stated by the DBSA2, is:
Regional economic policy in Southern Africa is aimed at obtaining a more balanced distribution of economic activity in Southern Africa and promoting the economic development of the outer periphery (DBSA, 1983, 46).
As has previously been mentioned, industrial 
decentralisation is to be the driving economic force 
to achieve the above aims. The Tomlinson Commission 
(1954) had been appointed to make recommendations on 
the economic development of the homelands. Having 
diagnosed major problems of overcrowding and 
population growth relative to the growth of 
employment opportunities, the Commission called for 
a vast resettlement project and the need to remove 
50 per cent of the people off the land. This meant 
the creation of urban areas and the creation of non- 
agricultural employment.
Aside from the above stated goals, a further 
perceived goal of "legitimizing the homeland 
governments both in the eyes of their own people and 
internationally, is apparent. In 'legitimizing' the 
Homeland Governments, the general aim clearly, is to 
provide these Governments with some sort of power 
base/economy which will encourage blacks to settle
is the main instrument for directing capital
in these areas. Such 'legitimisation1 would take 
over from the current influx control measures. The 
following quote sums up this argument:
The objective of decentralization in South Africa is
to give sufficient economic content to the policy of homeland development so that the governments that are created in those states are not simply fictitious governments but that they have an economic base to create their sources of tax revenue to enable them at least in some respects to act independently from the South African Government ... Influx control must be controlled more through economic measures so that people will voluntarily remain in and go to areas rather than being forced to do so (S Brand, cited in Zille, 1983a, 75)
The White Paper on urbanisation (1986) tends to 
indicate a change of attitude by the South African 
Government as regards the enforcement of influx 
control. Paragraph 4.3.4 states that:
In future, freedom of movement to and within urban areas will apply to all citizens of the RSA on a non discriminatory basis.
However, so as not to totally abolish the idea of 
separate development, paragraph 4,3.5 of the White 
Paper emphasises that separate living areas for 
various population groups in the towns and cities 
will still be observed at dispersed locations within 
50 kilometres of the cities.
Wellings and Black (1986, 22) express the opinion
Whilst the Governments new rhetoric stresses the 1 economic interdepence1 of 'white' South Africa and the bantustams, the 1 development' of the latter into separate sub-economies remains a central objective of the apartheid regime.
Wellings and Black's predictions have subsequently 
;been confirmed with respect to the TBVC countries. 
The leading article in 'Business Day' on July 28 
reads as follows:
The most dire predictions of the left have been fulfilled by Government's reversion to a form of grand apartheid which treats residents of Venda, Bophuthatswana, Giskei and Transkei as aliens in
Ttvs above article goes on to add that "unauthorized" 
South Africans from the TBVC regions will not be 
regarded as permanent residents and that labour 
controls will continue.
RESULTS OP THE SOUTH AFRICAN POLICY
The degree to which the South African regional 
economic policy has achieved success in terms of the 
stated goals can be gauged in a number of ways.
In terms of a reduction of economic imbalances the 
question really at issue, is whether or not the 
outer-peripheral areas have become more attractive 
to investment; whether they are reducing the 
relative attractiveness in terms of migration to the 
existing metropolitan areas and whether the 
economies generated there, are viable, self- 
sufficient units or not.
Job creation rates have been notoriously low 
throughout the implementation of South Africa's 
industrial decentralization programme. Between 
1959/60 and 1969/70 there were only 11 500 jobs 
created Bell (1984). Because of this dismal rate of
job creation decentralization into the homelands was 
encouraged. The subsequent results were only 
marginally, better. Between 1970 and 1978 the 
official figures record only another 34 900 jobs 
(Maasdorp, 1982, 242-3). The table below shows some 
interesting trends, particularly significant is the 
substantial increase in job creation following the 
1982 incentives. The most recent figures for the 
1984/5 period show a continuing increase. However, 
these figures require careful interpretation. 
Firstly, it must be noted that usually only less 
than half the 'proposed jobs' are actually created. 
Secondly, the contribution of the new jobs, although 
a substantial increase since 1982, is still minimal 
compared to the "two million or so unemployed in the 
Bantustans ..." (Tomlinson and Hyslop, 1984, 6).
TABLE 9= PROJECTS ESTABLISHED, CAPITAL INVESTED ANDE*f>UrM£«r CflEATBO UNDER THE AUSPICES OF Tk£DECENTRALISATION 80RRD. 1375-1985
SOTS E5TA8LISHED XPANOED EMPLOYMENTCREATION
1. The data re fe r :  te prejeets In CASA and thenon-independent homelands. Up te  and Including1981, the reporting year wae the relevantcalender year. Thereafter, I t  Is April 1 to March 31 of the fo llow ing year, April 1982 being nhen the now decontrol I satlon concession package began.
2. The figures fo r 1982/83, 1993/84 and 1985/86ro fle c t proposed pro jects. In practices lig h tly  less than ha lf of the proposedprojects are actua lly  Implemented.
3. The helving of the proposed cap ita l comeltnantbetween 1982/83 and 1983/84 resu lts  from there having been t*o  pro jects In 1982/ 83 which alone accounted fo r a Rl,2 b i l l io n  investment.
SOURCEi Tomlinson and Addleson , 1986 . SAJE.(forthcoming).
In terms of the issue of whether or not the IDP's 
are reducing the relative attractiveness of the 
existing metropolitan areas, there is heated debate. 
The Decentralization Board figures would tend to 
indicate that the increased incentives since 1982 
have had a marked effect. Bell (1986) does not 
contend the significance of the increase in job 
creation as much as he contends that a substantial 
proportion of the increase was due to spontaneous 
decentralization. This argument is important to an 
evaluation of the decentralization policies validity 
because, if decentralization has been occurring 
predominantly as a result of the incentive package, 
then such decentralization might well stop should 
the decentralization incentives be halted. On the 
other hand, if Bell’s analysis is correct, then it 
can be argued that the incentive package is merely 
re-inforcing an existing trend, and that if the 
incentives were withdrawn, a substantial proportion 
of the decentralized industries would continue to 
operate .In the decentralized locations. So too,
assuming Bell is correct, has the decentralization 
policy been particularly ineffective. In fact it 
can be argued that the incentive scheme has beesi 
protecting,decentralized companies from competition, 
thus reducing the efficiency of the companies
(Tomlinson and Addleson, 1986).
Bell’s (1964, 1986) analysis shows that between
1956/7 and 1965/6 the proportion of manufacturing 
employment situated in the major industrial areas 
increased from 79,6 to 81,9 per cent. Between
1965/6 and 1979 this percentage dropped constantly 
from 81,9 per cent to 76,9 per cent. In the
homeland and border areas becween 1967/8 and 1979 
these areas increased their percentage from 11,75
per cent to 15,54 per cent. Bell goes on to add 
that in terms of annual growth rates, between 1961/2 
and 1967/8 the main industrial -areas experienced a 
growth rate of 5,9 per cent, a rate that Cell during 
the 1967/8 to 1979 period to 2,1 per cent. The 
corresponding rate of growth in the homelands and 
border areas increased slightly from 5,2 per cent 
(1962) to 5,3 per cent in 1967/8 to 1979.
Bell and Padayachee (1984, 435) argue that this
trend is in response to international competition 
from the newly industrializing countries and Japr.n 
and this has had the effect since the late 19601s of 
encouraging industrialists to look for cheaper 
labour, The advantage of cheap labour is that it 
allows industrialists to maintain their 
profitability. To an extent, Maasdorp (1985, 228) 
finds supporting evidence for Bells arguement. 
Maasdorp (1985) found that the textile industry in 
the Durban Metropolitan Area has been experiencing 
difficulty in finding suitable labour to operate in 
the shift-orientated industry. Maasdorp's study 
revealed that both White and Indian workers were 
becoming less amenable to shift-work as other 
opportunities open. For this reason, the
decentralized areas were becoming advantageous. 
Factories in these areas are close to residential 
areas, and as a result shift work is easier for the 
employee.
Several counter arguments have been raised by 
Wellings and Black (1986), Tomlinson and Hyslop 
(1984), and Hirsch (1983). Firstly, the empirical 
evidence (Table 9) indicates that state intervention 
in the1form of incentives has played the major role 
in promoting decentralization. Secondly, Hirsch
(1983, 11) argues "... if decentralization is such a 
tempting prospect to capital, why have so few 
capitals taken it up?" 'Hirs-ch goes on to ask ". . . 
why has the state been forced to assist capital to 
the extent it has through cheap loans and investment 
..." It must, however, be noted that Bell's 
contention is that a significant number of labour 
intensive industries have in fact been 
decantralizing without using the Decentralization 
Board's incentives. As such they are not included 
in the Decentralization Board's statistics. 
Thirdly, whilst there is some evidence of a sectoral 
bias towards more labour intensive "ifarms of 
production in decentralized areas, they do not seem 
to be significantly more export orientated, nor has 
it been shown that there is a disproportionate 
number of industries affected by excessive 
competition from exports. (Mailings and Black, 
1986, 12). Finally, Mailings and Black (1986) draw 
attention to the considerable hostility within the 
business community towards the decentralization 
policy.
It is important to consider the nature (labour or 
capital intensive) of jobs created in the 
decentralized locations, as this feature has a 
direct bearing on both the cost per job created and 
the number of jobs created. Furthermore, it has a 
direct bearing on the validity ul Bell's (1986) 
arguement discussed above.
Outside of Bell, the literature, including Mailings 
and Black (1985), Kok (1986), the Kleu Commission 
(1983), and Maasdorp (1985), expresses the opinion 
that in addition to the actual shortfall in jobs 
created the jobs are of a capital intensive nature.
It is clear that the progress aade with the 
decentralization programme has le:'t a good deal to be desired and that such progress hasapparently been of a more capital intensive nature (Kleu Report, 1983/ 20).
Wellings and Black (1986, 25) refer to studies by 
McCarthy {1983) which illustrate that there has been 
a mo apid growth of the capital component, in the
Border, Ciskei and Southern Transkei regions, than
the labour component. Similar opinion is expressed 
by Glaser (1983, 20) who states that labour 
processes "ha/e by no means been consistently labour 
intensive".
Also, in an attempt tc force/encourage
industrialists to locate away from the PWV, Maasdorp
(1982) suggests that between 1968 and 1980
permission for waivers for 115 000 jobs were refused 
as a result of section 3 of the Environment Planning 
Act. Furthermore, Maasdorp estimates that only 
34 000 of the job opportunities were subsequently 
decentralized (Maasdorp, 1982). What is obvious is 
that job creation is being 'stunted1 in an effort to 
control the spatial location of these jobs. 
Further, those jobs created are done so at 
subsidized costs.
The net effect of the capital intensive nature of 
job creation, the cost to the Government in 
providing incentives, and the duplication of 
infrastructure is that the cost per decentralized 
job is approximately four times its metropolitan 
equivalent (Wellings and Black, 1986, 14).
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In terms of the policy's ability to help stimulate 
viable economics in the outer-periphery, there 
appears to be general consensus that the policy has 
fallen short of expectations. Numerous authors, 
including Dewar, Todes and Watson (1984) Tomlinson
(1983) McCart.sy (1983) Maasdorp (1980, 1982, 1985), 
indicate that little success has been achieved in 
the creation of self-sustaining growth poles. They 
point out that the IDP's lack the ability to 
generate agglomeration economies, to attract 
propulsive industry, to capture the multiplier 
effects, create linkages or to diffuse benefits to 
the surrounding region-
In attempting to explain then, why there has been an 
increased investment in the decentralized locations, 
a survey conducted by Wellings and Black (1986, 14) 
found that "the provision of incentives is the most 
important factor influencing industrialists 
decisions to invest in growth points". Green and 
Hirsch (1982b, 43) found similar evidence in their 
research.
Industrialists ... consistently indicated that the cheap capital/loans ... were the most important incentives other than the conditions of the labour force.
Th.'.s being the case, it would appear that the 
Government has accepted that incentives will have to 
operate indefinitely to maintain investment in the 
decentralized locations. Dewar et al (1984, 63) 
indicate that "it appears unlikely that incentives 
will be phased out". Wellings and Black (1986) 
refer to a comment made by Dougie de Beer, Chairman 
of the Decentralization Board confirming that the
Government appears to have accepted the cost 
ineffectiveness of the homeland growth points.
One of the most salient points of the new 
incentives is that there is a general acceptance now that the regional development areas and points have a more or less permanent cost disadvantage inherent in the establishment of industries in those areas {Wellings and Black, 1986, 15).
It is generally acknowledged that despite the number 
of jobs created in the industrial development 
points, little success has been achieved in the 
creation of self-sustaining growth poles ... A 
number of authors (Todes & Watson, 19B4a,; 
Tomlinson, 1983; McCarthy, 1983; Maasdorp, 1980) 
have pointed out that the IDP's lack the ability to 
generate agglomeration economies, attract propulsive 
industries, capture the multiplier effects, create 
linkages or diffuse benefits to the surrounding 
region.
in terms of the promotion of economic development in 
the outer periphery the 1956 Government White Paper, 
stated that after a period of 50 years an 
approximately equal proportion of Whites and Blacks 
should be reached in European Territory. This goal 
has “ailed. "Even the most conservative estimates 
of the de facto black population in the Common Area 
of South Africa in 2000 indicate the failure of this 
goal" (Tomlinson s Hyslop, 1984, 38).
An attempt to explain this apparent failure or 
alternatively, to assess the success of this goal, 
analysis will centre on the impact on agricultural 
production, urban development and job creation.
There is little doubt that the rate of employment in 
the outer periphery has increased- particularly with 
the 1981 White Paper incentives. Further, as has 
previously been mentioned, the amount of capital 
investment in the outer periphery is also rising 
rapidly. However, in an effort to evaluate the 
policy's impact on the development of the outer- 
periphery, one must assess the 'multiplier 
effects' - or the effect of an investment on 
regional incomes and employment.
A paper by Tomlinson and Hyslop illustrates the 
problems currently experienced in Southern Africa. 
They go so far as to say that "new evidence 
indicates that the Bantustan Governments are not 
able to bear the costs of the decentralization 
concessions" (Tomlinson & Hyslop, 1984, 43/4).
Similar studies by Dewar efc al (1984a) and Mailings 
and Black (1986) also indicate that the effect of 
the regional multiplier in the homelands is 
suppressed by numerous factors. The most important 
of these factors include 'trickle down' effects, and 
the effect of local ownership and profit sharing.
In terms of the backward and foreward linkages 
Tomlinson and Hyslop (1984) and Mailings and Black
(1986) draw attention to the fact that the majority 
of the inputs are in fact drawn from the 
metropolitan areas of South Africa.
The proportions of plant/manufacturers and service inputs drawn from the local economy (foreward linkages) are negligable (Mailings and Black, 1986, 26).
:Trickle-down effects have also been limited. There 
has been very limited tapping of local purchasing 
power in the area, leakage of purchasing power out 
of the regions being the dominant process. This has 
been manifest in the growth of small white towns 
located on the borders of the homelandsr making use 
of the increased purchasing powers of the homeland 
population.
The scarcity of managerial talent and the 
difficulties involved in mobilizing capital are 
regarded as the major limitations to local ownership 
and profit sharing.
Also as previously mentioned, although the 
decentralization trend is 'picking up' the actual 
job creation rate falls far short of what is 
required.
Dewar et al (1984a) suggest that the impact of 
growth centres in the outer periphery has been very 
limited. They suggest that regional impact has been 
small because the wages paid are low and so, 
subsequent income circulation is only minimal 
{Tomlinson 5 Hyslop, 1984, 38) . Dewar et al Watson 
(1984a) add that the centre’s hinterland has 
registered very limited impact because most of the 
inputs in the production-c/cle are imported with 
very limited use of local resources.
... agricultural production has largely stagnated. Attempts at promoting agricultural production in these areas have placed too much emphasis on large scale capital intensive projects ... little has been achieved in promoting rural development or alleviating pc/erty in the rural areas of the outer periphery (DBSA, 1984, 49).
In the same way it is argued that the growth 
centres, as alternatives to the existing core areas, 
have failed to advance. Job creation in all sectors 
has been small and as a result, the degree of 
urbanisation has been very limited. Those towns or 
'centres' that do exist, lack viable economic bases. 
Bell, (1984, 14) whites that the crux of the matter 
is that the actual number of jobs created is very 
small. "Taken overall, therefore, these numbers of 
extra jobs clearly cannot be expected to have had 
any significant impact on the geographical 
distribution of the Black population..."
Lastly, a point made in evaluating the previous goal 
is worth re-iterating - the 'growth centres' in the 
South African strategy have failed' to achieve any 
degree of self-sufficiency or to generate any 
agglomeration tendencies. This in itself is an 
indication that the goal of developing the outer 
periphery has failed, firtially at least. The 
limited success that has occurred, is in terms of 
job creation.
Legitimizing the homeland Governments is a difficult 
if not subjective goal to evaluate. Tomlinson and 
Hyslop (1984, 8) interpret the philosophy behind
this goal as being that, "a stronger industrial base 
in the Bantustans fosters the growth of the dominant 
petty bourgeoisie. This factor in turn gives 
Bantustans greater credibility in the eyes of the 
international community and in those sections of 
their own population.
In terms of the above, any measure of the success of 
this goal must be in terms of the creation of an
economic base, or of a group of people who benefit 
from this policy and in whose incerests it is to 
carry on with the South African apartheid strategy. 
This being the case, people would voluntarily 
inhabit and invest in the homeland or outer 
peripheral areas. This would also reflect a more 
balanced distribution of economic activity. In 
terms o£ the success of the South African strategy 
Bell (1987) writes:
Though some significant changes in the inter­regional distribution of manufacturin employment have occurred since the late 1960's the degree of industrial decentralisation actually achieved to date is relatively small and certainly falls far short of what is needed to make blacks voluntarily remain in and go to certain areas rather than being forced to do so.
The 1986 Rhite Paper revealed a changing priority 
towards deconcentration points for investment in 
terms of the urbanisation policy. This emphasis 
reinforces to an extent a trend that has been 
occuring in the past. Maasdcrp (1985) indicated 
that although the IDP's received priority from the 
Government, "it is the deconcentration points which 
may be favoured by investors" (Maasdorp, 1985, 226). 
Wellings and Black (1986) indicate that a preference 
Eor deconcentnation points has been evident for some 
time. The concentration of decentralized activity 
in those centres which are most advantaged 
economically has been a feature of the programme 
from the beginning.
CONCLUSION
Prom the above discussion it can be seen that 
although investment in the outer-periphery has 
increased, and although job creation appears to have 
been fairly high, the Government's stated goals have 
not been achieved. It appears that the problem lies 
in the actual potential of the outer periphery to 
support the amount of people that is required. The 
following exert outlines clearly the problems 
facing the South African strat.gy:
At ;t of the problem is the lack ofco,. =ness of these peripheral,artie*w. .j.y-stimulated growth points relative to the other industrial centres of South Africa their disadvantages measured inter alia, in terms of such factors as lack of access to markets, lack of highly and easily exploitable natural resources,. few economies of scale, inadequate financial and other back-up facilities, and inadequately trained labour force (due to a lack over long periods of time of extensive investment in social overhead capital), insufficient social and cultural facilities to attract skilled labour and management, and so on, are too great to be overcome through incentives" (Dewar, at al, 1984a, 174-175} .
One notable exception to the above comment must be 
made. Large corporations can internalize the 
provision of services required by them, thus 
enabling subsidiaries of such corporations to choose 
locations further removed from markets and 
agglomeration economies. Thus it is the small 
companies which rely on numerous external sources of 
services which are more likely to base their 
location decisions on the existence of agglomeration 
economies. Furthermore, taking Bell's {1984, 1986) 
claims into consideration, labour intensive industry
■ -y»
would appear to be attracted, although only to 
limited extent to date, to the peripheral areas.
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Ch. 5. TRANSKEI: A CASE STUDY
5.1 INTRODUCTION; TRAMSKEI - A PART -OF THE SOUTH 
AFRICAN POLITICAL ECONOMY
In using the Transkei as a case study, it is vital 
to look at the historical specificity of this region 
within the context of the development of South 
Africa. The Transkei is an integral part of the 
South African economy. Although the South African 
Government has acknowledged this principle in the 
1982 White Paper, prior to 1962 Transkei was viewed 
as an independent economy -and even since the 1982 
White Paper a certain amount of circumspection is 
expressed about the Governments preoccupation with 
homeland development {Wellings and Black, 1986, 
22 ) .
One cannot ignore the fact that the establishment of 
the 'Homelands' is a means of implementing separate
development of all races in Southern Africa.
Indeed, the Homeland system and the policy of 
industrial decentralization must be recognised as a 
means for the South African Government to create 
separate development of races and to provide the 
Homeland governments with "a certain minimum
economic power" (Brand, 1983 , 38).
An analysis of the transition of the majority of 
local inhabitants in the Transkei region from 
pastoral cultivators to peasant producers and 
finally to wage workers in the South African economy 
is vital to any analysis of Transkei1s current 
development opportunities and constraints 
including an understanding of the growth and
development of South Africa and its economy.
Initially the local economy in the Transkei region 
was subsistence based. However, with the
advancement of Europeans into the interior, and the 
subsequent contact with the local population, the 
type of production changed. It then became 
concerned with peasant production aimed at the 
regular production of goods for external markets in 
the South African interior. Security for the 
peasant farmer lay in his access to land for 
production and the use of family labour to ensure 
agricultural production on a subsistence basis.
When the British took over the Cape Colony at the 
turn of the century, they sought regulated trade 
with the indigenous population.
In 1817 they established a bi-annual trade fair at Grahamstown whim the Xhosa were permitted to attend. By 1824 trade fairs were being held three times a week at Fort Willshire; this meant that Xhosas were entering the Cape Colony on a regular and legal basis (Louw and Kendall 1986,7).
During these early stages, peasant production was 
controlled by the demands of the market. The 
Europeans promoted barter and trade with indigenous 
tribes with a view to transforming these subsistence 
farmers into "a class of indigenous farmers whose 
prosperity was dependent upon the regular sale of 
their surplus produce to white purchasers ..." 
(Southall, 1983, 6J) By the 1840's and 50's the 
natives were selling tobacco, firewood, cattle and 
milk, and selling surplus grain for cash or stock 
{Louw and Kendall 1986, 9). By 1865 loca*
production had improved so dramatically that native
agriculture was of a higher standard than European 
agriculture.
Taking everything into consideration, the native district of Peddle surpasses the European district of Albany in its productive powers(Bundy, 1979, 71).
As the indigenous people were exposed to more and 
more western material goods, they too began to show 
concern for the material accummulation of wealth and 
to avoid triba,'. laws prohibiting such practices. At 
the same time there was increasing encroachment of 
white fawners into the region which ..resulted in the 
increasing disposession of locals from their land. 
With their security becoming seriously undermined, 
many blacks began to rely more heavily on wage
labour for survival. Those peasants still posessing 
land still enjoyed good profits from their
production for the European market.
The discovery of diamonds at Griqualand West in 1867 
and of gold on the Witwatersrand in 1886 resulted in 
rapid population growth and an increased demand for 
farm produce from the peasants. By 1890 there were 
many progressive black farmers who had purchased 
their farms outright. They invested much of their 
profits in fences, walls, irrigation and improved 
stock breeds, and adopted the most advanced farming 
methods of the time. They lived in brick houses
(built by Europeans) and stocked them with 
furniture, crockery, cutlery, stationary and so on 
They were the mainstay of agricultural 
societies and associations, owning farms of up to 
1710 morgen (Louw and Kendall 1986, 10). The
discovery of diamonds and gold also had an impact on 
the demand for manual labourers. Manual labour was
needed foe the construction oE roads and railways as 
well as for the mining operations. To solve this
"legislators were in no way backward in 
establishing a framework of co-ercive laws and tax measures whose design and effect was to draw out a greater supply of labour from dominated and recently subjugated African communiti.s" (Southall, 1963, 70).
The introduction of a hut tax forced adults to find 
a cash income. This was generally achieved by the 
sale of cattle and crops. Those rendered landless 
by the colonial incursion or who had insufficient 
land to provide for even a meagre subsistence were 
becoming increasingly impoverished. In 1894 the 
Glen Grey Act drawn up by Cecil Rhodes became law in
the Cape. This act provided for individual land
tenure in black reserves on the basis of equal
distribution. To facilitate equal distribution of 
land, the Reserves were split into agricultural 
holdings of ten acres each, with no man being
allowed to own more than one lot. Louw and Kendall 
£ 1986) emphasise that this Act was aimed to increase 
the supply of labour to the mines.
The Government was well aware that ten acres of poor land could not provide for the needs of one family, and that most of the men would be forced out of the reserves onto the labour market (Louw and Kendall, 1986, 13).
This had the desired effect of the legislation, and 
many were forced to go and look for work on the 
labour market. This situation became even worse as 
overstocking, overpopulation and indebtedness 
increased. A major effect of these problems was 
that surplus production from the Transk’i region
began to decrease, a phenomenon that would result in 
food shortages for the indigenous people 
structural underdevelopment of the Transkeian 
economy became an issue. Bundy (1979) writes "The 
territories produced wage labourers somewhat in 
proportion to the extent that structural 
underdevelopment had been induced by the penetration 
of colonial rule and capitalist economic relations1' 
(Southall, 1983, 73).
The indigenous population had become increasingly 
aware of the root of their insecurity and in an 
attempt to move back to peasant .production in place 
of wage labour, Africans were trying to buy back 
land from white settlers. This was considered to be 
a threat to the supply of wage labour for the mines 
and was prevented by the passing of the 1913 Land 
Act limiting the size of Transkei.
The natural rate of population increase made 
overpopulation in Transkei a critical issue - a 
situation enhanced by the continuing decline of 
agricultural production. Agricultural production 
had been devastated by the 1894-5 drought, by the 
rinderpest epidemic of 1897 and by East Coast fever 
in 1910-11. As if natural disaster, legislation and 
a shortage of land were not enough, relative access 
to markets further destroyed peasant production. 
The European farmers and the peasants competed for 
similar markets, but the Europeans" enjoyed 
favourable legislation, state subsidies, reduced 
railage rates and better credit facilities - none of 
which were offered to the African peasants.
The iQt of the new wage labourer might not have been 
so bad had he been receiving a good wage. This had
not been the case. The mine owners - the dominant 
employers - had agreed amongst themselves to pay 
certain minimial wages to avoid competition for 
labour. Furthermore, wages were kept particularly 
low because it was assumed by the mine owners that 
the labourers were also in possession of small farms 
in the Transkei which would supplement their income. 
The lew wages paid, greatly improved the 
profitability of the mines. In fact the situation 
in the Transkei was rapidly worsening and the non 
migrant part of families were increasingly unable to 
eke out a subsistence for themselves, let alone 
-supplement the migrant labourers wage. -Chy••■migrant 
labourers wage was in fact becoming the major source 
of income for the whole family, a condition that 
still exists today (Abedian, 1983: Wakelin and
Haines, 1986).
The early thirties marked the decline of reserve 
agricultural production.
The tale is one of increasing pressure of population on deteriorating land, and the fall was not only in productivity per head, but in the total crop produced ... in the Transkei it was conspicuous a'fter 19-30 (Wilson 1971, 55-6) .
The migrant system also resulted in a shortage of 
active •-ocking males in the Transkei. By 1936 "the 
male a:-- .-r tees as a percentage of males aged 18-54 
was 53 per cent" {Southall, 1983, 77). This greatly 
affected the potential local work force, not to 
mention family and social life. It became 
increasingly evident that the population in Transkei 
was living below the bread line - malnutrition was 
rife, infant mortality was high, sanitation was poor 
and water supplies were insufficient, The
increasing pressusrj on the land in the Transkei also 
resulted in damage to the lands carrying capacity 
(denudation., ,donga erosion, destruction of forests) .
In stark contrast to the success of the Peddle 
district in 1865, where indigenous agricultural 
production was of better quality than European 
production, by 1940 conditions in the Herschel 
district were described as follows:
A lot of the area is mountainous and most of the rest is badly eroded, so chere is not much left for cultivation ... There is virtually no work in the whole area ... All forms of malnutrition are obviously a problem throughout the Reserve (Louw and Kendall, 1986, 11).
With the coming to power of the Nationalist 
Government in 1948, the policy of controlled 
allocation of migrant labour was changed to an all 
out attempt to stem the flow of Blacks to the white 
urban areas. As a result urbanisation of the 
Homelands became che major policy. So too, the 
reorganization of homeland agriculture became a 
priority. Although Betterment Schemes had been in 
use since the 19301s, proclamation 116 of 1949 
marked the full implementation of the Betterment 
Schemes. Land was demarcated by the authorities 
into residential, arable, forestry and grazing land. 
In practice resettlement was only undertaken after 
the publication of the Tomlinson Commission in 1955. 
With the co-operation of Chiefs and Headmen 
resettlement has continued steadily. By 1979 a 
total of 745 administrative areas had been planned 
and of these, 486 had been completed (Baskin, 1984, 
3). Betterment Schemes tended to benefit only the 
chiefs, headmen and wealthy peasants. The mass of 
poorer peasants bitterly resented them. In order to
implement this rehabilitation programme, the Bantu 
Authorities Act (1955) was implemented, in so doing 
consolidating the powers of the administrative elite 
and returning power to the tribal chiefs' (Southall, 
1983, 104).
In 1960 a policy of industrial decentralization was 
implemented. The results of the South African 
policy have already been discussed (Ch. 4). Suffice 
to say that political factors prevented the 
allocation of the massive resources needed to 
establish urban based industry, Furthermore, the 
application of growth pole theory .W decentralize 
industry was more politically based than 
economically viable.
SUMMARY
The picture of the current state of Transkei's 
economy, and the success of the adopti regional 
development policies to date, is 'bleak1 say the 
least. A quote by Prof W L Nkuhlu of the University 
of Transkei aptly sums up the situation. "... I 
wish to stats that the situation in Transkei is 
desperate ..." (Nkuhlu, 1984, 11).
One does not have to look far to find the reasons 
for this gloomy outlook. On the Transkei economy 
Thomas (1981) writes "... even the limited 
information available shows that Transkei's economy 
is currently far from buoyant and the prospects for 
any dramatic improvement are rather limited" 
(Thomas, 1981, 1).
Agricultural production, the cornerstone .of the 
Transkei’s economy has not developed at all; in
... over the last 20 years maize yields have been decreasing, this has been explained by pointing to populati'on growth, increased soil erosion, declining soil fertility and an increased build up of pests and diseases 
(Baskin, 1984, 9).
Land pressure continues to be a major problem. 
There is an overpopulation of hunvans and livestock 
and the resultant problems include severs erosion; 
decline in yields; poor condition of cattle; loss 
of natural resources such as game, fish and fruit; 
increasing malnutrition and a growing class of 
landless people (Baskin, 1984: Haines et al, 1984),
Industrialization - the pivotal element of the South 
African and Transkeian strategies - has proved very 
costly and has shown poor growth tendencies. Baskin 
(1984, 15} writes, "Estimates ... show that
employment in the industrial capitalist sector grew 
at annual rate of only 2,2 per cent compared with an 
estimate growth in the labour supply of 3.1 per cent 
between 1960 - 1980".
The demography of Tjr.anskei is also fraught with 
problems. As a result of the very high migrancy 
levels "..., the two age groups which create the 
biggest economic, political and/or social burden - 
juveniles and old age people - have increased 
fastest" (THOMAS, 1981, 5).
In terms of institutional arrangements, there is 
growing resentment by the local communities about 
the lack of representation, and the non-democratic 
choice of representatives. Further, allegations of 
bribery, corruption and power abuse are widespread 
(Southall, 1983: Haines et al, 1984: Wakelin and
Haines, 1986).
Finally, the case study itself will show that;
Transkei represents a classic case of a peripheralized, underdeveloped region, its 
internal economy is weak, it is highly dependent upon an external economy? -it is characterised by some economic sectors which are modernized 
and externally dominated and oriented, and cchers which are fragile and primarily 
orientated to survival; the economic and social welfare of the people is low, but significant variations occur spatially and in terms of class (Dewar et al 1984, 49).
5.3 TRANSKBI - PHYSIOGRAPHY AND. .RELATIONSHIP TO THE 
SOUTHERN AFRICAN SPACE ECONOMY
Transkei is situated within the south east section 
of Southern Africa. Transkei covers an area of 
43 798 km2. The geographical location of Transkei 
is between latitudes 30 degrees and 33 degrees south 
and longitudes 27 degrees and 30 degrees east. 
Natural boundaries are formed by the Indian Ocean, 
the Great Kei River and the Drakensberg mountains? 
This state also borders on Lesotho and the South 
African provinces of Natal and the Cape. It is 
evident from the maps included below, that Transkei 
is located in the outer periphery.
DIAGRAM 10
THE GEOGRAPHICAL LOCATION OF TRANSKEI IN RELATION TO THE 
SOUTH AFRICAN SPACE ECONOMY
SOURCE: Board, Davies and
As was staked in chapter 4, these 'outer peripheral1 
areas are characterized by a lew level of economic 
activity, a poor provision of service centres, a 
high level of outmigration, increasing population 
pressures, very low levels of income, high 
unemployment levels, a high level of malnutrition 
and high infant mortality rates.
The Transkei represents a classic case of a 
peripheralized underdeveloped region. Its internal 
economy is weak and it is highly dependent upon the 
South African economy. Historically the region has 
not been viewed as an important productive area 
within the Southern African space urocomy and has 
received little investment in infrastructure and 
services. The Transkei1s major contribution to the 
development of the Southern African economy has been 
through the production of migrant labour for the 
mining industry.
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DEMOGRAPHY
Estimates as to Transfcei's population, population 
growth cate and growth in the labour force vaty in 
the literature. The official statistics from the 
1980 Population Census suggest an overall population 
(de facto) of about 2,65 million in 1980 (Thomas, 
1981, 3), whilst Robinson (1981, 4) suggests a
figure of just under 3 million. Thomas (1981/ 3) 
estimates the population growth rate to be 2,67 per 
cent a year, a figure very similar to the official 
statistics of 2,6 per cent. Muller (1984, 7)
estimates a higher figure of about 3,0'per cent over 
the period 1964 to 1982. In terms of the growth in 
the labour force, Baskin (1984, 15) estimates a
growth rate of 3,1 per cent, a figure very similar 
to Muller's (1984, 7) prediction on the annual
growth in population.
The average population density in Transkei is 43 
persons/km2, with densities reaching up to 85 
persons/km^ in some administrative districts. The 
coastal areas have the highest densities, 
particularly in the north-eastern parts of the 
country whilst the drier more mountainous western 
areas have densities lower than 25 persons/km^ 
(Hawkins Report, 1980).
In terms of urban/rural ratios, it seems that about 
95 per cent live in the rural areas. (Robinson, 
1981, 4? Thomas, 1981, 4). Those living in rural 
areas live in scattered ’'-"esteads or consolidated 
villages. These vi'1' . lose as part of the
consolidation polic. the late 1950's. The
aim of this policy WL combine the arable and
grazing lands of individual homesteads and to
provide more services. About half of the rural 
population now lives in these villages (Robinson, 
1981, 4).
Of the urban population, about one half live in 
Omtata, (38 000) and Butterworth, (24 500). 
(ROBINSON, 1981, 4). The five per cent rate of 
urbanisation is low, "Compared to most other Third 
World countries such a rate is still extremely low" 
(Thomas, 1981, 4).
The age structure of the 'resident' Transkeian 
population is characterised by a large number of 
dependants. In 1980 it was estimated that some 42 
per cent of the total were under th.s age of 15 
(Thomas, 1981, 5).
In conclusion relative to the amount of land 
available in Transkei, the population is very large, 
resulting in a high population density, a feature 
which is compounded by the high population growth 
rate. The impact of population pressure not only 
affects the acces: to land and the viability of 
agriculture, but s* rerates a huge demand for 
employment for physical and social infrastructure 
which creates great demands on a limited central 
Government budget. The prohibitive population 
pressure limits the viability of rural agriculture 
because of a shortage of land.
EMPLOYMENT
Employment creation is regarded as the top priority 
in development planning in Transkei. The ability of 
the Transkeian economy to create employment is 
particularly low. Osmonde, Lange et al (1982,25)
V '
Indicate that in the north-east region only 13 per 
cent of the labour force is locally employed. The 
situation in the north-west region is even worse. 
Vandeverre et al (1985, 9) indicate that in this 
region only 9 per cent of the labour force is 
employed in local wage jobs. The south-east region 
is substantially better off in this respect, with 30 
per cent of the labour force locally employed. 
However, the South west region includes CJmtata, 
which has a significant impact on the -ynount of 
local employment. An important phenomi • to note, 
i. that in all three of the above reg' , as much 
as 50 per cent of all local employm. - is in the 
public sector (Osmonde, Lange et al, 1982, 1983: 
Vandeverre et al, 1985).
THE MIGRANT LABOUR SYSTEM
Muller {1984, 8) indicates that in 1982 two fifths 
of the Transkeian labour force was employed in a 
migran*- capacity.
Numti. . is problems characterise the migrant labour
phenomenon. The most obvious are serious social
pressures that arise from separating families. 
There are however, a n'unber of other serious
problems that face regional olanners/economists as a 
result of migrancy etv~.loyment. First, "the
relatively high returns on migration in comparison 
with subsistence product„or combine cumulatively 
with the legacy of underdevs.^opment to undermine the 
emergence of a peasant seu;>rrr" (Muller, 1984, 10). 
Secondly, although migrant labour provides a certain 
amount of remittances to bc\3ter local incomes and 
profits, tax revenues accrue to the country in which 
the labour is employed whilst the social costs fall
on the migrants' home country (Muller, 1984, 19). 
Thirdly, migrancy fails to relieve rural land 
pressures .because although the migrant himself 
can/could be classified as an urban worker, his 
family still remains in the rural areas of Transkei. 
The homelands have therefore become the dumping 
grounds for the old, the disabled and the young.
A number of 'problems' for the Transkei are however, 
eased by the migrant labour system. The most 
obvious of these effects is ‘ the provision of 
employment. Considering that about twenty per cent 
of the labour-supply in Transkei is unemployed, 
(Muller, 1984, 8: Nkuhlu, 1984, 4), if there were
to be a decline in the migrant labour opportunities, 
unemployment and increased social dissatisfaction 
would result. It must be remembered that "with more 
than half of all economically active men being 
employed as migrants for at least 8-9 months a year, 
migrant-earning trends have played a major role in 
determining household income levels" (Thomas, 1981, 
14).
Moll's (1984) survey of the 'Lower Roza 
Administration Area' in the Qumbu district, 
considered as one of the more prosperous peri-urban 
areas in Transkei (Moll, 1984, 39), illustrates the 
trend Thomas refers to. Moll found that migrant 
remittances were a very important soure of household 
income, constituting about 33 per cent of total 
household income. This fiaure was particularly 
remarkable in view of Moll's findings that migrants 
remitted only 20 per cent of their income. Moll's 
20 per cent remittancy ratio is, however, notably 
low in comparison with other similar studies 
performed in Transkei. Abedian (1983, 268) suggests
that about 40 per cent of migrants wages ars 
remitted. Both figures, however indicate that a 
remarkably large pa,r.t of ihouaehold income is based 
on migrant wages. More recent surveys by Wakelin 
and Haines (1986, 444) found that less than 20 per 
cent of household consumption is produced on the 
land, the remainder of income coming largely from 
remittances.
Of the numbers of people employed as migrant 
labourers, and of the creation of job opportunities 
in Tcanskei., Nkuhlu (1984, 6) writes: "The Transkei
is not in a position to absorb -the 420 000 
Transkeians who are now employed in the RSA, nor to 
provide employment for the additional 27 000 
expected to enter the labour market annually."
Finally, it must also be remembered that the income 
level of migrants is far higher than any comparable 
job Transkei could offer, i.e. "... a person could 
be unemployed for 9 years; work one year as a miner 
and still be better off than a worker who had spent 
the entire period in the subsistence sector ..." 
(Mullar, 1984, 10).
PUBLIC SL'CTOR EMPLOYMENT
The Government/Public sector provided a large share, 
34,00 per cent (Muller, 1984, 7), of the employment 
opportunities in Transkei in 1982. This job 
creation is largely the result of the development of 
a government bureaucracy. In terms of future job 
creation, this sector will reach, or may already 
have reached, a stage where it cannot expand any 
further. Nkuhlu (1983, 3) writes, "It is estimated 
that about 54 000 people are employed by the
Government this year. ... As far as I can see the 
Governmen1- is no longer able to absorb the annual 
increase a£ matriculants."
PRIVATE SECTOR EMPLOYMENT
The promotion of the private sector enjoys a very 
high priority in the South African and also in the 
Transkeian regional strategy. The promotion of the 
industrial sector was till recently seen as the 
major vehicle of this job creation. As was 
previously mentioned, private sector employment in 
Transkei is small. Mullex (.1984, 89) .suggests that 
22,4 per cent of the local employment opportunities 
are in the pri.ite sector. The number of persons 
employed in the industrial sector is small relative 
to the potential demand.
Estimates of the number of persons employed in the 
industrial sector vary. Muller (1984, 8) estimates 
only 14 000 in 1982, while for the same year the 
Transkeian Department of Interior suggests 28 000. 
Thomas (1983, 240) suggests a maximum of 20 000.
The message from these estimates is however, the 
same. Considering that the demand for jobs is about 
27 000 per year (Thomas, 1983, 227},
industrialization has not managed effectively to 
provide job opportunities which can offer labour 
non-migrant employment in Transkei.
There are numerous reasons for this lack of job 
opportunities, the main reason being that investors 
do not find Transkei an attractive investment 
proposition. It seems that not even the Government 
subsidies will provide a suitable stimulus. Muller 
(1984, 9) writes:
Even the substantially increased incentives announced at the Good Hope Conference in 1982 
are unlikely to 'be able to attract sufficient industries to overcome the legacy of structural underdevelopment and isolation from major markets.
The reason for this lack of investment is that the 
existing metropolitan areas of South Africa are 
still far too attractive for private investment 
compared to the essential underdevelopment in 
Transkei -
... it is impossible to fly in the face of the basic dynamic causing economic concentration: The presence of large markets, the possibilities of economies of scale in production, backward and forward linkages between industries, efficient communication services .... the presence of financial and other back-up services; the presence of high-order social and cultural services ..." (Dewar et al, 1984a, 93/4).
Dewar et al can be criticized on the above comment 
in the sense that, the more recent empirical data 
(as discussed in chapter 4) suggests that 
industrialists have become more responsive to 
industrial decentralization and deconcentration. 
Bell (1984, 1986) has also drawn, attention to the
increasing trend of spontaneous decentralization 
particularly to the deconcentration points. 
Although debate continues around Bell's findings, 
his empirical evidence, especially in his more 
recent work (1986, 277), is certainly worthy of
consideration (Tomlinson and Addleson, 1986). 
Particularly significant are Bells findings in 
relation to the changing spatial division of labour 
in the manufacturing industries. Bell's (1986)
analysis suggests that since the 1960's a 
combination of market forces, control of population 
movements in the metropolitan areas, restrictions on 
the use of black labour in the metropolitan areas, 
and the effect of increased trade union 
organisational activity {since the 1970's) have all 
played a part in encouraging a process of industrial 
deconcentration (Bell, 1986, 284).
Equally significant are the findings of Green and 
Hirsch (1982) and Mailings and Black (1986)
indicating that industrialists consistently refer to 
bhe incentive package, and particularly .the wage 
subsidies as the primary motivating force
encouraging decentralization. If one accepts that 
the incentives are the primary motivating force in 
industry decentralizing, then, even whilst 
acknowledging Bells findings, it appears that the 
amount of private investment in Transkei, 
particularly in the industrial sector, will be 
dependent on the cash incentives offered by the 
Transkei Government. Muller (1984, 9) suggests that 
these limits of 'generosity' for the Transkeian 
Treasury might already have been reached.
THE RURAL SUBSISTENCE SECTOR
The rural subsistence sector in Transkei experiences 
major problems. First, there is a shortage of land 
available for families to successfully grow an 
annual crop. A survey by Leeuwenberg, (1977, 16) 
showed that in 1977, 67,3 per cent of people in
Transkei could never produce enough to feed 
themselves and only 8,9 per cent could always
produce enough to feed themselves. A more recent 
survey by May (1985) based on the Umzimkulu
district, a region which "as a whols compares very 
favourably with the rest of the North East Region". 
(May., 1985., 23) indicates that biie performance of 
subsistence agriculture in Transkei is poor.
The findings of May, although based on a limited 
survey are indicative of the problems experienced 
with subsistence agriculture in Transkei. The most 
significant findings were that less than 14 per cent 
of the households surveyed were capable of producing 
enough maize to meet their own needs. Secondly, 
more that 48 per cent of the sample population was 
landless. This figure is well above other figures 
quoted by Baskin (1984) and Muller and Tapscott 
(1984) indicating figures of 20-30 per cent and 23,3 
to 28,6 per cent respectively, and as such should be 
considered somewhat higher " verage. Wakeling
and Haines (1986, 450) indx at even for the
few that have plots, agricu u. as a means of
subsistence is limited because the plots of land are 
too small. Thirdly, only 2.5 per cent of the 
landholders had any hope of meeting the requirements 
for self-sufficiency in terms of maize production. 
Moll (1984, 27) in his analysis of the Qumbu
district found that only 4 per cent were self- 
sufficient in maize production. Finally May, who 
suggests that cattle ownership is a means of 
providing a degree of economic security, a source of 
food and milk and a saleable item, indicates that 55 
per cent of the households sampled did not own 
cattle. Finally, Moll (1984, 37) also found that 
the poorest group in his survey were those surviving 
off agriculture only.
The critical nature of the above statistics is 
highlighted when one considers 95 per cent of 
Transkei's resident population live in rural areas.
A major problem which relates to the above findings, 
is that of population pressure on the land. This 
pressure can partly be attributed to a high natural 
birth rate and cultural preferences but mainly to 
the small amount of land granted to Transkei by the 
South African Government, a feature made worse by 
influx control legislation. The major cultural 
aspects affecting land pressure are the result of 
excessive commitment of " tnskeian savings to stock., 
and the phenomenon of communal grazing. There is a 
strong tendency for a person to keep stock longer 
than .he would .if -the cost ©f grazing had bo be borne 
by that person. By the same token, stock owners are 
in posession of far more stock units than they could 
conceivably afford were they to carry the burden of 
providing grazing for these animals.
what makes the 1 cattle complex' problematic is that in fulfilling his own ambitions, the individual disregards the costs he imposes on others, when his cattle consume the grazing, erode the land, spread disease etc. The basic reason for this disregard is free communal grazing (Southey, 1981, 48).
Population pressure is also increased as a result of 
the policies of the South African Government (since 
1948) stemming the flow of blacks to 'white South 
Africa'. This increase in population density places 
a great burden on the productivity of agricultural 
land and has caused a decline in agricultural 
production.
A further problem is migrancy. In the employment 
section of this chapter, and above, this phenomenon 
has been discussed. The returns on a migrant job 
are far higher than those which can be earned as a
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subsistence agriculturalist. Thus ... "The
relationship between migrant employment and 
subsistence .-ampLoyinent seems 'dear. As lun^ as the 
prospects for migration improve, the committment to 
the drudgery. and risks of peasant existence 
decline" (Muller, 1984, 11).
SKILL LEVELS IN TRANSKE1
Besides its agricultural land, Transkdi's only other 
major natural resource is its people. There is 
however, a major deficiency in the Transkeian labour 
•market and that is the quality of available labour. 
This low quality of labour available is partly 
responsible for and partly a result of, the region's 
structural underdevelopment. The low-skill levels 
encourage a lack of investment because the investors 
perceive the phenomenon in a negative light. At the 
same time, those industries which do locate in the 
region use mainly unskilled labour and this does not 
have any beneficial impact on the local skill 
levels. Nkuhlu (1985, S) indicates that 87 per ctint 
of the jobs created are in the unskilled labour 
category.
The shortage of skilled labour is also a feature in 
the public sector, "Virtually all government 
departments have numerous vacancies for engineers, 
architects, economists and technicians. This limits 
the capacity of the country to plan and implement 
development projects" (Nkuhlu, 1984, 3).
Because labour intensive industry attracted to the 
region further promotes these low-skill levels, and 
because other industry, requiring more highly- 
skilled labour will not locate in the region until
the skill-levels have been increased, it would 
appear that the Government will have to make some 
effort to -correct the situation. Nkuhlu .(1984, 11) 
writes "... The Government must initiate a training 
programme based on ... skill requirements. 
Financial incentives must be used to influence local 
nationals to obtain qualifications in the required 
fields" (Nkuhlu, 1984, 11).
UNEMPLOYMENT IN TRANSKEI
The degree of unemployment in the Transkei is very 
high. Nkuhlu {1&84, 4) and "Muller (1984, 8) offer 
the highest estimate at 20 per cent. Thomas (1984, 
2) suggests 16,5 per cent, and Dewar, Todes and 
Watson (1984, 81) suggest 16,0 per cent. In terms 
of absolute numbers, 16,0 per cent represents some 
145 000 people. More recent studies (1985) by the 
DBSA on the rural areas in Transkei indicate that in 
terms of the eighteen villages surveyed, of the 
5 707 potentially economically active people, 27.9 
per cent were unemployed. (DBSA, 1986, 58)
Findings by Dewar et al (1984a, 81) relating to job 
creation as a result of industrial decentralization, 
indicate that at Butterworth and Umtata, over the 
twenty years prior to 1964 only 11. 000 jobs were 
created. Compared to the increase of 27 000 job 
seekers per year, this is minimal. It is estimated 
that unemployment increases at about 4 000 per annum 
(Dewar, Todes 5 Watson, 1984, 81). Compared to
current job creation trends this is critical.
The situation is aggravated by the fact that 
currently, two out of five persons in the labour 
mcrket are migrants. The number employed in migrant
V!
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jobs appears to have been falling in recent years. 
"Available statistics on migrant employment suggest 
.a recruitment peak of about 425 000 men in 1978 
followed by a decline to about 345 000 in 1979 and 
1980" (Thomas, 1981, 6).
It seems that the unemployment issue is bound to 
become even more critical if job creation in 
Transkei continues at such a poor rate. Thomas 
(1981) writes.
Should the RSA economy cool off considerably and few new employment opportunities become available Eor 'outsiders', Transkei's internal socio-political stability could be endangered seriously as a result of increasing unemployment (Thomas, 1981, 7).
Finally, ecc.poisr Ung the serious shortage of 
employment opportunities available to people in 
Transkei, is the fact that 'commuter1 job 
opportunities to Transkeians are minimal. 
"Transkeians are poorly placed to engage in commuter 
labour. The nearest metropolitan area, Bast London, 
is more than adequately serviced by Ciskeians" 
(Mugler, 1984, 14).
CONCLUSION
The phenomenon of migrancy has both benefits and 
constraints. The major benefit is from the number 
of employmant opportunities it offers and the 
subsequent income that is remitted to families in 
Transkei. The major problems are social, and the 
negative effects migrancy has on agriculture.
The public sector is currently very ' large, but 
opportunities for future growth of employment are
very : >J ted, thus requiring the private sector to 
contriU4ue the majority of jobs in the future. The 
.perSormanoc in the privace sector has, however, been 
poor and it seems that even with the current 
incentives, Transkei has no alternative for the 
existing metropolitan areas.
The subsistence secc^r is beset --Lch problems: the
shortage of arable land; a vast number of people 
wishing to use the rural land? unequal access to 
land? and the comparative attractiveness of migrant 
labour job-opportunities.
There is a good supply of cheap labour, but this 
opportunity seems to be greatly reduced by the fact 
that the skill-levels of the labour force are very 
low, and act as a strong deterrent to investment.
Unemployment is currently a very serious problem in 
Transkei. The future looks depressing considering 
the poor record of job creation in the private 
sector, the overburdened existing agriculture 
sector, and the fully-staffed public sector. The 
problem becomes even more serious if one considers 
the number of people currently employed in migrant 
labour in South Africa.
5.6 AGRICULTURE IN TRANSKEI
Because of the lack of natural resources in 
Transkei, the existing resources of agricultural 
land are central to any planning strategy.
Devoid of any exploitable mineral resources, far away from major industrial centres or harbours, poorly located to compete with Ciskei - East London, Central KwaZulu and other industrial growth points, and ill suited to mass tourism or
other significant service industries, Transkei has little else other than its land resources to offer as a base for economic development ... no ■wonder ... that development plans have placed major emphasis on agricultural development (Thomas, 1984, 2).
AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION
"The aim of agriculture is to create a class of 
full-time peasant farmers who could produce crops 
and livestock for sale in the local and export 
market" (Nkuhlu, 1984, 5).
The success of .agricultural production in Transkei 
has been limited. Maize production and the 
livestock count are almost identical to what they 
were in the 1950's (Robinson, 1981, 6). Baskin
(1984) however suggests that maize yields have in 
fact been declining over the last twenty years. 
This has been explained by pointing to population 
growth, increasing soil erosion, declining soil 
fertility and an increased build up of pests and 
diseases.
There are, however, many reasons responsible for 
this failure. Public sector funding for rural 
development comes almost exclusively from the 
Central Government budget. In terms of the 
apportioning of the 'economic cake1, for the year 
1983/84, from total Government spending of R627 
million, spending on rural development - including 
schools, health, roads, pensions, drought relief and 
agriculture - amounts to some R168 million.
The table below shows the rural related-spending in 
Transkei for the 1983/ ’ 1 budget:
sr
TABLE 11 RURAL DEVELOPMENT RELATED SPENDING IN TRANSKEI 
(1983/84 BUDGET)
'000 %
Traditional leaders and Uibal district 097 1,2
administration
Agriculture 344 6,2
Education 53 899 32,1
27 914 16,6
Pensions 58 000 34,6
Parastatal organizations and special
projects 6 910 4,1
Post Offices 575 0,3
Government transport and road const!:. 3 650 2,2
Social Welfare and drought relief 3 057 1,8
Other construction and repairs 1 500 0'9
2,(57 946 IQO'O
SOURCE; Thomas, 1984, 5.
Taking a closer look at fche above table, it is 
interesting to note that only about 6,2 per cent of 
rural-related spending is specifically for 
agriculture. Even more significant is that in terms 
of the total central Government budget-, agriculture 
receives only 1,6 per cent of the total. Clearly 
then, although the importance of agriculture is 
stressed by development economists in Transkei, the 
budgeting would tend to indicate that agriculture 
and the idea of an 'integrated rural development'
(IRD) strategy is not enjoying the emphasis it 
deserves. The apparent acceptance of an IRD
strategy by Transkei's planners and policy makers, 
is in no way reflected by the current pattern of 
allocation of public funds" (Thomas, 1984, 6).
Future budgeting does seem to indicate a larger 
share of funds (:'> this sector for the 1983 - 1988 
planning horizon. It is proposed that projects 
relating to peasant farming should add up to R115 
million over the next five years, representing an 
increase of 18,1 per cent. Although this does 
represent a dramatic increase, Thomas (1984, 7-8) 
notes that
although the five year planning period started in 1983/84 the budget has not revealed absolute spending in the order of magnitude suggested. A further limiting factor could be the impact of the recession in South Africa. Considering that South Africa provides Transkei with most of its budget .... GNP = HI 907 million (1982) of which the R1 153 million comes largely from migrants" (Nkuhlu, 1984, 1).
The current economic squeeze 'in South Africa could 
lead to lower budget grants from South Africa to 
Transkei resulting in less jobs for Transkeians, and 
a cut in the number of Transkeian migrants, 
resulting in less remittances.
Another major problem affecting Transkeian 
agriculture is the growing land pressure and 
landlessness. The increased land pressure and 
landlessness in Transkei is caused by an over­
population of humans and livestock. Robinson (1981, 
G-7) outlines the, symptoms of this phenomenon
... replacement of cattle by smaller stock; increasingly severe soil erosion, critical shortage of manure, decline in crop yields? poor condition of cattle in drought years resulting in heavy stock losses; progressive disappearance of such natural resources as game, fish and Eruit, increase of malnutrition and the emergence of a growing class of landless people (Robinson, 1984, 6-7).
This overburdening of the land results in a loss of 
agricultural potential. This is a phenomenon that 
•<has .also 'been .found in a number of the South African 
'Homelands or National States'.
Most policy planners have tended to emphasize the importance of agriculture in development plans ... However, a thorough analysis of the possibilities of rural development leads almost inevitably to the conclusion that a massive outwards migration of people from rural KwaZulu is a necessary condition for the development of its agricultural potential (Buthelezi Commission, 1982, 172) .
The phenomenon of rural land pressure is closely 
linked to the incidence of urbanisation. In the 
following section on 1 Industry in Transkei1 the 
reasons behind the lack of urbanisation will be 
analysed. Needless to say, in 'T'ra.nskei, a similar 
problem exists to that which was referred to above 
in KwaZulu. Rural population pressure is inhibiting 
agriculture. The affect is that agricultural output 
from already established plots is diminishing and 
with population growth, more and more people need to
The existence of the above problem of landlessness 
has been investigated by Baskin (1984), May (1985), 
Wakelin and Haines (1986). Baskin’s (1984, 5)
survey reveals
We have thus deduced that right across the Transkei in all regions, magisterial districts and villages, the degree of landlessness falls within the range of 20 - 30 per cent. If anything, this range understates the degree of landlessness, for many households contained more than one family but had to remain as one because the younger married members could not obtain a separate kraalsite let alone arable land.
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Traditionally the allocation o£ land, to which all 
T-ranskeians are entitled, has been the
responsibility of the chiefs and headmen. The
'historical background' of Transkei revealed that 
the problem of landlessness is not a new one, and 
that it began largely as a result uf European 
migration into the Transkei region and the 
subsequent influx control measures instituted by the 
South African Government, which resulted in there 
being a shortage of land in Transkei. Thus the 
situation exists where it is not possible to 
allocate an -economically -viable plot of land to all 
Transkeians. The Chiefs and Headmen continue to
have the responsibility of allocating land to their 
subjects. A major problem that exists in this 
regard, is that the allocation of a limited supply 
of land has become subject to increased corruption 
and abuse. Land has been allocated on a 
preferential basis involving bribery and personal 
favours (Hammond-Tooke, 1975, 211; Southall, 1982, 
89? Baskin, 1984, 12). This unfair allocation of
land is exaccerbated by the fact that some land 
owners are accummulating far larger portions of land 
than others, leaving even less to be sub-divided 
between the poor.
COMMERCIALIZATION OP AGRICULTURE
The commercialization of agriculture is part of the 
'modernisation' paradigm of development. It is 
envisaged by protagonists of this approach, that 
agriculture in this form, will bring about more 
widespread development and upliftment in the rural
Fundamental to the above are the following 
assumptions, made in terms of the 'modernization' 
paradigm. Firstly, it is assumed that 'backward‘ 
peasant farmers will change their agricultural 
methods as a result of the demonstration effect 
provided by commercial farms. Secondly, the 
assumption that extra jobs and income will be 
provided for the rural surplus population by the 
emergent farmers and estates. Thirdly the internal 
multiplier will operate, by which the benefits of 
the export product will be retained within the 
region from which it originates, to provide for 
future investment. Fourthly, better-off farmers 
will have higher rates of savings and will re-invest 
in the rural areas. Fifthly, that a level of 
bureaucratic efficiency exists: That there is a 
plentiful supply of skills and resources and final]y 
that the creation of a surplus rural population will 
help to stimulate the formation of urban centres 
(Dewar et al 1984a, 97).
Dewar et al (1984a) go on to add that in practice, 
the demonstration effect has enjoyed some success 
and the exposure to new techniques and methods has 
given the locals new ideas. However,
the demonstration effect has been prevented from operating more widely by, on the one hand, the numerous and complex structural factors inhibiting general agricultural development, and on the other, by the huge gap between the high technology cash cropping of the estates and the subsistence - type agriculture practised elsewhere in the region.
As regards the improvement in skill levels, it has 
been found that the farmers serve more as a labour 
force instructed in a top-down fashion, than
-independent farmers learning a new range of modern
In terms of the creation of extra jobs and improved 
incomes/ the cost of agricultural job creation is 
still considered to be high in relation to
Transkei's resources (R6 300 per job). Further, the 
number of jobs created by such schemes'-3 is small in 
terms of the present and future demand for jobs in 
Transkei.
Incomes have also been found to offer little
competition for .migramt wages. An -analysis -by 
Dewar, Todes and Watson (1984a, 102) illustrates
clearly the futility of much of the agricultural 
pursuits by individuals on the present schemes.
The success of the creation of an internal
multiplier is based on the assumption that export 
earnings will remain within the Transkei region. 
However, analysis shows that
... it seems unlikely that estate farms canbreak into the South African market to any ..significant -degree and chances of breaking into markets beyond this are even more remote. The chances therefore, of generating revenue sufficient to provide a basis for future development must also be regarded with some scepticism (Dewar et al 1984a, 104).
In terms of bureaucratic efficiency, it has been 
mentioned before in this chapter (Employment) that 
there is a critical shortage of suitably skilled 
personnel in Transkei.
3 To date the main commercial farming enterprises have been a number of relatively capital intensive schemes (Ncora, Magwa and Majola Tea Estates).
Bearing the above in mind, it is obvious that it is 
extremely difficult to run high technology farming. 
As a result, this kind of expertise has to be 
imported (usually from South Africa) at great cost.
ORGANIZING RURAL DEVELOPMENT
At present, the Department of Agriculture and 
Forestry is the key department organising rural 
development matters. It has a limited capacity 
though, due to staff shortages, lack of senior 
management, lack ,of an efficient countrywide network 
of offices and a lack of transport and communication 
facilities. Bearing in mind the complexities of the 
agricultural issue it is not surprising that 
"Recent years have, unfortunately, repeatedly shown 
that depaitments find it difficult to initiate 
within their own spheres innovative, grass roots 
based development efforts" (Thomas, 1984, 9).
CONCLUSIONS
Agricultural potential is Transkei's major asset, 
because of a general lack of any other major natural 
resources. Its performance has been poor over the 
last 30 years and will continue to deteriorate as 
the population increases. Verbal support for the 
agricultural sector is sufficient, however, the 
policy support is not represented in the budget 
allocations and real expenditure. Commercialization 
of agriculture has had only limited success because 
there are so few employment opportunities relative 
to the migrant option. Furthermore, the incomes 
obtained from agriculture are low and offer little 
competition to migrant earnings. In terms of access
wto markets, the existing South African markets tend 
to be too competitive for Transkei produce.
As has already been mentioned in the employment 
section, the private sector has a very small share 
in total employment creation. e In evaluating the 
current success of this sector in Transkei, there 
are a number of questions to be looked at. Does the 
growth centre generate any self sustaining growth? 
To this end, important issues include the success 
attained in attracting industry, and the formation 
of agglomeration economies. Secondly, it is 
important to ascertain the regional impact of the 
policy. More specifically, what has the impact been 
on employment creation, income generation and 
service provision in the centres themselves and in 
the hinterlands?
The most important characteristics of propulsive industrie" are that they are large, modern, fast growing, capital intensive, form part of the most advanced sector of the economy and have a high degree of backward and forward linkages to 
other Indusb.cial sectors (Dewar et al, 1984a,66).
Two major problems suggested for this failure to 
attract industries are, first, that there is a 
shortage of skilled labour available locally. Thus 
the skilled labour component for any industry, needs 
to be imported at great cost. Second, that the 
comprehensive back-up services required for 
industry, as well as the required physical 
infrastructure, is not available.
In considering the formation of agglomeration 
economies in an urban area, one is primarily
•concerned with the provision of essential back-up 
services {banking, financial, repairs,
communications, utility services) and then the
provision of labour for industry, and finally a
market for products produced. In terms of Transkei, 
it has been found that in the development 'poles' 
these services are inadequately provided. The 
service structure in Butterworth and Umtata are both 
insufficient because they are not large enough
to generate sufficient thresholds to make the
establishment of an adequate range or level of 
services a viable proposition" (Dewar et al 1984a, 
71) .
Within the South African industrial decentralization 
strategy the disadvantages of locating in the outer- 
periphery, and in Butterworth and Umtata
specifically, were envisaged as disadvantages which 
could be offset by incentives to industrialists, 
making up for the lack of facilities and
agglomeration economies in the growth centres. In 
fact it can be argued that the incentives are very 
lucrative to an investor. The fact remains however, 
that to date, very little industry has been 
attracted into Transkei. Because incentives are 
offered in a 1 blanket system1 to all types of 
industry and to all aspects of the production 
process (labour, capital, . transport, training, 
relocations, housing, electricity) the problem
arises where 1 lame ducks', (firms which rely on 
subsidies to survive), are making use of the 
incentives. Branch plants tend to promote low- 
skilled and low-paid jobs (Stohr 6 Todtling, 1978). 
Branch plants also tend to have linkages over larger
distances and therefore make fewer purchases, have 
smaller multiplier effects and contribute to leakage 
outside the region.
On this issue of industries gaining incentives and 
not providing very much benefit, Mkuhlu (1984) 
argues that in the past, emphasis has been on job 
creation and not on the 'type' of jobs created, or 
on the multiplier effects a particular industry 
could have on a region.
The recommendation is that preference be given to industries that use local raw materials or are likely to use services of other industries in the region. In this way industrialists would have a multiplier effect which is not the case at present.... Industries whose onlycontribution to Transkei is wages paid tounskilled labour, are still being accepted ....it is unwise to accept industries that are not likely to contribute to enhancing the level of skills of Transkeians, use no Transkeian produced raw materials or parts and produce products that are of no use to Transkeians (Nkuhlu, 1984, 6-9).
Nkuhlu's final comment that many of the industries 
locating in the region are of no use to Transkeians 
is, however, somewhat short sighted in the sense
that job creation in Transkei is of primary 
importance, and any industry that provides 
additional employment does have a direct benefit. 
Where Nkuhlu is correct though, is that the South
African tax payer may well be subsidising some
unprofitable industries who rely on the incentives
offered to operate. This is, however, a feature 
that has arisen from the South African Government's 
persistence with promoting industrial development at 
the various IDP's. It is for this reason that the 
Transkei Development Corporation (TDC) has to accept
i l
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any industry which will provide employment for 
Transkeian labour.
Thus the failure to attract industry to the 
decentralized industrial points is not entirely the 
fault of the incentive system. As was previously 
mentioned, the South African strategy based on 
industrial decentralization through 'growth poles' 
deviates from the theory, in that the 'growth poles' 
have been located too far from the existing core 
areas, in centres that to date have grown very 
little and may in the future continue to be 
ineffectual.
Baskin (1984, 9) predicts that even the
substantially increased incentives announced in the 
1982 White Paper "are unlikely to be able to attract 
sufficient industries to overcome the legacy of 
structural underdevelopment and isolation from major 
markets."
The above prediction by Baskin receives support from 
studies by Wellings and Black (1986) and Bell (1986) 
whose findings indicate that there is a tendency for 
industrialists to ^relocate to the deconcentration 
points rather than the IDP’s. Further, the 1982 
White Paper and the subsequent 1986 White Paper on 
urbanisation illustrate -a changing emphasis of the 
South African Government towards the promotion of 
centres with a greater natural potential for 
generating growth.
In terms of the regional impact of the policy, the 
first point to look at is the benefit to the pole 
itself. Questions to be asked are: Has there been
an increase in incomes? Has there been an increase
in employment? Has there been an improvement in the 
types of urban services available?
The wages offered by industries in Butterworth are 
low in relative terms. For unskilled labour, they 
are between 35% and 57% of the national average and 
in absolute terms R104,05/month as opposed to the 
household subsistence level of R236,56/month (Dewar 
et al 1984a, 84).
With respect to unemployment, the creation of a 
total of approximately 11 000 job opportunities in 
Butterworth and Umtata (Thomas, 1983, 47) relative 
to the over 150 000 unemployed, represents a 
minuscule amount, a phenomenon worsened by the fact 
that it appears that those industries moving to 
decentralization points are becoming increasingly 
capital intensive (Mailings and Black, 1986; Kok, 
1986; Maasdorp, 1985).
In terms of the urbanisation of population - rather 
than having resulted in a much better su oly of 
urban services, industrial growth has simply 
resulted in an overburdening of the listing 
services in Butterworth and Umtata. This phenomenon 
is made worse by the fact that there is a general 
rural -to urban migration occurring as people search 
for employment. "This rural urban trend places 
increased pressure on Umtata and Butterworth to 
provide housing, utility and social services as well 
as jobs for a rapidly increasing population" 
(Robinson, 1981, 8).
In terms of the impact of the pole on its 
hinterland, as was outlined in Chapter 2 the growth 
pole should have such an impact through the purchase
of raw materials and foodstuffs from the hinterland; 
through wage remittances to rural families? through 
absorption of surplus population off the .land and 
through the spread of capital from the pole into the 
hinterland.
The previously mentioned study by Dewar, Todes and 
Watson (1984a) shows that the problem facing 
Transkei is that raw materials are, in many cases, 
produced more cheaply and reliably in South Africa 
than in Transkei. The South African goods are 
cheaper because they are greatly subsidised 
(Bembridge, 1986) and finally, as was discussed in 
the previous section on agriculture, agriculture 
faces numerous problems with commercialization.
It has already been mentioned that industrial wages 
are very low because of the unskilled nature of 
employment and the labour surplus market. Bearing 
this fact in mind, it is clear that the amount of 
money remitted can be very small. "In terms of the 
scale of rural poverty, ... the effect of 
remittances from the pole must, ... be minimal"
(Dewar et al 1984a, 88). The magnitude of the
problem to be faced in Transkei 4-s apparent when one 
considers that 60 per cent of the presently rural 
population will have to be urbanised to allow the 
commercialization of agriculture (Development 
Strategy, 1980-2000) This means that 200 000 extra 
jobs need to be created in Industry by the year 
2000. The seemingly impossible nature of this task 
is reinforced when one considers that only 11 000 
jobs have been created in Bufcterworth and Umtata in 
the last 15 - 20 years.
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The spread o£ capital from the 'pole' into the 
region, occurred in advanced capitalist economies 
when diseconomies o£ scale arose and economic 
activity moved away from the pole to cheaper land 
and labour, and less congestion of land uses and 
traffic. The 'growth poles' in Tranakei are 
however, both far too small to experience such 
diseconomies and are growing at far too slow a rate 
to experience such diseconomies in the foreseeable
CONCLUSION - INDDSTRY
To date, few industries and no propulsive industries 
have located in Transkei. The reason for this lack 
of investment is unquestionably the lack of 
agglomeration economies and the poor quality of 
labour available. Although the incentives offer :i 
to industrialists are substantial, they still do r.,c 
compare with the perceived disadvantages of locating 
in the Transkei.
The regional impact of the policy has been minimal 
with incomes being low, unemployment being high, job 
creation remaining very low.
The effect on the hinterland has been small, with 
local purchasing power still centering on the South 
African markets wher? food and produce are more 
readily available and at lower cost.
Industry has failed to absorb any major proportion 
of the rural population - there has not been 
anywhere near enough urbanisation and the prospects 
for the future are dismal.
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INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS
The purpose behind an analysis o£ the institutional 
arrangements in the Transkei is to broaden ones
understanding of the current interventive context in 
terms of its socii1. structure, power relations and 
administrative dynamics. This in turn highlights 
alliances ar..-: ccn^ a'i/.cr. i m s , strengths and
weaknesses of the str-cf-ur". Ir, rerms of these
relationships one can begin to understand the
population's perceptions of the institutional 
arrangements, their implications for intervention 
and finally one can apply this knowledge to
implementation of suggested policies and projects.
RURAL SOCIO-SPATIAL ORGANISATION
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Generally speaking rural spatial organisation can be 
broken down into four main categories. At the 
lowest scale 1 scattered homesteads' exist. These 
homesteads consist merely of a group of huts 
clustered around some natural resource, usually a 
water supply or brushwood. A group of homesteads is 
called a 'location section'. These location 
sections are usually separated spatially from one 
another and are based upon a common lineage. In 
charge of this unit is a sub-headman who in turn is 
responsible to and appointed by a headman. Four or 
five location sections make up a 'location' usually 
about 80km^ in extent (Hammond-Took 1975, 16). In 
charge of this unit is a ‘headman’ (appointed by the 
government) who has far reaching powers controlling 
the basic means of production that is the access to 
land, and the ability to impose taxes on his 
subjects. The control of the headman results in his 
authority being crucial to administrative processes 
and his far reaching powers impose (possibly by 
coersion) solidarity and loyalty of his subjects 
(Haines et al, 1984). Finally, 30 or 40 locations 
make up a magisterial district controlled by a 
magistrate.
Overlapping this traditional structure are the 
Tribal Authorities (of which there are 165) 
instituted by the Bantu Authorities Act of 1951. 
The institutionalisation of the tribal authorities 
has been criticised as being a political manoeuvere
the ... source of chiefly authority lay in a new, four-tiered administrative structure which, by emphasising the legitimacy of tradition, sought expressly to limit popular participation in decision making and to place local government in the hands of a conservative elite (Southall, 1984, 104).
The size of the tribal authorities varies, but they 
all have 'locations' as their basic components - 
these locations are never shared by chiefdoms. 
Criteria for the chiefdomship at the time of 
implementation was clear proof of descent from the 
last known Chief. The heads of the various tribal 
authorities in a 'district1 together form a district 
authority of which there are 28 in Transkei. 
Districts are in turn grouped into 'regional 
authorities1.
The most important strand of government is now the 
tribal authority. The balance of power lies 
predominantly with the Chiefs who have become 
closely associated with tfe Government. Before the 
introduction of the Bantu Authorities system in 1955 
Chiefs had only enjoyed limited judicial authority. 
With the introduction of the new system, the power 
of the Chiefs was greatly increased. The Chiefs 
were given 1 ex officio' membership of the 
Territorial Authorities, they could claim taxes, 
they controlled the Regional Authorities and they 
are integrally involved in the judicial system 
(Southall, 1-983). TJiis close .association, has in 
some cases resulted in Chiefs resenting this 
situation because their subjects feel that they are 
no longer represented fairly by the Chiefs, as much 
as the Chiefs represent, and implement Government 
policy (Klopper and Krone, 1984, 64).
Dissatisfaction also exists because headmen are 
excluded from participation in the Tribal 
Authorities Council. The 'location' which lends 
itself to grass-roots intervention (controlled by a 
headman) is therefore not adequately represented. 
For this reason, participation can' be hijacked by
people wishing to serve and propagate their own or 
state interests.
Tribal authorities are divided into Regional and
District Authorities. Their main function being to 
serve as guide and advisor to the Chiefs in the
exercise of local administration. The chiefs at 
entrusted with wide and varied responsibilities, the 
most important being law and order, control of 
workseekers and unauthorized influx into urban 
areas. The Chiefs also assumed the power to
allocate land, formally a responsibility of the
headman. Tne control of the judicial system by the 
Chiefs effectively prevents any official complaints 
by the locals against the Chiefs as regards the
abuse of responsibilities. The Chief is the arbiter 
in the Tribal Authority courts, and as such can
reject and accept cases as he sees fit. T
councillors are unlikely to go against his judgeme 
because, 1 whilst the judgements of the Chief ,
court must, in theory be ratified by h u
councillors, it is generally recognized that these 
officials are supportive of his actions" (Haines et 
al, 1984, 15). Clearly then, the responsibilities 
of the Chief® are open .to .abuse. "A number of
chiefs come to demand payment for their services as 
intermediaries between the central state and their 
subjects - payment from the former as well as the 
latter" (Haines et al, 1984, 7}.
The Chief's assumed responsibility for the
allocation of land is also open to abuse and
widespread use of bribery (Baskin, 1984; Southall, 
1983).
li
State pensions made via the chief or headman are 
also often abused. The pensions can and have been 
.refused "where individuals (or their families) have 
fallen into disfavour or are seen as trouble makers 
(Haines et al, 1984, 16).
A further problem that faces the Chiefs role in 
Transkei as a representative of his subjects, is 
that by becoming more closely associated with the 
Government, he has also become associated with the 
South African Government and as such is viewed as a 
part of the South African political machine.
Greater power meant diminished legitimacy. Chiefs were no longer perceived as intermediaries between the state ano its followers, but unambiguosly as the instruments of the South African State (Beinhart and Bundy, 1978, 305).
In terms of planning and policy implementation, the 
tribal authority system is the primary 
administrative structure through which rural 
development programmes are channelled. District 
commissioners who oversee the Chiefs and headman, 
have expressed dissatisfaction with the system 
because of their lack of co-operation and lack of 
training.
Other implementation problems are that there is no 
government department specifically assigned to 
implement rural development - rather aspects are 
covered by a number of largely " autonomous 
departments: Agriculture, Health, Works and Energy,
Local Government and Land Tenure. Not surprisingly 
there has been very poor co-operation and co­
ordination between departments.
CONCLUSION
Any proposed planning sfcategy and policies are 
obviously affected by the institutional 
arrangements. The above discussion isolates a 
number of problem areas which will affect the nature 
of proposals and the effectiveness of subsequent 
project implementation.
Clear from the previous discussion is that there are 
serious limits to the possible effectiveness of 
public participation in the planning process, and in 
the making of decisions that affect the lives of the 
local communities. Decision making comes from the 
Government via the Chiefs and headmen down to the 
local population, and there appears to be very 
little evidence of a reverse flow of information.
Any future proposals involving public participation 
will have to look at both the cause and the symptoms 
in the sense that even if the institutional 
arrangements and the major actors were to become 
more receptive to a bottom-up or grass roots 
decision making process, it appears that the local 
communities will take some convincing that the 
system can work for them. It is necessary to have a 
degree of power devolution to the grass roots level, 
to encourage local initiative and promote local 
enthusiasm.
.9 PHYSICAL INFRASTRUCTURE
The major elements of physical infrastructure in 
Transkei include the road network, the provision of 
running water, sewerage provision and power 
provision.
Analysis performed in the north-eastern area 
(Osmond, Lange et al 1982, 29) found that improved 
road access and public transport provision is a high 
priority (second only to water provision) amongst 
rural dwellers. The quality of roads in Transkei 
deteriorates sharply as one moves from the urban to 
the rural areas - an aspect which negatively 
influences access to other activities and services 
for the population (particularly the rural 
population) and pushes up the costs of public 
transport.
According to Dewar et al (1984, 63) public transport 
concentrates on main routes, particularly those 
passing through Butterworth and Umtata. Access to 
these centres from the rural areas, and between 
rural areas is very poor.
Inadequate access to clean water is a major problem 
in Transkei, and particularly in the rural areas. 
Dewar et al (1984a) indicate that water supplies 
were adequate in only 16,95 per cent of Transkei. 
Almost half of the Transkei was classified as being 
'needy' in terms -of water supply. Wakelin and 
Haines (1986, 445) survey of 18 villages found that 
most villages were inadequately supplied, and in 
those that were supplied, the quality of water was 
poor, because humans and cattle shared the same 
source. Furthermore, more than half the households 
surveyed had to walk more than 1,5 km to obtain 
water. Analyses done by Osmonde, Lange et al 
(1982, 1983) and Vandeverre et al (1985) found
similar results for the north-east, the south-east 
and the north-western regions of Transkei. Urban 
areas are considerably better serviced than the 
rural areas, having piped, reticulated water.
Sewerage systems in the small urban areas are 
predominantly of bucket systems and septic tanks. 
The rural areas use the most basic system of pir. 
latrines.
Electricity is supplied from ESCOM in only four 
towns, namely Butterworth, Umtata, Idutywa and 
Umzimkulu. Most of the other urban areas of
Transkei rely on diesel generation for electricity. 
The rural areas are predictably worst off, relying 
on wood for cooking and candles and paraffin for
lighting. The use of natural fuels in an
uncontrolled and unplanned manner has resulted in
the denudation of forests.
SOCIAL INFRASTRUCTURE
HEALTH
There is a paucity of information as regards health 
conditions in Transkei, but the high rates of infant 
mortality, starvation and infectious diseases 
reflect the poor environmental conditions in 
Transkei. The infant .mortality rate is regarded as 
a health indicator of the level of development and 
availability of primary health care services in a 
country (Klopper and Krone, 1984, 189). In
Transkei, the infant mortality rates are between 
130-155 per thousand (Thomas, 1983, Ligthelm, 1984). 
These rates are high in relation to the rates of 9,4 
for whites, 18,8 for coloureds, 20,4 for Asians, 
34,6 for Africans experienced in Cape Town (SAIRR 
1982, 528). Most of the infant deaths result mainly 
from malnutrition. Tuberculosis is the dominant 
infectious disease experienced in Transkei,
accounting Cor 14 per cent of all cases reported in 
South Africa as a whole (SAIRR, 1982, 527).
Health facilities range from primary health care 
services, provided through 171 static and 
residential clinics plus 44 mobile clinics, and are 
operated by nurses. The second level of health .care 
is provided at a number of general district 
hospitals staffed by doctors. Specialist or 
tertiary health care is found in Butterworth and 
Umtata. This level of health care consumes the vast 
majority of health resources, allowing only 10 per 
cent of the annual budget to be spent on primary 
levels of care as opposed to the 60 per cent 
allocated to tertiary level services {Hawkins 
Report, 1980,. 132). Wakelin and Haines (1986, 445) 
indicate that although people have to walk great 
distances to reach medical facilities, the reliance 
on western medicine has increased. It is 
interesting to note in this regard, that among the 
criticisms of rural clinics is that they do not 
dispense sufficient medicine or administer enough 
injections.
In terms of the above information, it is apparent 
that the primary level, which is care delivered at 
the point of contact between the patient and the 
health service is gaining the least support from the 
Government. This level also has the potential to be 
most accessible to the population living in the 
rural areas.
EDUCATION
The Hawkins Report (1980) indicates that over 50 per 
cent of the de facto population in Transkei had
received little or no education in 1970. Literacy 
levels are low, with only 22 per cent of the 
population having passed standard two, and only 7 
per cent of the population having passed standard 
seven. Statistics on the levels of attendance at 
school in 1978 show that as much as 83 per cent of 
children of school going age do attend schools 
(Hawkins Report, 1980, 128) but that the quality of 
education received is unsatisfactory. The reasons 
for this were isolated as being due to, high pupil- 
teacher ratios, poorly qualified teachers and the 
perception by the locals that education is inferior 
to 'white' education.
The provision of education facilities favours the 
more highly urbanised south-west of the region, with 
the north-east being particularly badly serviced. 
There is a bias in Government budgeting towar 
spending on education in the urban areas and 
tertiary rather than primary and pre-sci-
education.
5.11 PROBLEM STATEMENT 
DEMOGRAPHY
1. The Transkei experiences a high population
growth rate, a feature compounded by a shortage 
of land resulting in high population density on 
the land.
2. In terms of urban/rural ratios there are
particularly few urban dwellers. This fact, 
coupled with the limited amount of land
available and the large number of population,
results in very high rural land pressure.
r3. Because of the low urbanisation levels, 
agriculture is forced to support far more people 
than it can accommodate. This results in non­
economic farming units and poor agricultural 
production.
4. The Transkeian age structures are such that 
relatively few people of a working age are 
required to support a large number of 
dependants.
EMPLOYMENT CREATION
1. There is a particularly high incidence of 
migrancy which has numerous social and economic 
problems.
2. Employment in the public sector is large, but it 
would appear that this sector's capacity to 
provide jobs has been exhausted.
3. The growth of employment opportunities in the 
private sector has been small. Further, the 
cost of creating jobs in this sector has been 
particularly expensive.
4. The subsistence sector is beset with problems, 
the major ones being the shortage of arable 
land, the attractiveness of migrant labour and 
the large population living in the rural areas.
5. In terras of labour supply available, although 
the large supply of cheap labour is a potential 
advantage to investors, the critical shortage of 
labour of a semi-skilled and skilled nature has
a negative effect on the investment potential of 
Transkei.
■5, Unemployment is a critical problem in Transkei - 
the prospects are made less attractive by the 
fact that the past performance of the priva 
sector in job creation has been particula
AGRICULTURE
1. Agriculture has performed unsatisfactorily over 
the last 30 years.
2. Rural population densities are prohibitive to 
agriculture in Transkei.
3. There is a lack of Government support fee 
agriculture.
4. The commercialisation of agriculture faces ms 
problems in view of the fact that the locals a. 
slow, and in some cases hesitant, to learn ne~ 
skills; the number of jobs created is small; 
the existing South African market is dominant; 
and there is a shortage of suitably skilled 
labour in Transkei.
5. Access to land in Transkei is unequal with 
landlessness being a major problem.
INDUSTRY
1. Few industries have been attracted to the
Transkei.
i2. Related to the point above, agglomeration
economies intended to stimulate self-sustaining 
growth are not evolving, and the possibility of 
them forming in the future is bleak.
3. Although the incentives offered in this region 
are particularly lucrative, they still do not 
outweigh the perceived disadvantages of locating 
in the outer periphery.
4. The regional impact of the policy has been
slight - incomes are still very low; job
creation is inadequate compared to unemployment 
and the cost of job creation is prohibitive.
5. Industry has failed in its task or relieving
scwue of the ruial population pressure through 
the creation o£ urban-based employment.
INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS
1. There is little scope for local level or
community based participation.
2. Representation of the rural population is non-
democratic and the appointed representatives are
in some instants not trusted by their subjects.
PHYSICAL INFRASTRUCTURE
1. The region is lacking in the basic
infrastructure necessary to attract private 
investment.
2. The rural areas have a very poor provision of 
infrastructure which inhibits rural development.
SOCIAL INFRASTRUCTURE
1. There is a very low level of literacy and a very 
small percentage of people who have passed 
standard six.
2. There appears to be a shortage of appropriately 
qualified persons and a lack of training 
programmes.
3. There is a shortage of staff for both hospitals, 
clinics and schools.
4. Financial assistance to health services is not 
aimed at preventative health care.
Ch. 6. PLANNING IN TRANSKEI
INTRODUCTION
Central to Transkei's development strategy is the 
greatest possible increase in the earnings and 
social welfare of the labour force. To this end, 
emphasis is placed on the promotion of agriculture 
and local industry. in an effort to improve 
conditions in the rural areas and to provide labour 
intensive employment, emphasis is placed on rural 
development. Related projects are under the 
guidance of the central Government Rural Development 
Steering Committee and committees established at the 
magisterial district level to promote community 
level involvement.
A number of development agencies have also been 
established by the National Planning Committee (NPC) 
to co-ordinate the implementation of the 
Government's planning policies and to implement 
central government policies. These include the 
Transkei Development Corporation (TDC), Transkei 
Agricultural Corporation (TRACOR), Transkei 
Appropriate Technology Unit (TATU), .and Transkei 
Small Industry Development Organisation (TRANSIDO).
Broadly speaking, Government planning policy can be 
divided into policies affecting employment (included 
here, the primary, secondary and tertiary sectors), 
social development policies and spatial development 
policies.
EMPLOYMENT POLICIES
From the 1 Development Priorities and Public Sector 
Spending' White Paper of 1982, it is evident that 
the key sectors in the development strategy are seen 
to be those which generate exports (forestry, hydro­
electric power and tourism) and those which replace 
imports {crop and livestock production, forestry, 
fisheries, quarrying and manufacturing of locally 
required goods).
THE PRIMARY SECTOR
There has been conflicting debate over the reasons 
for the apparent failure of agriculture. Official 
sources have argued in the past that the quality of 
land given to the homelands includes some of the 
countries most productive, and the the reason for 
the failure of agriculture is that black peasants 
have simply not maxiraised their opportunities 
(Southall, 1983, 222-223). This arguement is in
stark contrast to i-he previous evaluation of the 
decline of agriculture in Transkei. However, 
without repeating the previous discussion at this 
stage, the arguement previously stated is more 
convincing and more carefully documented than the 
notion that black farmers are, to put it sinply, 
'backward1. In fact historical evidence, previously 
discussed, is convincing in the manner in which it 
depicts the African farmer as being quick to react 
to favourable market forces and to reap the benefits 
from the capitalist system (Louw and Kendall, 1986).
As has previously been mentioned, the Tomlinson 
Commission suggested numerous agricultural reforms 
to complement the proposed industrial
decentralization programme. The Commission adopted 
the stance that black agriculture was deteriorating 
as a result of poor farming methods and as such the 
modernisation and commercialization of agriculture 
was recommended. The Commission suggested that the 
reserve population be divided into two classes, one 
dependent upon wage labour and one dependent on 
peasant farming.
The plot sizes recommended by the Commission were 
about 52 morgen per family. Those unable to obtain 
land would go and work as urban based wage labour. 
This proportion was by far the greater. 
Approximately 71 per cent of the Reserve population 
would be transformed into a landless class 
(Southall, 1983, 224).
In an effort to modernise agriculture, the 
Commission suggested that Betterment Schemes be 
implemented. These Betterment Schemes involved 
reorganizing the rural land into residential, arable 
and grazing land. It was also suggested that a
portion of the rural population be settled on 
irrigation schemes to promote more effective farming 
methods on smaller plots of land. The
recommendation that the existing tribal tenure 
system be replaced by a form of freehold was not 
received favourably by the Transkei Government. The 
reason for this was that freehold tenure would 
undermine the existing tribal structure.
Furthermore, the Betterment Schemes were costly.
For these reasons, the implementation of the 
Commissions proposals was gradual. However,
Southall (1983, 225), indicates that by the 1980's 
Betterment Schemes have been widely implemented in 
Transkei, and have become "increasingly acceptable
as beneficial results became apparent". The issue 
of promoting freehold tenure remains a thorny one 
because this system would effectively undermine what 
is one of the Chief's major privileges, that is the 
allocation of plots. Wakelin and Haines (1986, 450) 
find that the land tenure problem has important 
negative effects on rural attitudes. Linked to the 
complaints about smallness of allocated plots, was a 
very real sense of insecurity of tenure, 
particularly in those settlements which were waiting 
or undergoing rehabilitation. However, bearing in 
mind that the Chiefs predominate in the Ti ' caucus, 
the Commission's suggestions wilj remain 
unimplemented for some time (Southall, 1983). The 
principle of freehold has, however, been accepted in 
Pingoland, and Southall (1983) argues that if it is 
successful, the commercialization of land values 
might be difficult to stop.
Since the Betterment Schemes were often poorly 
received, use has also been made of 'group farming1. 
The groups farms or co-operatives are motivated on 
the grounds that the land units are too small. The 
success of these farms has according to Southall 
been minimal, Southall (1983), however, does not 
explain in any detail why group farming and the use 
of co-operatives have failed. Certainly other 
studies in third world countries have shown that, 
group farming and the use of co-operatives can be 
beneficial (Bratton, 1986: Sinha, 1984). This is
an issue that is further discussed in the policy 
section, but it is the author's contention that the 
failure of group farming and co-operatives may be 
largely attributed to the lack of back-up services 
and Government support. Grindle (1985), Bratton 
(1986), Dewar et al (1984a) and Sinha (1984)
indicate very clearly the important role Government 
has to play in this respect. Southall also suggests 
that the success of the irrigation schemes advocated 
by the Commission has been minimal. The costs o£ 
implementing the Ncora scheme (R40 million) is very 
high and the amount o£ land under irrigation is very 
small {Southall, 1983). Recent surveys by Nakelin 
and Haines (1986) find that subsistence farmers have 
suffered as a result of Betterment Schemes. May 
(1985, 18) expands on the problem explaining that 
betterment has been roorly implemented. The result 
this has been the partial and unco-ordinated re- 
ation of land for resettlement, which in turn 
,xed in both a high indicence of landle. ' >‘ss, 
d skewed distribution of landholdings.
The commercialization of agriculture by official 
agencies has shown mixed results. Little has been 
done about the promotion of livestock farming, but 
the Transkeian Government and the TDC have become 
involved in a few ventures - namely the Magwa and 
Majola tea estates, some phormium tenax projects, 
coffee projects and sugar projects. Forestry has, 
however, been the longest standing joint venture 
having been pursued on .a large scale. Haines (1985, 
543) indicates, that one possible exception to the 
criticisms of Betterment Schemes and estate farms is 
the forestry projects. The major benefit that has 
been forthcoming from this sector, is its positive 
contribution to the slowing, and even the reversing 
in some instances, of ecological deterioration in 
the Transkei.
However, what is obvious from the analysis of 
Transkeian agriculture since 1948-9 is that rural 
development has played second fiddle to the
promotion of industrial development. Thomas' (1984, 
5) earlier statistics on the Transkeian budget 
allowances are very informative - only 1,6 per cent 
of the 1983/4 budget allocations was for 
agriculture.
Agriculture is viewed as the largest and most 
important sector of Transkei's economy and icust 
therefore make the greatest contribution to meet the 
Government's central goals of employment creation 
and increased food production. To this end the 
Government has advocated the promotion of a class of 
full time peasant farmers, who would produce crops 
and livestock products for sale on local and export 
markets. In terms of implementation, the Government 
recognises the need for participation of rural 
people in project identification, planning and
implementation. The Regional and Tribal authorities 
are seen by the Government to be the major bodies 
involved in the promotion of consultation with local 
communities.
It is important to bear in mind the potential 
conflicts that might arise from this arrangement. 
The Tribal Authorities no longer engoy the 
confidence of their subjects. The Chiefs are
viewed, in some cases, as being "puppets" of the
South African Government and of the Transkei 
Government. They are also accused o£ bribery and 
abuse of their allocated responsibilities (Baskin, 
1964; Haines et al, 1984). For these reasons, any 
planning strategy involving public participation 
could well be faced with a lack of co-operation,
distrust and disinterest from the locals.
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Highest priority is given to projects which improve 
crop and livestock production and promote the use of 
technologies appropriate to peasant farming. TATD 
is involved in the development and implementation of 
such technologies and is also involved in a number 
of rural development projects aimed at the community 
level. The goals of TATU concentrate on human and 
natural resource development in order to encourage 
economically viable development at the lowest 
possible cost. The technology it employs is simple 
and easy to understand, and involves labour 
intensive techniques. Encouragement and assistance 
is given to rural communities to undertake self-help 
projects which improve their living conditions, and 
demonstrations are given on how to reduce the 
capital and maintenance costs of clinics, schools 
and other public works. TATU is involved in a wide 
variety of projects including building projects 
(schools, clinics, self-help housing and marketing 
centres), the use of new building techniques (timber 
frame construction, ferro-cement construction and 
soil-ceraent construction), water projects (domest'lc 
water supply, irrigation schemes and spring 
protection schemes), agricultural presets 
(experimental crops, drought resistant gard >ng, 
intensive free cropping) and finally training 
projects (water tank making, netwire manufacture and 
candle-making).
The community response to TATU projects is generally 
positive with the locals becoming actively involved 
in decision-making, implementation and the planning 
of future projects. A good example of community 
involvement in such a project in Transkei is the 
Gabazi road reconstruction project. The Gabazi 
community was isolated from the outside world and
with the help of TATU's "outreach services" (aimed 
at assisting villages to plan, apply for and 
organise the implementation of local development 
projects), they established a strong action 
committee whose brief was to organise the 
reconstruction of the road. On completion of the 
road- a local road improvement committee was 
established who are responsible for the continued 
maintenance of this road. Further
... the confidence inspired by the success of this project has resulted in the community looking towards solving other common problems such as inadequate domestic and irrigation water, wood fuel shortages and so on. A number of other communities have also expressed aninterest in re-constructing their access roads (TATU, 1986, 30).
The promotion of appropriate technologies in rural 
development yolicy is viewed as important because, 
firstly it tends to be more labour intensive thus 
providing more employment opportunities. Secondly, 
appropriate technologies tend to be less 
sophisticated, require less technical inputs, less 
capital expenditure and are easier to understand - 
an important factor for public participation in
projects and for acceptance of new proposals.
Provision is • also made for the promotion of
commercial agriculture through carefully controlled 
credit facilities to individual groups.
Other areas of priority include the provision of 
water in the rural areas with the emphasis, in the 
short te..m, being on provision for residential u 
rather c.han large scale irrigation projects, t. 
development of appropriate organise1•ons at. 
institutional arrangements for rural development and 
thrj promotion of forestry, fishing and mining.
In terms of the pi —notion of agriculture, TSACOR is 
the major government institution involved in 
implementation. The role of TRACOR can be seen as 
the promotion of agricultural development, increased 
food production, increased productivity and the 
creation of employment. TRACOR is involved in the 
identification, planning and financing of projects 
with public and private capital. TRACOR also 
provides technical assistance and training to locals 
participating in agricultural development? and 
ensures the access of the agricultural community to 
agricultural supplies and services.
The planning policies of TRACOR concentrate on the 
involvement of local people in agriculture, the 
optimal utilization of resources, the promotion of 
entrepreneurial activities by Transkeians, the 
promotion of agro-based industries and to provide 
financial assistance to farmers, agricultural co­
operatives and other bodies.
TRACOR's funding comes predominantly from the 
Transkei Government's budget, and as such it is fair 
to assume that decision-nnaking will be defined by 
the Transkei Governments policy. Furthermore, the 
board of directors of TRACOR are all appointed by 
the President of Transkei. The dominance of Central 
Government policy on decision making issues that 
immediately affect the rural communities is 
significant. Any distrust that the local
communities feel for the Government (whether because 
they perceive the Government's association with the 
South African Government unfavourably, or because 
the locals feel the central Government is not really 
concerned about the quality of life in the rural
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areas) is reflected in the acceptance of advice and 
projects promoted by TRACOR. This is unfortunate 
because if the situation arises where TRACOR does 
offer some sound/helpful advice, they can expect a 
negative reception of the advice because of feelings 
of distrust.
The feelings of distrust are exacerbated by the lack 
of local decision-making powers at the 
local/community level. Evident too from the 
literature on the implementation of Betterment 
Schemes is that the locals do not believe they will 
benefit from new farming practices or that these 
practices are designed for their benefit.
THE SECONDARY SECTOR
The active promotion of industry in Transkei has as 
its origin the Tomlinson Commission. The policies 
suggested by the Commission have been discussed 
previously, and as such it is not necessary to 
explain the nature of and results of these 
industrial policies in this section. More important 
is to examine the current emphasis placed on 
different types of industry by the Transkeian 
Government.
In terms of the planning priorities in the secondary 
sector, the emphasis is on small scale and informal 
sector industry. The aim is development at a 
grassroots level. It is important to note that this 
is a move away from those labour intensive large 
scale industries advocated in the South African 
industrial development programme and as such, are 
more sensitive to Transkei's critical employment 
problems.
This change in emphasis is also important because it 
can be interpreted as an acknowledgement by the 
Transkei Government that rural development does not 
automatically occur as a result of urbanisation or 
industrialization. The high priority given to rural 
development (although not necessarily sufficient) 
suggests that the national policy is now to tackle 
both urban development and rural development as 
separate, but related issues. This is further 
illustrated by the fact that it has been stated in 
the development strategy that 40 per cent of the 
existing rural population need to find employment 
outside the agricultural sector (Development 
Strategy, 1980-2000, 44).
Priority is given to industrial (resource based 
industiy) ventures that develop or utilize local 
agriculture, forestry and human resources; that 
supply inputs for other industrial, construction or 
service industry? that can replace imported goods 
for local consumption, and finally those which 
develop a competitive advantage in their exports to 
the RSA or foreign markets. The increased emphasis 
on industry that uses local factor,s of production 
can be interpreted as an acknowledgement by the 
Transkeian planners of the past backwash effects, 
where the benefits of industry were largely 
experienced outside of Transkei.
The TDC has the responsibility of implementing 
commercial, financial and industrial projects. In a 
similar fashion to TRACOR this organisation also 
provides capital, technical expertise, specialised 
advice for the aquisition and establishment of 
industrial/commercial enterprises. The TDC provides
easy term loans, stands surety and acts as executor 
and administrator for any person, citizen or 
business in the Transkei. TRANSIDO assists the TDC 
through the promotion of small scale industry and 
the informal sector.
Funding for TDC is from the Transkei Government 
although project funds are obtained from the DBSA 
and the capital market. Decision-making can be 
expectisa so follow that of Government, as the TDC 
directors are appointed by the President of 
Transkei.
Little emphasis is given within the Transkei's 
planning priorities (1983) as regards institutional 
policies that will be implemented to support the 
development of small scale enterprises and the 
informal sector. This lack of detailed policy is 
unfortunate, as it can be interpreted as showing a 
lack of understanding of the complex problems that 
face small enterprise development in the Transkei. 
More recently, however, (1985) the Institute of 
Management and Development Studies (IMDS) of the 
University of Transkei hosted a seminar with the 
main objective being to establish the criteria 
necessary for the active promotion of small business 
development in Transkei. The main resolutions of 
this seminar were that the Transkeian Department of 
Coma»/;:i3# Industry and Tourism should ensure the co­
ordination of small business development through the 
development of a Council for the Promotion of Small 
Business. A major function of this council would be 
the development of a programme addressing problems 
experienced by small businesses regarding access to 
credit/capital and management expertise in both the 
formal and informal sectors o£ the Transkei1s
economy. The UoR of a ' rebate scheme' was suggested 
to encourage private sector consultants to render a 
variety of services to small businesses, thus 
ensuring a wider geographic spread of services, with 
less emphasis on the public sector to directly fund 
and implement the provision of such services. The 
need was also expressed for the deregulation,
privatization and decentralization of services where 
possible, in order to improve the profitability of 
the private sector (Viljoen, 1985, 571-572). The 
above resolutions, although not yet formally
included in Transkei national planning policy, serve 
to indicate that greater cognisance is being taken 
by some of the related planning/research
organisations in the Transkei of the complexities 
facing small enterprise development.
THE TERTIARY SECTOR
The promotion of the tertiary or service sector is 
seen as a means of promoting employment through the 
stimulation of local enterprises, the involvement of 
local entrepreneurs and the promotion of local 
initiative, using labour intensive and appropriate 
technologies. Government priority is that
commercial and financial services of a minimum
standard are spread to all parts of Transkei.
The development agencies involved in the 
implementation of the tertiary sector policies, 
include TATU, TRTC (Transkei Road and Transport 
Corporation) and TESCOR (Transkei Electricity Supply 
Corporation). All of these organisations are 
predominantly appointed by the Transkei Government 
with limited project financing coming from the DBSA.
It is worthy of note that TATO also provides inputs 
for both the primary and secondary sectors in so far 
as they employ appropriate technology. The extent 
of TATU1s involvement includes the provision of 
technology for rural development, research of 
various technology types/ technical assistance to 
exploit, utilize and develop any natural resources 
in the promotion of appropriate technology use and 
the guidance to any undertakings and enterprises 
involved in any development programme.
MIGRANT LABOUR
On the issue of migrant labour, the Transkei 
Government recommends that an agreement be entered 
into with South Africa to ensure that the number of 
Transkeians working in the RSA as migrants or 
contract workers be maintained or increased.
The philosophy behind this is that the Transkei 
simply cannot absorb the 420 000 "'ranskeians 
currently working in the RSA. If South Africa were 
to provide more employment for Transkeians and 
particularly for those living in the rural areas, 
the degree of overpopulation could be decreased/ a 
factor that is a prerequisite for rural development 
in Transkei,
SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT POLICIES
The Transkei Government views the promotion of 
education as the key policy for social development. 
The Government priority is based on the philosophy 
that through education one can generate a capable 
and informed population who can contribute to the 
growth and development of society. The improvement
in skill levels also allows the population to find 
work opportunities more easily both in. Transkei and 
in Southern Africa.
The policies the Government has suggested include 
the provision of free basic education, expansion of 
training facilities, the promotion of non-formal 
training {to provide practical training) and adult 
education programmes.
In terms of health care services, the emphasis is on 
primary health care, the extension of clinic 
services, mobile clinics and community health 
centres.
As regards housing problems, whilst acknowledging 
the serious nature of the problem, the Government 
has indicated that they can only play a supportive 
role in the provision of infrastructure for the 
construction of housing stock, the onus lying to a 
greater extent on the private sector.
SPATIAL DEVELOPMENT
The major policy advocated by GQyejrn.ms.nt is the 
promotion of service centres. The Government 
philosophy is based on the premise that if the 
Transkei hopes -to employ a large proportion of its 
population on the land, markets are needed to sell 
output. The promotion of rural service centres in 
Transkei has been criticised by Dewar et al (1984a) 
and May (1985) amongst others. The actual benefit 
that could be obtained from rural service centres, 
namely the provision of essential services for the 
rural population are not as much in question, as is 
the potential for these centres to function
economically. Wakelin and Haines (1986, 450)
indicate that, few, if any, of the villages show any 
sign of economic development. Economic stagnation 
(even regression in parts) is rather the norm.
Dewar et al (1984a, 185) emphasise that the type of 
centres that would have the greatest potential for 
becoming a viable economic centre are those that 
already exist as growing vibrant centres. They go 
on to add that "De Novo settlement creation has 
limited chances of success and often simply results 
in a massive waste of infrastructural investment".
The service centre concept is also based on the 
notion that urban nodes can in some way stimulate 
rural development, by providing easy access to 
innovations, credit, markets and extension agents. 
May (1985, 29-32) indicates, however, that such a 
growth pole type of strategy would have only limited 
impact, in that there is no real basis on which 
improvements can be made to rural agriculture. The 
major problem he Outlines is one of access to land. 
Furthermore, May suggests productivity is low f 
alternative forms of employment are limited, and 
that existing ..small towns have shown a steady 
decline over the past decade. Admittedly May's 
study is notable for its very high landlessness 
statistics of 48 per cent, but even using Baskin’s 
(1984), and Muller and Tapscotts (1984) figures of 
20-30 per cent, May's point is still valid in that a 
significant proportion of the rural population would 
have no opportunity to improve their agricultural 
production. In terms of a service centres ability 
to satisfy the rural population's basic needs, May 
found that basic needs as indicated in the survey, 
centred on day to day needs (building materials,
fuel, roads, transport and water provision). 
Wakelin and Tapscotts' (1986, 444) survey identified 
similar basic needs. Rural service centres have 
according to May, very little chance of effectively 
providing for such needs. Such projects rely more 
heavily upon local organisations than upon spatial 
planning, and indeed, may benefit little from the 
development of a hierarchy of service centres (May 
1985, 32).
Prom this then, it is apparent, that in the Transkei 
basic needs cannot simply be met at a service 
centre, but should perhaps be tackled by local 
development agents and b>* the rural community at the 
village level, such as have past road projects been 
tackled by TATU. Dewar et al emphasise that the use 
of the service centre approach, is not only 
contingent on the provision of physical and social 
infrastructure, but that also required is a 
"significant re-orientation towards local democratic 
control and decision-making" (1984a, 186).
This function will be assumed by small towns whose 
minimum services are seen as being administrative, 
residential utilities, agricultural ..extension, 
health, education, commerce and industry. The major 
role of service centres is seen by the Transkei 
planning authorities to be to provide access to 
markets for farmers. To this end', the priorities 
document advocates
the establishment of a hierarchical network of physical bases from which to deliver public services; agricultural support services to increase productivity with a view to transforming subsistence into market oriented farming; the provision of basic infrastructure (Development Priorities and Public Sector Spending 1983-1988, 1983, 19).
These services are to be provided/located in centres 
cnat are accessible to the local population, with 
cognisance taken of a.hierarchy o£ functions. The 
envisaged hierarchy incorporates existing towns "and 
other places which at present suggest themselves as 
suitable due to accessibility or an existing 
concentration of activities" (Development
Priorities and Public Sector Spending, 1983-1983, 
1983, 19). (The provision of this additional
infrastructure can also be viewed as being 
supplementary to those social infrastructural 
policies mentioned above.) The table included below 
illustrates the envisaged pattern of urban 
settlement deemed necessary by the Transkei 
Government.
1.3; THE PROPOSED PATTERN OF URBAN SETTLEMENT IN
TRANSKEI
Number Population total "Urban1per Centre Population1983 2003 2003000's C30's 000's
timtata 70 J00 200Butterworth ,30 >50 250Other Regional
Market Towns 20 300Rural Nodes 90 0,4 4501 200
SOURCE: Development Priorities and Public Sector Spending 1983-1988, 20.
6.5 INSTITUTIONAL POLICIES
In Transkei 1 s plan*' 
made as to the lit
irities no reference is 
jf local level decision-
making structures. Reference is made through TATU 
to encouraging local initiative and giving limited 
government support to innovative, motivated rural 
organisations. Clearly absent is any attempt to 
give rural communities real decision-making powers 
as regards their own development be it agricultural 
production, marketing policies, or investment of 
profits.
CH. 7 A CRITICAL EVALUATION OF BOTTOM-DP POLICIES IN 
TRANSKEI
The assumption that Transkeian agriculture is 
potentially viable, is subject to a number of 
constraints. . Studies by May (1985), Wakelin and 
Haines (1986), Moll {1984) to name but a few, all 
indicated that there is one very dominant constraint 
limiting the potential o£ Transkeian agriculture, 
and that is rural population density. The effect of 
this factor is that many of the rural population 
have no access to land and many of "' ?se that do, 
have such small parcels of land, t) :hey are not 
economically viable. May {1985) - . Moll (1985)
indicate that between 2,5 and per cent of 
landholders in Transkei, have sufficient land to 
become self sufficient in maize production. The 
above two points indicate that were an agriculture 
based strategy to be promoted, it must be noted that 
a large percentage of the population would not 
experience any benefits, and secondly that the 
success of the agriculture policies would hinge on 
large scale resettlement programmes removing the 
i.cplus population from the land.
Important to the adoption of a purely bottom-up 
approach would be that Transkei has a wide range of 
natural resources which can provide the basis for 
the diversification o£ the economy. It is very 
apparent from the nati-vaal planning policy emphasis, 
that Transkei' s only t&al potential lies in the 
exploitation of i .-v agricultural and human 
resources. As suet», tmy economic strategy in 
Transkei will rely cn fehe maximization of this 
potential. The exis'u ■ constraints on agriculture 
have been discussed sbove, and require no further
emphasis here. Thus it is important to discuss the 
second aspect of this assumption - the potential of 
Transkei's human resources. Bell {1984, 1986) has 
argued convincingly, ti at there has been a
significant trend of spontaneous decentralization by 
certain manufacturing industry to maximise the
potential of the cheap labour supply in the oucer 
periphery. Although there has been much criticism 
of Bell's analysis from numberous sources {Tomlinson 
and Addleson, 1986; Hirsch, 1983; Mailings and 
Black, 1986), it is apparent that Bell has
identified a trend to decentralize, although the 
scale of such investment certainly appears to be 
limited in terms of its job creation potential. Far 
more notable from the case study is the fact that
very little industry has located in Transkei, and
very few jobs have been generated from the promotion 
of this sector.
The implication of the above is that Transkei has 
very little potential to diversify its economy or to 
maximise the potential of its cheap labour other 
than in the agricultural sector. This being the
case, bearing in mind the existing constraints that 
exist on the development of -the agricultural sector, 
it is painfully evident that the Transkeian
economies development depends on the agricultural 
sector. To diversify this sector, requires the 
removal of excess rural population to urban areas, 
or to other sectors of the economy where they do not 
exert pressure on the arable land.
This leads to a further problem. The emphasis 
placed within the bottom-up approach on urban 
development only as a result of agricultural demand 
is fundamentally inadequate in the case of Transkei.
The only way the surplus rural population can be 
absorbed off the arable land (thus making 
agriculture more viable), is if a process of rapid 
urbanisation takes place. For this reason, the 
shortage of policies aimed at the stimulation of 
urbanisation as a prerequisite renders the bottom-up 
approach in Tcanskei unsuitable to a large extent.
Bottom-up policies relating to the provision of 
numerous facilities including physical and social 
infrastructure, credit and marketing subsidies, 
price supports/ agricultural subsidies (Lo and 
Salih, 1981) take on utopian flavour in Transkei. 
Transkei's economy is far from bouyant (Nkuhlu, 
1984), unemployment is rampant (Muller, 1984? 
Thomas 1984; DBSA, 1986), and the agricultural 
sector iL generally stagnant (Moll, 1984; May, 
1985; Wakelin and Haines, 1986). The implication 
of this, is that the Transkeian Treasury does not 
have sufficient funds to offer the suggested 
subsidies and price supports, and what is more, any 
restructuring of the Transkeian economy appears to 
be dependent on the revitalization of the 
agricultural sector.
Moving now to an evaluation of implementing 
decentralized decision-making structures, what is 
most evident, is that the suggested policies are 
utopian in the extreme. The benefits to be obtained 
from a bottom-up approach are certainly desirable, 
and whilst in no way wishing to discredit the 
concept of decentralized decision-making, it is 
important to take note of a number of potential 
weaknesses in the approach.
The Eirscriticism is that the bottom-up approach 
assumes -hat existing centralized government will be 
amenable .to the idea o£ decentralizing power. 
Hebbert (1984) argues that it is unlikely that 
centralized governments would willingly hand over 
control if it weakens the entrenched elite's power 
base. Klopper and Krone (1984) have indicated that 
in the Transkei the Chiefs make up two thirds of the 
TNI?. As previously mentioned, the Chiefs enjoy 
wide ranging powers (Southall, 1983) in the existing 
Transkeian administration system, and if they stand 
to lose these powers through the decentralization of 
decision-making, it is not unfair to assume they 
will reject the concept. The bottom-up theorists 
have paid lit'ie attention to detail when suggesting 
how decentralization will occur (Hebbert, 1984) and 
as a result, the concept of decentralization, though 
a good one (Rondinelli, 1986), has little chance of 
being accepted by the Transkeian Government unless 
it is tempered in many respects (This will be 
discussed in the following chapter).
The second area of concern relates to the
relationship between decentralized government and 
rural development. It is questionable .whether
decentralized decision-making structures themselves 
will in fact necessarily benefit the rural 
population. More important is that decentralized 
decision-making is also democratic. It can be
argued that the existing structure based on chiefs, 
headmen and sub-headmen represents such a 
decentralization of decision making. The existing 
structures in Transkei allow a degree of regional 
control of regional resources - that is the
allocation of land, level of taxes and distribution 
of pensions (Southall 1983; Klopper and Krone,
1984). The case study, however, highlighted the 
fact that this decentralization ot power has been 
abused. Haines et al (1984) indicate that the 
Chiefs and their councillors have formed small 
elites, abusing their powers and showing little
concern for rural development. Wakelin and Haines 
.(1986) and Klopper and Krone (1984) suggest that the 
tribal system inhibits local initiative. What is 
apparent though, is that rural elites rend to gain 
control of the regional resources and decision 
making powers and the system becomes very
undemocratic. Hebbe:t (1984) suggests that this has 
been the dominant trend throughout the world, where 
there has been a decentralization of decision 
making.
The inequalities that could result from the use of 
bottom-up policies, are not limited to differences 
within a region. Hebbert (1984) argues that 
differences between regions are just as likely. 
Differences between regions arise because some 
regions are historically stronger and richer than 
others. The reasons for this vary - some regions 
have poor soil and very little rain, while other do 
not. Some regions have better linkages to markets. 
A recent study by Wakelin and Haines (1986, 444-461)
based on 18 villages in the Transkei highlighted the
fact that conditions between villages varied 
substantially in terms of health facilities, 
prevision of water, education facilities, 
unemployment and economic activity. Similar
findings come from studies by Thomas (1981), Baskin 
(1984), Muller (1984), Moll (1984), May (1985) to 
name but a few. The impact of such regional 
inequality, especially in terms of access to land 
and markets would be that those regions favourably
situated would tend to re-inforce their strength. 
Furthermore, if a centralized government is to be 
abandoned, a critical question arises. Who or what 
institution will be responsible for redistributing 
wealth in favour of the weaker regions? The 
expressed aim (Stohr and Todtling, 1978) of the 
bottom-up school was greater equity of living 
conditions - yet the arguemer.t suggested by Hebbert 
(1984) as discussed above would seem to indicate a 
re-inforcement of inter-regional differences.
A further point of a practical nature that must be 
noted, relates to the implicit assumption by the 
bottom-up theorists that a level of expertise exists 
in the various regions, thus allowing mini- 
governments to operate. Hebbert (1984) argues that 
such a level of expertise is rarely found in Third 
World countries. Certainly the case study of 
Transkei indicates a distinct shortage of skilled 
personnel in the region (Nkuhlu, 1984; Dewar et al, 
1984a; Moll, 1984). Finally, severe doubt can be 
placed on the feasibility and desirability of 
attempting to effect a degree of selective spatial 
closure (Stohr and Todtling, 1978) on the Transkeian 
economy. It has been established that the Transkei 
economy has only limited potential for expansion, 
and that only the agricultural sector and agro-based 
industry {when surpluses have been generated) can be 
developed in the short term. Further, the 
development of the primary sector is heavily 
constrained. The Transkeian economy has little 
prospect of being able to employ the transkeian 
population. Rather the reduction of population 
pressure and unemployment hinges on the South 
African economy absorbing Transkeian labour. 
Therefore, considering that Transkei has a weak
economy, and relies to a large degree on migrant 
remittances from the South African economy (Thomas, 
1981; Moll, 1984; May 1985), it seems unrealistic 
for the Transkei to attempt a strategy considered by 
Hebbert (1984) to be too challenging even for 
countries with very strong economies.
CONCLUSION
The previous discussion has examined the theoretical 
benefits to Transkei from the implementation of a 
bottom-up strategy and a related critique of the 
suggested policies. The critique, although tackling 
some of the fundamental concepts of bottom-up 
strategy, does not however, render the concept 
useless. In a previous chapter of this dissertation 
(Development from the bottn- and/or the top) a 
number of issues were no ; •'m the bottom-up 
policies that would be usefi. - ;ms of a regional 
planning strategy. By way o. . conclusion, it is 
useful to summarise those bottom-up policies which 
can effectively be used in an integrated planning 
strategy, albeit that these policies require a 
certain amount of modification, to make them more 
feasible in ;the Transkei context. The modification 
of these bottom-up policies, plus the use of other 
policies of a top-down nature are discussed in the 
following chapter.
The major contribution of the bottom-up policies to 
a regional planning strategy in Transkei lies 
firstly in the increased emphasis on rural 
development, and more specifically in the promotion 
of agricultural development in Transkei. Useful 
contributions from the bottom-up approach that 
require further consideration include, the use of
pricing controls for rural produce, policies aiding 
the marketing o£ rural surplus, policies affecting 
the access and distribution of arable land to the 
farmers and the promotion of appropriate 
technologies required, physical infrastructure and 
labour intensive farming methods in Transkei.
The promotion of urbanisation in response to rural 
needs also has definite advantages in terms of the 
development of multip'’ier effects, and a more 
spatially dispersed location of urban centres. 
Finally, the decentralization of decision-making has 
advantages to the rural population, in the sense 
that it has the potential to give rural communities 
greater control ever their own development, and is 
generally held to make rural development planning 
more effective.
CH. 8 A RECOMMENDED PLANNING FRAMEWORK FOR TRANSKEI
8.1 INTRODUCTION
The emphasis of the following chapter is on a policy 
. framework for Transkei, However, the policies in 
some instances are not limited to Transkei. Rather 
the stance is taken that the success of the 
strategyf involving the promotion of rural 
development in Transkei, is contingent on the 
promotion of urbanisation in South Africa as a whole 
(That is, the homelands included). Furthermore the 
author rejects the concept of any form of influx 
control within the boundaries of South Africa.
The major contribution of the bottom-up school of 
thought is in the promotion of rural development and 
to a degree in the promotion of decentralized 
decision-making, with regard to rural development, 
policies borrowed from the bottom-up school although 
not exclusive to a bottom-up approach include the 
promotion of collective farming (implicit here being 
community based decision-making), a more active 
promotion of rural development in terras of the 
distribution of the ..Transkeian budget, .greater 
emphasis on the provision of rura! physical and 
service infrastructure, the promotion of rural 
service centres as a function of rural production 
and need, and finally to policies aimed at the 
promotion of easier access to a wider range of 
services in the rural areas. It is important to 
note at the outset however, that the suggested rural 
development policies are based on the assumption 
that Transkeian agriculture can become a viable 
prospect economically. Linked to this assumption, 
is that population densities on farming land will
decline to an extent which will allow for the 
economic viability of agriculture. Implicit from
this, ..is that a degree of urbanisation will occur in
the Transkei, although the major urban growth is 
considered to occur in the existing metropolitan and 
secondary cities in South Africa (Rondinelli, 1983).
As regards the urbanisation processes which will 
absorb some of Transkei’s surplus population, as 
previously mentioned the author finds the 
enforcement of influx control measure against 
Transkei and the other TBVC states unacceptable.
Aside of the moral issues that influx control can be
criticised for, its effect is highly detrimental to 
the Transkeian economy. For the purpose of this 
document, it is assumed in this policy section that 
free movement will be allowed for all people living 
in South Africa (including those citizens of the 
TBVC states). Implicit from this statement is that 
a policy of free urbanisation will be adopted by the 
South African Government which includes the TBVC 
states.
The promotion of urbanisation in Southern Africa is 
discussed after the policies relating to rural 
development. Due to the fact that the South African 
decentralization programme has shown such poor 
results to date, a somewhat different approach is 
adopted by the author in terms of recommended 
government policy. It must be noted that the 
promotion of urbanisation as a prerequisite for 
rural development, as is the case in this document, 
is a definite departure from the traditional bottom- 
up approach. Thus the urbanisation policies in this 
document are of both a botfcom-up (as regards the 
promotion and establishment of rural villages,
service centres and rural towns), and a top-down 
nature (in terms of the promotion of 
industrialization in the metropolitan and secondary 
cities).
The final major section of this chapter is devoted 
to the issue of decision-making in terms of 
Transkei. Here too, there is a mix of bottom-up and 
top-down policies. The use of community based 
decision-making, especially in the rural areas is 
accepted, however, the author takes a sympathetic 
stand to Hebbert (1984) and Rondinelli (1986) 
amongst others, who suggest that a degree of 
centralization in decision-making is important to 
ensure that regional inequalities within the 
Transkei are not exaccerbated.
RURAL DEVELOPMENT
The major issues that arise from the bottom-up 
theory as regards the promotion of rural development 
have been mentioned in the introduction to this 
section, and they require no repitition here. The 
purpose of this section is to apply the bottom-up 
theory to the gene-ration of policies for rural 
development in Transkei.
Central to a bottom-up approach to rural 
development, is the promotion of agriculture. 
Erskine (1984, 458) indicates that there are a
number of key factors that should also be included 
in a bottom-up approach to agricultural development. 
A summary of Erskine's findings serves as a good 
means of contextualising the following policy 
section.
Tv-' bottom-up emphasis is primarily based on the 
'stir-MVttion1 of agriculture rather than the 
plan.i.ng of rural agriculture. The emphasis is 
placed en encouraging "self help" rather than 
enforcing new projects or farming methods. Priority 
is placed on stimulating existing potential and 
ensuring motivation, by allowing fair terms of trade 
between the farmer and the market.
Intervention is limited to the provision of required 
physical and social infrastructure to improving 
access to markets, to supporting farmers 
associations, to encouraging further education, and 
to the provision of technical advice - for example 
relating to water, soil, and irrigation potential 
and the diffusion of new technology. Thus the role 
of the government is one of providing services for 
rural needs (Chopra, 1982a). It is useful to 
outline the major criteria that have in the past 
limited agricultural production. Without restating 
those problems highlighted in the case study on 
Transkei, a number of critical areas of concerned 
can be isolated. Drawing on the case study, 
Bembridge (1984a), Lenta and Maasdorp (1984) and 
Hakin (1984) the critical areas of concern.can be 
summarised as including the following, all of which 
are addressed on the following pages. First, there 
is the problem of access to land, second, labour 
supply problems, third, availaility of capital, 
fourth, access to new innovations, fifth, the 
relative attractiveness of migrant labour, sixth, 
the issue of type of land tenure, seventh, access to 
marketing facilities, eight, organisational 
problems, particularly as regards the role of 
central Government and ninth, access to physical and 
social infrastructure.
LAND TENURE ARRANGEMENTS - THE ADVANTAGES AND 
DISADVANTAGES OF FREEHOLD TENURE
In 1983 the Swart Commission suggested that tenure 
arrangements in the Ciskei should be varied between 
communal rights, leasehold rights and freehold 
rights. Central to sr.y policy on land tenure is 
the question, will freehold rights increase the 
productivity of agriculture, and will it result in a 
more even distribution of land? Before suggesting 
suitable policies, it is worthwhile to outline the 
benefits and problems of freehold tenure.
Moll (1985) provides an excellent summary of the 
arguements for and against freehold tenure in the 
South African homelands, and as such a brief summary 
of Moll's findings and others including Lenta and 
Maasdorp (1984), Sinha (1984) and Low (1984)/ 
provide a good background to the land tenure 
arguement.
Moll (1985) concludes in his analysis that freehold 
tenure would be unlikely to greatly improve the use 
of arable land in .the homelands. Moll argues that 
the 20-30 per cent of land that remains unused each 
year is not necessarily the result of the land 
tenure arrangements, ascribing this phenomenon more 
to factors such as the occurrence of drought, to 
fallow and marginal land. Lenta and Maasdorp (1984) 
support this position arguing that shortages of 
finance, means of ploughing, and persons not 
utilizing their farming rights are the major causes 
(1984, 41-42). The impact of these viewpoints is 
that it is highly questionable whether or not free­
hold tenure would improve the intensity of land use 
and overall product] ’-i.
In terms of access to credit facilities, Bratton 
(1986) and Sinha (1984) argue that communal farmers 
enjoy far ater access to credit than single
private far.' j. Moll (1985) suggests that
considerations „trier than ownership of land play a 
significant role in access to credit facilities "not 
the least being good financial sense on the part of 
the lending agency" (Moll, 198S, 42).
A second area of consideration is the validity of 
the assumption that freehold, would increase a 
farmers desire to invest and farm his land to a 
higher degree (Sinha, 1984). Moll (1985), suggests 
that other factors such as incentives, the use of 
pricing policies, terms of trade, and the provision 
of marketing facilities would be far more 
significant. Certainly, Bratton's (1986) study in 
Zimbabwe found that the small capitalist farmer has 
less access to these benefits than those farmers 
practicing group farming on communal lands.
The most convincing arguement for freehold can be 
based on the findings of the case study relating to 
the abuse of power 'by the. Tribal Chiefs in the sense 
that they have adopted corrupt practices in 
allocating land (Baskin, 1984: Southall, 1983 r
Haines et al 1984). It can also be argued, though 
based on speculation to a degree (Moll, 1985), that 
the constant threat of havings one's land 
confiscated by the Chief has resulted in a degree of 
Insecurity. Low (1984, 301) summarises well this 
phenomenon.
Whilst indigenous land tenure systems have considerable flexibility as regards land allocation, this flexibility does not mean that
land is necessarily made available to those who are most willing and able to use it productively.
The above discussion does not in itself provide 
adequate justification for freehold or communal land 
tenure systems. Both have their advantages. 
However, what does become very evident from Moll 
(1965), Grindle (1985) and Sinha (1984), to mention 
only a few, is that a far greater emphasis appears 
to be placed on other considerations such as access 
to production assets (labour and draft power) and 
production services (including extension services, 
credit input supply and market outlets), than on 
type of land tenure. These aspects are discussed in 
the following paragraphs. At this stage, though, a 
tentative recommendation is made that communal 
tenure has distinct advantages for agricultural 
activities. In terms of urban and residential 
areas, policies are discussed in a later section to 
follow. However, it must be emphasised that the 
recommendation for communal tenure in the farming 
sectors is based to a degree on the following 
discussion dealing with relative access of rural 
population to production services and assets.
ORGANISING RURAL AGRICULTURE - THE PROMOTION OF 
GROUP FARMING: ACCESS TO PRODUCTION ASSETS AND
PRODUCTION SERVICES
The promotion of communes, kibbutzim, collectives 
and integrated villages has been recommended by 
bottom-up theorists and was discussed in the 
theoretical section of this document. The previous 
discussion was not conclusive about which type of 
tenure was most advantageous. The purpose of this 
discussion is to evaluate by means of examples the
relative advantage of communal tenure. The criteria 
used for evaluation have previously been mentioned, 
and relate to the rural population's access to 
production services and assets. However, although 
the arguement that follows indicates that communal 
farmers enjoy a wide range of benefits that 
individual farmers do not, many of the benefits 
obdained by communal farmers could equally apply to 
private individuals, who, although operating on a 
freehold tenure basis, form co-operatives. In light 
of this fact, the following discussion could be 
interpreted to apply for farmers on both private or 
communal land,- but who operate through communes 
{group farms) or co-operatives.
Much of the following discussion is based on the 
group farming practices currently pursued in 
Zimbabwe. This study has particular relevance to 
Transkei for a number of reasons. The main 
similarities between the Transkei region and 
Bratton’s (1966) survey in Zimbabwe include the fact 
that the survey area was characterised by a 
predominantly rural population. Secondly, the 
survey area was in the tribal trust lands of 
Zimbabwe -which are .pr.e'dominatly •communally based. 
Thirdly, problems of extreme population pressure are 
experienced. Fourthly, the area was characterised 
by a high level of male migration, of up to 45 per 
cent (Bratton, 1986, 371). Finally, this evaluation 
is interesting because one of»the Swart Commissions 
recommendations for Ciskei was that group farming be 
promoted, and group farming and the use of co­
operatives has been used in the Transkei.
In Zimbabwe 44 per cent of cultivators belong to 
some form of farmer organisation or another. In
terms of the problems faced by the farmers there is 
basically no difference to those mentioned 
previously relating to Transkei and the South 
African homelands {Bembridge, 1984: Lenta and
Maasdorp, 1984).
In terms, of access to land on the Zimbabwean group 
farms, in general the collective organisations 
(group farmers) control their own land, and there is 
relative equity in the size of land holdings. 
Farmers in Zimbabwe control the use of their land by 
way of a 'use right' (Bratton, 1986, 374), similar 
to the rights in Transkei. The notable difference 
though, is that land holdings are far more equal 
than is the case in Transkei.
Zimbabwean farmers also experience labour supply 
problems. At certain peak periods during the year, 
extra labour is needed for weeding, harvesting and 
ploughing. Lenta and Maasdorp (1984) defined 
similar problems in the homelands, a feature which 
is exaccerbated by the high incidence of male 
migrancy. Bratton (1986, 375) indicates that in 
Zimbabwe the me• common practice is for communal 
groups to organic themselves into .labour groups and 
to practice reciprocal labour sharing. Sinha's 
(1984, 68) studies showed similar results "... a
commune type of organisation ... can mobilize 
surplus labour more effectively in the creation of 
infrastructure, irrigation networks and land 
improvement".
The advantage of communal farming practices is that 
procedures for pooling are more institutionalized.
Labour groups have a written roster of work assignments which is linked to a pattern of improved practices and which controls the rotation of work around the field of each member (Bratton, 1986, 375).
The extent to which communal farmers benefit over 
individuals is apparent from Brattons (1986, 375) 
findings, that 46 per cent of farmers in communes 
had access to extra labour, whilst only 21 per cent 
of individuals had access to extra labour.
May (1985) identified the contribution of draft 
animals to Transkeian cropping as being significant 
especially in terms of ploughing fields. The 
situation in Zimbabwe is very similar. Along with 
land, farmers in the survey said that draft power 
was the principle constraint that prevented them 
from producing more crops (Bratton, 1986, 376).
The response of the collectives in Zimbabwe to draft 
problems is very similar to that of labour problems. 
Those farmers that have oxen are willing to lend
them to farmers without, in return for the use of 
labour. Bratton's (1986, 376) findings indicate
that 42 per cent of farmers make use of other 
peoples draft animals and reciprocate by way of 
farming labour groups which work for the farmers who 
lent them the cattle. The result of this communal 
use of cattle is that most farmers can then plant 
both a winter and a summer crop. Those individual 
farmers who do not have access to other farmers
cattle, tend not to plant winter crops? 82 per cent
of those who do not borrow cattle, do not plant 
winter crops.
The situation as regards access to production
services is again much easier for communal farmers. 
Transkeian and Zimbabwean farmers experience similar' 
problems in terms of access to extension services, 
credit, transport and marketing facilities.
Wakelin and Haines (1986, 452) indicated that
Transkeian farmers rarely made contact with 
extension officers. Bratton (1986, 377) indicates 
that only 31. per cent of individual farmers in
Zimbabwe see an extension worker in a season, 
whereas 86 per cent of the group farmers had contact 
with an extension worker. The reason for this
phenomenon is that it is far easier for field
workers to visit a number of farmers on a communal 
farm than it is to see individuals. Furthermore, 
the communal farmers are advantaged, because they 
cultivate a wider range of crops, which results in 
the fact that group farmers are three times as 
likely to gain benefit from and make use of 
technical innovation.
In terms of access to credit facilities, the pattern 
repeats itself. M’ 11 (1985, 42) indicates that
lending institutions ahoujd use "good financial 
sense" in allocating credit to farmers. Bratton 
(1986, 378) found in his survey that "the recovery 
rates from group farmers" of credit given, "are 
significantly higher than from individual farmers", 
that is 92 per cent versus 54 per cent. The 
implication of this is that group farmers are a far 
better risk than are individual farmers. Sinha 
(1984, 69) expresses similar findings," farmers,
supported by communal organisations are in a much 
better position in this respect than capitalist 
farmers.
In terms of input supply such as the purchase of 
seed, fertilizer and chemical pesticides, the small 
capitalist farmer is equally disadvantaged. In the 
absence of subsidies or special production schemesr 
small farmers always pay top prices for inputs and 
enjoy the least reliable supplies (Bratton, 1986, 
378).
Sinha {1984, 68) explains that the group farmers are 
able to obtain economies of scale. The most 
economical way of purchasing inputs is direct from 
the factory. Bratton (1986, 378) indicates that the 
group farmers are far more likely to gain directly 
from the factory (77 per cent versus 38 per cent). 
The savings on a bag of fertilizer can be anywhere 
between 30 and 60 per cent when purchased directly 
from the factory. Similarly in terms of supply of 
inputs, suppliers and transporters attend more 
promptly to a large bulk order with a single 
delivery point than to small and framented orders 
from scattered individuals (Bratton, 1986, 379).
In terms oZ access to markets the situation is 
similar .again - group farmers are more than .twice as 
likely (57 per cent versus 25 per cent as
individuals to move their surplusses ouk of the 
communal lands to an official marketing centre.
Finally, having demonstrated that group farmers have 
far better access to what Lenta and Maaadorp (1984,
7) referred to as 'farm level factors' and
'conditioning factors' (that is government measures 
and outside influences that effect the nature of
production), it is important to consider what impact 
this has had on agricultural production.
Bratton's (1986, 380) findings are that,
... under every set of agro-ecological conditions, farmers in groups are consistently more efficient at maize production than individual farmers.
Bratton goes on to add that group farmers sell 
between twice and seven times as much maite as 
individuals and at a higher pries. Furthermore, 
group farmers grow a much wider range of crops than 
do individuals.
If one now relates the above discussion to Moll's 
(1965) discussion (previously covered) about whether 
or not free hold tenure would necessarily improve 
agricultural production, it seems evident that 
communal farming practices have a far jreater 
benefit to production and profit making for the 
farmer than is the case for the individual farmer. 
One particular advantage of free hold that did arise 
was the contention made by Moll (1985) and Low 
(1984) as regards insecurity as a result of the 
threat of land being repossessed. Although the 
claims have not been substantiated, there is 
certainly a chance that this could be a problem. 
Vink (1984, 446) proposes that this could be
prevented by policy proposals which remove the right 
"to interfere in any way with farming operations, as 
well as excessive rights to expropriation of land". 
This is a significantly different approach to that 
suggested by the Swart Commission (for Ciskei) which 
recommended that Tribal Authority rights should be 
increased (1983, 19). This was specifically in order 
to gain support from the Tribal Authorities to 
implement reforms. The evidence suggested by Baskin
(1984), Muller and Tapscott (1984) amongst others, 
indicates that the Transkeian Tribal Authorities in 
fact exploit .their powers and as such the author 
does not accept the Swart Commissions suggestions.
Equally evident, however, is that the collective 
organisation relies on a well developed state 
apparatus which co-ordinates the provision of 
extension services, marketing, credit facilities and 
ensures an adequate provision of_physical and social 
infrastructure to support the group farmers. Sinha 
(1984, 67) concludes that agriculture seems to
suffer unless adequate support facilities, such as 
credit, marketing, storage and other infrastructure 
are provided.
THE IMPACT OF MARKETING SUPPORT, PRICE SUPPORT AND 
AGRICULTURAL INCENTIVES
The discussion above highlighted the importance oC 
support facilities to the promotion of increased 
production. The purpose of this section is to 
illustrate the impact of government support on 
agricultural production, and to highlight some of 
the potential hazards of haphazard government 
support.
The example of Mexico is somewhat far removed from 
the Southern African situation, but does serve to 
illustrate the potential impact of greatly increased 
central government investment in rural development. 
In 1980, President Jose Lopez Pertillo introduced a 
massive initiative to improve rural conditions and 
improve agricultural productivity in Mexico 
(Grindle, 1985, 172). This initiative was known as 
the SAM or Mexican Pood System.
The major input of the SAM was to provide subsidies 
for the production of staple crops; to provide 
price protection for grain producers; to subsidize 
the purchase of fertilizer, seed and credit; to 
drop interest rates and to provide crop insurance 
for both loss of potential profit as well as 
production costs. In addition, subsidies were 
provided for processors and consumers in order to 
offset the past unfair terms of trade between the 
urban and rural areas. The cost of servicing the 
above incentives was enormous, public investment 
being increased by 35 per cent.
The results of the SAM project were equally 
spectacular. The area of land harvested in grain 
increased by 19 per cent between 1980 and 1981. 
Grain output increased by 19 per cent over the same 
period, whilst general agricultural output increased 
by 22 per cent. Finally, the amount of imports of 
basic grain required by Mexico dropped from 8,2 
million tons in 1980 to 2,5 million tons in 1981 
(Gindle, 1985, 176).
The SAM project did, however, have its ..problems. 
The incentives were not carefully enough targetted, 
and the result was that many of the existing wealthy 
farmers gained an unfair benefit, reinforcing to an 
extent income disparities (Grindle, 1985, 178). The 
major problem, however, was that the incentives were 
so generous, and so widely available, that the 
Mexican government could not continue with the 
programme when the price of petroleum (Mexico's main 
asset) dropped world wide. What the SAM project did 
achieve though, was to illustrate how responsive 
peasant agriculture was to favourable market
conditions. A further issue that became evident was 
that it is vital that the required finance is made 
available for investment in rural agriculture. This 
is significant in the South African situation. If 
the South African Government is going to promote 
rural development/ as was indicated in the 1986 
White Paper on urbanisation, then it is vital that 
the Government avoids the use of any restrictions 
(such as section 2 and 3 of the Environmental 
Planning Act) in the urban areas that might hinder 
the economic growth of the South African economy.
Whilst accepting Grindle's (1985) findings that 
pricing policies and the stimulation of agriculture 
through the use of incentives is vital to any rural 
development policy in Transkei, the author remains 
critical of a number of aspects. The use of 
incentives must be more cautiously implemented than 
was the case in Mexico. Two major faults of the SAM 
project were that in many instances, the poorest 
section of the rural population gained least benefit 
from the incentives because the wealthier farmers 
were better able to use the incentives; and 
secondly, the cost of servicing the incentives is 
too much for a country with a weak economy.
Far more appropriate would be to monitor the 
relative terms of trade between the urban and rural 
areas, as opposed to merely raising the selling 
price of agricultural produce artificially. Sinha 
(1984) provides a convincing arguement against the 
use of large blanket incentives. Sinha argues that 
increasing the price of food grain prices by too 
large a margin can have a negative impact, if the 
final urban prices are not also subsidised. 
Increased rural food prices will increase the urban
conditions. A further issue that became evident was 
that it is vital that the required finance is made 
.available for investment in rural agriculture. This 
is significant in the South African situation. If 
the South African Government is going to promote 
rural development/ as was indicated in the 1986 
White Paper on urbanisation, then it is vital that 
the Government avoids the use of any restrictions 
{such as section 2 and 3 of the Environmental 
Planning Act) in the urban areas that might hinder 
the economic growth of the South African economy.
Whilst accepting Grindle's (1985) findings that 
pricing policies and the stimulation of agriculture 
through the use of incentives is vital to any rural 
development policy in Transkei, the author remains 
critical of a number of aspects. The use of 
incentives must be more cautiously implemented than 
was the case in Mexico. Two major faults of the SAM 
project were that in many instances, the poorest 
section of the rural population gained least benefit 
from the incentives because the wealthier farmers 
were better able to use the incentives; and 
secondly, the cost of servicing the incentives is 
too much for a country with a weak economy.
Par more appropriate would be to monitor the 
relative terms of trade between the urban and rural 
areas, as opposed to merely raising the selling 
price of agricultural produce artificially. Sinha 
(1984) provides a convincing arguement against the 
use of large blanket incentives. Sinha argues that 
increasing the price of food grain prices by too 
large a margin can have a negative impact, if the 
final urban prices are not also subsidised. 
Increased rural food prices will increase the urban
prices that in turn will increase the cost oE 
living. This increases the cost of labour in the 
urban areas, and thus the cost oE inputs required by 
the rural areas, which originate from the urban 
areas. Thus this sets off an inflationary cycle. 
This inflationary cycle has negative effects on the 
relative advantage oE local goods produced for 
export (Sinha, 1984, 72). The author's conclusion 
is that in using incentives, one must carefully 
analyse the existing terms o£ trade, support those 
farmers who are unfairly prejudiced, but take 
precautions against supporting agriculturalists who 
are in fact inefficient and who rely on the 
subsidies to keep themselves in business. It is 
useful to note that this criticism could apply 
equally to the provision of subisidies for industry 
as noted by Mailings and Black (1986).
The above discussion has particular significance 
because many authors including Wakelin and Haines 
(1986), Dewar et al (1984a), May (1985), Moll
(1984), have indicated that the access to such 
services in Transkei is particularly poor. To a 
large extent, this may explain why, as Southall
(1983) pointed -out, group .-farming and co-operatives 
in Transkei have shown such poor results.
SPATIAL DEVELOPMENT POLICIES IN TRANSKEI
The previous discussions have dealt with land tenure 
arrangements, community organisation and the role 
and use of incentives. The purpose of this section 
is to provide a set of policies detailing the 
spatial distribution of activity. Important areas 
of consideration relate to the provision of physical 
and social infrastructure in the rural areas, and of
v  * .  '
improved access to these services by the rural 
population.
The Transkeian Government advocated the promotion of 
a service centre approach in their Development 
Priorities Paper (1983) largely as a means of 
improving the access of the rural population to 
physical and social infrastructure, and as a means 
of absorbing surplus rural population into non­
farming employment. A number of policy documents 
have been released by the National Planning 
Committee including the "North-East Region of 
Transkei Spatial Development Plan 1983-2003 
(Osmonde, Lange et al, 1982), Development proposals 
for the South Western Region of Transkei" (Osmonde, 
Lange et al, 1983) and more recently the "North-West 
Region of Transkei Spatial Development Plan, 1985- 
2005 (Vandeverre et al, 1985). Haines (198S, 542} 
argues that these studies have a far more flexible 
approach to the provision of services and periodic 
markets, than has been suggested by Dewar et al 
(1984a). The flexible approach adopted in the plan 
for the North-West region combined with the 
assumption that rural agriculture can become viable, 
also offsets those problems previously mentioned by 
May (1985) and Wakelin and Haines (1986) as were 
mentioned in the previous section on Transkei1 s 
spatial development policies. Vandeverre et al,
(1985) argue (for t. .! NW region) that although most 
of the population is regarded as rural, they rely to 
a large extent on migrant remittance as opposed to 
rurally generated incomes to survive. Similar 
findings have been forthcoming from May (1985), Moll
(1984), Wakelin and Haines (1986).
7A problem that arises from this phenomenon is that 
most of the rural population rely or urban services, 
especially shops and transport facilities to 
survive. Not all those people who live in the rural 
areas farm for a livelihood, many rely on urban 
services for the;." daily needs (Vandeverre At al, 
1985). In terms of this problem Vandeverre et al
(1985) indicate that there is inadequate access t-c 
services in the rural areas of Tzanskei. The 
author's policy emphasis in service provision is 
]argely aimed at the rural farming community. The 
author's stance is a typically bottom-up approach. 
That is, services are geared firstly to improving 
agricultural production, and only when agricultural 
production demands other functions such as sites for 
urban industrial growth, will they be provided. The 
motivation for this approach is partly based on 
financial constraints. The industrial
decentralization strategy adopted by the South 
African Government provides a multitude of evidence 
to support the contention that the mere provision of 
an urban centre will not guarantee that the centre 
will become economically viable (May 1985, Dewar et 
al, 1984b).
However, although the provision of services for the 
rural community is vital (Bratton, 1986, Sinha,
1984), it is impractical to suggest that the 
required services should be spread over the entire 
area of Transkei and into every rural village. 
Certain criteria should be used in selecting 
suitable centres from which and in which services 
can be provided, either on a permanent or a 
temporary basis. Based on the bottom-up philosphy 
that need should dictate, criteria would include the 
following. Firstly, which areas (this could be a
village, a commune, or a group of villages) have the 
greatest potential to benefit from service 
provision. Secondly related to the above, which 
areasr currently cannot become viable because of a 
shortage of services. It is important that this 
second criteria should not be confused with the 
policy approach used in the past by the South 
African Government in prioritizing locations foe 
industrial investment. Service provision will not 
be a priority in an area simply because the area has 
no services. An area will only become a priority 
area if the provision of services will improve the 
agricultural production of that area. Thirdly, the 
choice of location for further investment will be 
based on th® existing hierarchy of towns. So as to 
decrease the likelihood of investment being wasted, 
it is recommended that investment focus on existing 
centres in Transkei as far as is possible. 
Furthermore, centres with an existing communications 
network which link towns bo other higher and lower 
order centres and their hinterlands are preferable," 
because their primacy within the region already 
exists. This is not to imply that only existing 
towns will be promoted. If it is found that a 
certain area Qa,n economically support a se-rvice 
centre, then investment must be channelled into such 
an area.
The author follows a similar approach to Vandeverre 
et al (1985) in recommending a range of centres. 
The range of centres is based on the existing urban 
hierarchy of Transkei. Service provision is 
concentrated initially on the lower section of the 
urban hierarchy. This is at the village level, the 
rural centre, which is an existing centre that has 
emerged as a result of a significant degree of
centrality (either as a result o£ public investment 
such as a hospital, or because of the ability to 
create numerous jobs in the past, such as the tea 
estates), and finally the rural towns which also 
already exist and already have a fairly 
comprehensive range of public and private services.
As previously mentioned, it is impractical to 
suggest chat a comprehensive cange of services be 
provided a', every rural centre in Transkei, and for 
this reason, the author has opted for a hierarchy of 
service provision between the villages, the rural 
centres and the rural urban centres. Similarly, 
following Vandeverre et al’s (1985) proposals, use 
is made of a number of. periodic services. The 
advantage of this approach, L:? ’’hat depending on the 
intensity and demand for per:.idle functions, one can 
guage the need for permanent service centres. 
Before the level of demand has become evident, the 
use of periodic servicss and markets allow a degree 
of improved access to services by the rural 
population. It also ensures that public investment 
is not wasted in areas where no demand exists, and 
ensures public investment is concentrated in centres 
with the greatest potential.
The major function of centres will be to facilitate 
easier distribution of basic services and 
facilities. Equally important is that this spatial 
form will allow central government to allocate 
resources in a rational manner. The concentration 
of investment will allow for a better range of 
services to be provided, which in tun will act as 
an incentive to the location the informal and non- 
farming sector {Dewar et al, 1984a). The increased 
range of services also has obvious social benefits
including easier access to health facilities,
markets, and to a wider range of amenities 
(Vandeve.rre et al, 1985).
The author does not envisage the rural based urban 
growth as having a large impact on reducing rural 
overpopulation. Although a certain amount of the 
rural population, who are not engaged in farming
practices and who currently rely solely on migrant
remittances to survive, will be absorbed into urban 
employment of an informal or formal nature, this
percentage will be small. The author views the 
existing South African metropolitan and secondary 
cities as being the major urban cores that will 
absorb the rural surplus population (This aspect is 
discussed in a later section of this chapter).
It is important to identify the range of services 
required, as perceived by the rural population 
themselves. From surveys done by Wakelin and Haines
(1986), May (1985), Muller and Tapscott (1984) and 
Tollman (1984) the following priorities arise, 
although the order of priority differs from survey 
to survey.
TABLE 14: BASIC NEEDS PERCEIVED BY THE COMMUNITY AS PROBLEMS 
IN RANKED ORDER
Range of Community % of Total Sample whoBasic Needs perceived a problem with a
Basic Need
1 . Building Materials 94,992,180,0Transport 75,862,36. Medical 61,17. Farming 57,48. Livestock 51,0Schools 49,847,8Goods unavailable 41,0Employment 33,6Selling Goods 26,8Bast 24,4
SOURCE: May, 1985, 31
There are a number of noteworthy differences between 
surveys. Firstly, whereas May's (1985) survey 
indicates that employment creation is not a 
particularly high priority, Muller and Tapscott's
(1984) and Tollman's (1984) surveys conclude that 
employment is particularly important. Wakelin and 
Haines (1986) survey showed a similar trend to that 
of May's (1985) as did the Vandeverre et al (1985). 
Similarly, the priority of education facilities 
differed. May's (1985) survey again found education 
was a lower priority, in contrast to Wakelin and 
Haines (1986) and Vandeverre et al (1985) findings. 
The various surveys show many such differing 
perceptions of priority by the rural population. 
The impact of these differences is that no ' blue 
print' type approach will be suitable across the
entire Traaskea in terms of service provision. 
Clearly some survey areas had more pressing demands 
for services of a particular nature than others. 
For example, May's (1985) and Wakelin and Haines' 
survey areas were characterised by very high levels 
of migrancy. The majority of the rural population 
in these areas relied on migrant remittances, and 
this phenomenon might well explain why the provision 
of employment opportunities receive a relatively low 
priority. Thus the provision of services in rural 
centres must be tackled in a sensitive fashion, 
based on community decisions, thus allowing the 
communities to select their own priorities for 
service provision. Dewar et al (1984a, 187)
highlight the fact that simple standardised and 
hierarhically-determined approaches are doomed to 
failure.
Nevertheless, included below is a brief outline of 
service provision for villages, rural centres and 
rural towns, based to a large extent on the findings 
of Vandeverre et al (1985, 38-43), for N.E.
Transkei. Bearing in mind Dewar et al1 s comment 
above, it must be noted that this is only an example 
of what could be involved.
Villages are regarded primarily as service or 
consumption delivery areas. Priority is given to 
the provision of basic infrastructure. Improved 
access to a wider range of services is ensured 
through the provision of social and commercial 
services on a periodic basis (every two weeks). In 
line with Bratton's (1986) and Sinha's (1984) 
papers, rural agricultural production is supported 
by the provision of inputs including access to 
extension services and markets. Vandeverre et al
{1985) suggest that provision should occur on a 
periodic basis every two weeks. The basic physical 
infrastructure includes improved access to running 
water (May, 1985s Wakelin and Haines, 1986) within 
walking distance, that is ,5 kilometer (Vandeverre 
et al, 1985). Roads should link villages to rural 
service centres or the nearest rural town and should 
be passable by 2 wheel drive vehicles all year 
round. Vandeverre et al (1985) indicate the need 
for a woodlot within 5 km of each village, as a 
means of providing fuel for household use (May
1985). Health services are to be provided 
periodically (every two weeks) within one hours 
walking distance, as are educational facilities of a 
primary school level, although they are required on 
a daily basis. Public transport should take the 
form of a daily bus service, with stop off points 
within 2 km walking distance from each village 
(Vandeverre et al 1985).
Rural centres will act as service and production 
centre with a possible residential component in the 
long term (Vandeverre et al 1985, 38). Their major 
function will be to provide a wider range of higher 
order services, than are found in the villages, on a 
periodic or permanent basis depending on demand. 
The range of services suggested by Vandeverre et al 
(1985, 38-39) include all weather. access toads to 
nearest town; reticulated water supply to major 
consumers (for example a clinic); electricity to 
provide light for a few hours per night, a woodlot 
in the immediate vicinity; post office facilities 
(on a periodic basis); water borne sewage for major 
users and pit latrines for small users; housing 
facilities for permanently located government 
officials; agricultural extension services (on a
periodic basis); a junior secondary and primary 
school? mobile clinic and shopping facilities 
(operating on a periodic basis).
The major function of rural towns will be to provide 
a more comprehensive range» o£ permanent services 
aimed at rural needs including in the long and 
nedium term agro-processing industry and the 
informal sector. Furthermore, the rural towns will 
serve as a distribution depot from where the 
periodic services that operate in the rural service 
centres will function. Services required include 
{Vandeverre et al 1985, 41): reticulaUed water
within the town and to individual users; tarred 
roads linking towns water borne sewage disposal for 
fully developed areas of the town and pit latrines 
for peripheral areas; electricity to individual 
houses; bulk power to large scale users, refuse, 
postal and telephone services, access to woodlots in 
the immediate vicinity; police stations; education 
facilities including senior secondary schools; the 
provision of industrial sites or support services 
for small scale industry and businessmen. Marketing 
facilities include co-operatives, storage facilities 
and a credit agency.
Finally, housing should be provided for government 
officials, whilst provision should be aade for 
residents to erect their own dwellings on plots 
services to a range of affordable standards. 
Furthermore, it is in terms of residential land and 
industrial land that use can be made of freehold 
tenure.
Freehold tenure for private owners especially as 
regards industrial investment has definite
advantages. Whereas it has been argued in this 
document that agricultural production could benefit 
communal or group farming practices, criticism has 
been forthcoming from a number of sources opposing 
the lack of freehold rights in urban areas. Haines 
(1985, 344) states,
the continued refusal to allow non-Transkeians to buy land ... has cost the territory a substantial sum in terms of private investment. A prohibition of the entry of white chain supermarkets, singly or in joint ventures, with local capital/ even though such ventures would significantly lower prices of most goods, is a further example of such attitudes.
MANPOWER DEVELOPMENT POLICIES
The importance of manpower development receives 
considerable attention from the bottom-up school 
(Ayazi, 1978; Islam, 1980; Gaili, 1981). The need 
for appropriately skilled personnel is vital to 
ensure the involvement of community participation in 
policy determination, project implementation and 
project management. Aremo (1983) indicates that 
past grass roots projects of a self help nature have 
tended to be managed and implemented from outside oc 
the relevant community and as such have contributed 
little to manpower development. The impact of such 
practices is that the community has little chance of 
becoming self sufficient. Hebbert (1984) highlights 
the fact that skilled personnel are often in short 
supply in underdeveloped countries. Galli, (1981) 
though not in disagreement with Hebbert, (1984) 
stresses the need for appropriate education. Islam 
(1980) supports Galli's opinion and adds that 
"functional education" (1980, 29) is a central
concern for the motivation of the rural masses.
McCulIum {1980} also stresses that motivation is an 
important ingredient in implementing rural 
development initiatives,
The level of education in 'franskei is particularly 
low (Hawkins Report, 1980). The Transkeian Planning 
Priorities document (1983) has also stressed the 
importance of promoting education. The major 
policies suggested include the provision of free 
basic education, the extension of training 
facilities and the promotion of internal training 
(Transkei, 1983). The author's view support the 
above emphasis to an extent, but puts the priority 
on what Islam (1980) termed 'functional education'.
Galli (1981), based on analysis of Guinea-Bissau, 
argues that the promotion of "complementary basic 
education" (1981, 29) is a more "classical than
practical” type of education. Galli argues that 
greater emphasis needs to be placed on integrating 
productive realities into the classroom. She goes 
on to illustrate how the CBP or Popular Education 
Centres, have been introduced into 'bush schools' in 
Guinea-Bissau
The curriculi, timed to harmonise with the productive cycle, uses the community as its classroom. It focusses on fourinterdisciplinary, interrelated subjects: theCommunity and its Culture, Handicrafts and Skills, Health and Natural Sciences, Agriculture and Livestock Production (Galli, 1981, 30).
Islam (1980) indicates that similar emphasis has 
been placed on functional education in Bangladesh. 
Here education is focussed on day to day problems, 
such as housing problems, health, nutrition and the 
rights and responsibilities of citizens and state.
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Galli's (1981) survey showed that people graduating 
from such schools were immediately absorbed into 
local projects such as wacer supply projects and 
maintenance projects. Other graduates were employed 
in metalworking and building.
The advantages of such an educational bias in 
Transkei are fairly obvious. If local education 
were to prepare Transkeians :n she use of 
appropriate technologies, Ear less emphasis would 
have to be placed on Central Government to supply 
extension officers in the rural areas. Wakelin and 
Haines (1986) have indicated that to date this 
system has worked remarkably poorly. The problem in 
Transkei is compounded by the fact that settlements 
are dispersed and extension officers are few in 
number. However, it is the author's opinion, and 
Galll (1981) bears this out, that a more functional 
education, would place the local population in a 
better position to tackle many of their own basic 
needs such as were mentioned above. The Government 
or, as was the case in Guinea-Bissau, the CEPI, has 
a complimentary role in the sense that it must 
promote the use of apprenticeship in education in 
activities that are required in rural ..-.development 
such as housing construction, metal work and water 
supply. However, this is not to imply that 
traditional disciplines should be completely 
ignored. Clearly they have their role to play in 
preparing people to co-ordinat- marketing, to 
operate commercial activities and to act in 
managerial positions. What is emphasized though, is 
that Transkei should not place undue emphasis on 
formal education that would encourage graduates to 
move out of the Transkei on completing their 
education.
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To conclude this rural development policy
di.s.c.ussion, the following policies are suggested.
1 The discussion of the type of tenure that is 
tost suitable for the development of Transkei is 
not resolved. The author's opinion is that 
agricultural production will be benefitted by 
trh > continued promotion of communal land holding 
:ton, 1986; Moll, 1985). However, there is 
little evidence supporting the contention made 
by the Swart Commission (1983, 23) that the
traditional system provides "security, 
individualism and freedom of exchange", and as 
such the author adopts a similar stance as Vink 
(1984, 446) in recommending that the right to 
interfere with farming operations or to reposess 
land by the Chiefs and headmen, must be
prevented. In terms of urban residential, 
commercial and industrial land, the promotion of 
freehold is advantageous because it encourages 
investment in Transkei, by the private sector
which relieves some of the pressure on the 
Transkeian Government to supply these services 
and employment opportunities (Haines, 1985).
2. In terms of agricultural organisation, the
promotion of group farming has definite
advantages, and the evidence provided suggests 
that 'such an organisational framework, not only 
improves‘incomes for the farmers involved, but 
it increases the amount of food produced
(Bratton, 1984), provides for economies of scale 
(Sinha, 2984) and would ensure easier provision 
of services and marketing facilities.
Closely linked to the promotion of agriculture 
is the use of marketing support price
controls/support and agricultural subsidies 
(Sinha, 1984; Gindle, 1985; Bembridge 1984a).
Such assistance must, however, be carefully
targette'* to the rural population to ensure that 
the already wealthy and influential farmers do 
not derive an unfair benefit (Gindle, 1985).
Subsidies, incentives and protection must be 
utilized to facilitate the purchase of 
production inputs (fertilizer, seed, pesticides 
and the provision of irrigation systems), and to 
improve access to credit facilities, marketing 
facilities, storage facilities and other 
extension services. It must be noted that the 
indiscriminate use of incentives can in fact 
have an inflationary effect (Sinha, 1984) and 
result in a wasting of public funds (as was the 
case in the SAM project), and the support of 
inefficient farming methods.
The author proposes a system of service centres 
aimed at providing basic infrastructure in the 
rural areas aid improving the access of the 
rural population tp various extension .services. 
This spatial pattern compliments the suggested 
group farming structure, ensures a better 
provision of services and infrastructure to the 
rural population and makes easier access to 
provision of support services, especially those 
of a periodic or mobile nature. The role of the 
service centres is viewed by the author as being 
directly in response to rural needs, and more 
specifically is aimed at the promotion of 
agricultural production. Furthermore, a
concentration of investment will only occur in
those locations which have demonstrated a degree 
of centrality or have the potential to produce 
sufficient surplus to warrant further 
infrastructural investment,
5. With respect to manpower development, the policy 
emphasis is on the promotion of appropriate or 
functional education. Priority is placed on the 
improvement of skill levels determined to a 
large extent by rural needs,
6. Finally, a point previously noted, is worth 
emphasising due to its centrality in bottom-up 
thinking and because of its critical nature in 
terms of rural development. Dewar et al (1984a) 
indicated that fundamental to a service centre 
approach was a decentralization of decision 
making to provide local democratic control. 
This is an aspect that will be given 
consideration later in this chapter.
A SUITABLE INDUSTRIAL LOCATION POLICY FOR SOUTH 
AFRICA: IMPLICATIONS FOR THE TRANSKEI
INTRODUCTION
In terms of the assumption made above regarding the 
potential viability of Transkeian agriculture, 
implicit was the absorbtion of surplus rural 
population into the urban areas. Traditionally the 
Sout African Government: has attempted to achieve 
this through industrial decentralization, and more 
recently (post 1982) by a process of industrial 
deconcentration. The criticisms mentioned in the 
second and third chapter of this document serve to 
provide input for some form of remedial action, but
it is the author's contention that the more recent 
literature including Bell (1986), Kok (1986), 
Rondinelli (1983., 19fl6), Sluestone and Harrison
(1980) and Massey (1984) introduce some issues which 
are significant but which have tended to be 
insufficiently considered by official planners.
The emphasis of this document is on the Transkei, 
and as such the question of a suitable industrial 
location policy is not dealt with in great detail. 
As previously stated, the author adopts a similar 
stance to Dewar et al (1984a), Kok (1986), Mailings 
and Black (1986) to mention a few critics, in 
emphasising that the existing metropolitan and 
secondary cities have the greatest potential for 
urban growth. However, because of the centrality of 
urbanisation to the development of rural Transkei., 
and in line with Rondinelli (1986) and Kok (1986) 
who indicate that "rural and urban development are 
inextricably related" {Rondinelli, 1986, 233) broad 
policy guidelines are discussed.
OF THE 
DECENTRALIZATION POLICY
CURRENT INDUSTRIAL
The criticisms offered in chapters 3 and 4 have 
detailed the nature of weakness ovsr the last three 
and a half decades of South African industrial 
location policy. A number of criticisms are 
particularly pertinent to improving current policy. 
First, Wellings and Black (1986) Zille (1933) to 
mention only two of many authors, have emphasized 
that industrial decentralization policy serves the 
wrong purpose, that is political, in South Africa. 
Second, Addl-eson and Tomlinson { 1985) and Kok 
(3.986), argue that the number of sites chosen are
too numerous. Third, the wrong types o£ industry 
are being attracted and subsidized (Nkuhlu, 1984? 
Tomlinson 1983; Wellin.gs and Black, 1986). Fourth,
sites chosen, sometimes have no existing
infrastructure (Dewar et al, 1984). Fifth,
decentralized jobs have proved to be particularly 
expensive to create- (Kok, 1986? Kleu Commission, 
1983? McCarthy, 1983). Sixth, the number of jobs 
created has been small relative to demand (Maasdorp, 
1982; Tomlinson and Hyslop, 1984). Seventh,
industrialists complain about the lack of
infrastructure and services provided in the
designated growth points (Welling and Black, 1986). 
Eighth, the productivity of labour in the periphery 
is less than in the core (Tomlinson and Hyslop, 
1984). Ninth, the peripheral areas show little
ability or potential to decrease the relative
attractiveness of the core areas (McCarthy, 1983; 
Maasdorp, 1980; Tomlinson, 1983). Finally, the 
overly generous incentives have been subject to 
abuse ((fellings and Black, 1986), and it is argued 
by Bell (1984, 1986) and Bell and Padayachee (1985) 
that they may in fact have been paying businessmen 
to locate in areas they might well have chosen 
anyway.
The crux of the problem, in official government 
policy, appears however to have been in its choice 
of ’growth centres'. It hi:S been argued that the 
existing metropolitan and secondary urban areas are 
the most likely locations for urban investment 
(Dewar et al, 1984a? Rondinelli, 1983). This is a 
significant stance to note, because the South 
African Government has traditionally adopted an 
opposite approach, although the 1982 and 1986 White 
Papers indicated a softening in this direction.
RondinelU (1983) emphasises that the concentration 
of investment is vital to the attainment of self
sufficient growth. The South African policy has 
traditionally focussed on the creation of new
centres, a policy which is in direct conflict with
Rondinelli’s (1983), metropolitan or secondary city, 
bias. Furthermore, the Government bias toward lower 
order urban areas conflicts with Tomlinson’s (1383) 
and Tomlinson and Hyslop's (1984) contention that
the best opportunity for the maximisation of 
backward and foreward linkages will occur in regions 
with diverse economies. Hamilton and Linge (1983) 
provide supporting evidence for the above contention 
in explaining that small firms are tied to markets, 
to suppliers, and to management functions. Dewar et 
al (1984a) emphasise that these facilities are 
lacking in the outer periphery, whereas Rondinelli.
(1983) indicates that these facilities exist in the 
metropolitan and secondary cities.
The impact of the above criticisms, is that if the 
South Africa Government is to promote a degree of 
decentralization, then official policy must move 
away from the. political considerations of homeland 
or separate development and adopt more economically 
rational criteria in choosing investment priority 
areas. Certainly, it is the author's opinion, and 
this is supported by Tollman (1984), the Buthelezi 
Commission (1983) amongst others, that rural 
development in the South African periphery 
(especially the homelands) is contingent upon the 
South African Government abandoning the ideal of 
separate development (it is important to note that 
the author adopts a similar stance to Wellings and 
Black (1986) who suggest that this remains the South 
African Governments primary aim).
Rondinelli (1983, 205) supports his advocation of 
metropolitan and secondary cities as priority 
choices for investment, by adding that such a 
priority would ensure a more rational choice in 
terms of location (including potential accessibility 
and aconomic viability), range of human resources 
(includes size of labour force, range of skills 
available), and in terms of past growth potential.
Certainly, if the choice of investment priority is* 
metropolitan and secondary cities, and if publi'1. 
investment is used to upgrade existing inadequacii 
in the secondary cities, many of previous weaknesses 
identified in this chapter could be alleviated. 
Such public investment could include the 
decentralization of government functions, 
facilities, offices and parastatal enterprises 
(Rondinelli and Nellis, 1986), the upgrading of 
physical and service infrastructure, and the use of 
specifically targetted incentives.
The use of incentives can take a number of forms. 
Xuill et al (1980) indicate that these can be 
particularly ^attractive ’.to businessmen because of 
the almost "pathological" distaste with which they 
are held, and because they encourage re-investment. 
Related to the above, there is the tax free option, 
such as is used in Ciskei. The potential problem 
with this approach is that if no profits are made, 
then little benefit accrues to the businessmen in 
any case (Tomlinson and Addleson, 1985).
The third option is that of labour subsidies, and 
since 1982 these appear to have had a significant 
impact on investment (Wellings and Black, 1936:
Bell, 1986) although they have been subject to much 
abuse. Finally, use can be made o£ capital grants 
which have an advantage over tax incentives in that 
they provide ready cash for the businessman, and are 
not reliant on profits being made.
Restrictions can also be used as a means of 
controlling urban development. Rondinelli (1986) 
indicates that restrictions have been successful in 
South Korea. However, this can partly be ascribed 
to the trend for industrial location in target areas 
of South Korea to structural c anges in the economy. 
Within • 'th African context, Wellings and Black
(1986, :1k (1977), indicate the considerable
hostile. in the business sector to any form of
Government restriction on industrial location.
Although the South African policy has achieved far 
less success than did South Korea, Bell (1984, 1986) 
has argued that part of this limited success must 
also be ascribed to a changing spatial division of 
labour. Clearly though, in view of the absolute 
rejection by businessmen in South Africa of 
restrictions on industrial location, the adoption of 
any such measures .should be treated .with the utmost 
caution. Rather it is the author's opinion, that in 
view of the important role the public sector will 
have to make in supporting rural development in the 
periphery, and more specifically in the provision of 
services, infrastructure, marketing incentives, 
price supports (Sinha, 1984? Qrindle, 1985) heavy 
reliance will be placed on the private sector to 
ensure a strong national economy.
SOME NEW THOUGHTS ON INDUSTRIAL LOCATION POLICY
Blu.es.tone..and Harrison {198.0) and Massey ( 1984) have 
brought into question some of the traditional 
explanations for industrial location. Traditionally 
industrial location was considered to be based on 
least cost criteria, transport costs, the price of 
industrial land, proximity to raw materials, the 
skill levels of local labour and the cost of labour. 
Furthermore, it is in terms of the criteria that the 
South African Government has targetted its 
incentives. Bluestone and Harrison's (1980) 
findings are interesting and informative, and to an 
extent may provide some additional information 
explaining why certain industries do decentralize 
and why others do not. Their findings suggest that 
firstly, modern technology has reduced the relative 
disadvantage of long distances as represented by 
transportation and communication costs. Secondly, 
they find that land costs are more relevant within a 
particular area, than between different regions. 
Thirdly, related to transportation costs, proximity 
to raw materials has declined because products 
nowdays require relatively more processing and 
relatively leas material. -.Fourthly, in terms of 
labour quality, supply and cost, there has been a 
widespread deskilling process in certain industries 
in terms of which a skilled labour force is rendered 
less relevant• and in these typically labour 
intensive industries, the wage costs are critical.
Bluestone and Harrison's (1980) findings can explain 
two phenomena. They explain to an extent why 
certain industrialists are responsive to the huge 
incentive package, whilst others are not. That is, 
labour intensive industries are more concerned with
the price of labour, than they are with the distance 
function, land costs or transportation costs of raw 
..materials or the final product. Secondly, Bluestone 
and Harrison {1986) lend support to Massey (1984) 
who argues that labour processes and the production 
processes are more significant, and to Bell's (1984, 
1986) and Maasdorp (1985, 228) contention that
labour intensive industries have been decentralizing 
spontaneously as a means of improving their 
competitive edge.
In terms of the above, and bearing in mind that to 
date the South African Government has shown only a 
limited ability to influence the pattern of 
industrial location (Mailings and Black, 1986), far 
more appropriate would be for Government support to 
be based on each particular planning regions 
relative advantage. In those regions which have a 
relative advantage specific types of infrastructure 
can be provided. Clearly highly industrialized, 
capital intensive industry will have different 
demands and needs than regions with only 
agricultural potential. For example, public finance 
would be better channelled into basic services and 
infrastructure aimed at the -promotion of agriculture 
in the Transkei, than has been the emphasis in the 
past, which has been on the promotion of urban 
infrastructure. Instead of wasting public finance 
on the promotion of industry in Transkei, greater 
emphasis should be placed on generating employment 
opportunities in Pietermaritzburg, Port Elizabeth 
and East London which can absorb some of the surplus 
rural population from Transkei.
.6 ORGANISATION AND INDUSTRIALIZATION IN SOUTH AE'RICA
Closely related to the assumed free migration policy 
and the promotion of industrialization in the 
metropolitan and secondary cities, is the issue of 
urbanisation. The urbanisation question is 
currently receiving a great deal of attention in 
South Africa. In terms of this document, the major 
issues include housing provision, services and 
infrastructure provision and the promotion of 
economic activity.
Schlemmer (1986, 1) emphasises that, aside from
population growth, death and perhaps war, 
urbanisation is the most commonplace and inevitable 
social phenomenon in the history of mankind.
Hindson (1986) comments that in Southern Africa 
political ideology, more specifically apartheid, has 
greatly restricted the urbanisation process. The 
political ideology has resulted in a large mass of 
rural poor who are legally prevented from 
urbanising. This has definite negative impacts on 
welfare. Undoubtedly, those who migrate from the 
countryside .to the city ..are. frequently better off 
than if they had stayed in the countryside (U.N.,
1984, 41).
The South African Government has argued over a 
number of years, that the South African metropolitan 
areas are overurbanised. Hindson (1986) and 
Schlemmer (1986) to mention only a few, argue that 
this is a misinterpretation of the existing 
situation. The author supports those sentiments of 
Hindson (1986) ar.d Schlemmer (1986), and takes the 
stance that urbanisation in the existing
metropolitan and secondary cities is inevitable and 
desirable for the development of Southern Africa 
(Mailings and Black, 1986: ---war et al, 1984a). It
is not within the scope of this document to provide 
detailed policies for an urbanisation strategy in 
Southern Africa, and as such the following 
discussion is limited to providing broad policy 
guidelines Cor the inevitable urbanisation 
(Schlemmer, 1986) that will occur in Southern
In terms of housing provision in Southern Africa, to 
date the South African Government has officially 
combated squatting and or slum dwelling (Kok, 1986, 
17). Schlemmer (1986, 4) indicates that this policy 
is somewhat out of place. One gains the impression 
that many Third World societies have come to realise 
that a grudging acceptance of informal housing 
erected by the urban poor is emerging.
Kok (1986) finds that the literature reveals a 
number of positive aspects of informal housing. 
These include firstly, that such housing forms 
provide shelter that can be afforded by the urban 
poor. ..This in turn reduces the numbers o;f "so- 
called rough sleepers" (Kok, 1986, 10). Secondly, 
squatter settlements provide job opportunities in 
the informal sector especially•in family based home 
industries. Thirdly, squatter sett.aments allow 
people the opportunity to live closer to the centres 
of employment than would have been otherwise 
possible. Fourthly, Kok (1986, 18) finds evidence 
to discount the suggestion that squatters 
"inherently display a tendency to act in a radical 
and revolutionary fashion". Finally, the evidence 
suggests that crime in squatter areas is relatively 
limited.
In his presidential address to the South African 
Institute of Civil Engineers, Heydenrych £1985, 5) 
referred to the problems that would have to be 
tackled to cater for rapid urbanisation, the most 
controversial of which was the fact that informal 
settlements would have to become recognised by the 
planning professions as a reality of rap'1 
urbanisation.
... it is arguable that the greatest challence facing the design professions in South Africa is how to respond to these informal settlements. As a starting point in my view we will be forced to acknowledge that areas dtich ‘as Crossroads and Winterveld are not temporary phenomenon and are not necessarily bad. They are in fact a central component in a housing problem that would otherwise be insoluble. Accepting that then, there are two things which we can do.
In terms of service provision Heydenrych (1985)
continues,
It must be preferrable to , identify through proper planning where we can accommodate informal settlements and then encourage them to occur in those positions by providing water and by making it known that settlers would not be harassed. Secondly, we must *be ,OBsa-ni«s.ed .and have the skills to move in quickly when they develop - firstly to establish goodwill with the new city dwellers and then to work with them in keeping access routes open and in providing other basic services such as refuse removal and sewerage (Heydenrych, 1985, 5).
Hindson (198G) concurs adding that all people should 
have the right to live where they chose. Schlemmer 
(1986, 14) emphasises Heydenrych's point that
informal housing should be encouraged and 
accommodated.
The issue of land for housing for the urban poor is obviously crucial and unless new attitudes to urbanisation prevail, land will always be in short supply. As long as the supply of land lags behind 'the demand, the type of flexibility which could allow for the human dimension of accommodation ... will never materialize.
Supporting the provision of informal housing is also 
contingent on the provision of supporting services. 
The provision of clinics and health services, 
community centres and education facilities is 
important. There is really very little to say about 
such specific facilities and amenities except chat 
they should be provided or facilitated as adequately 
as possible (Sdhlemmer, 1986, 13).
Finally, in terms of the promotion of economic 
activity, formal sector policies have been discussed 
earlier in this section, and thus we focus on the 
info ...al and small business sector. Schlemmer 
(1986) indicates that only limited expectations 
should be placed on the informal sector as an 
employment creator.
Job creation in this sector is certainly cheap and the most skill requirements are modest. It is however,.most probably a form of activity too closely linked to the residual spending capacity of wage earners ... to have significant growth prospects (1986, 8).
On small business promotion, Schlemmer acknowledges 
that positive impact can be obtained from the 
injection of low cost capital into growth orientated 
entrepreneurship. A problem Schlemmer (1986, 8)
identifies.
is that the existing pattern is to seek out individuals as recipient of low interest loans and support services. The individuals by
definition, have to show some promise as businessmen and thus all too often excludes the very poor and the new in-migrants to cities.
Schlemmer's (1986) contention reinforces the issue 
of targetting which has been discussed previously 
and is discussed again later in this document. The 
ILO (1983) argues that the expansion of the informal 
sector has often been constrained, neglect and 
indifference, and sometimes even harassment on the 
part of the authorities have held back much needed 
development of the sector, thereby limiting its 
potential for employment promotion (ILO, 1983, 82).
The above policy is considered to be detrimental to 
the expansion of this sector, and is in "sharp 
contrast to a more enlightened policy of providing 
informal activity with access to electricity, water 
and other infrastructural facilities (ILO, 1983,
Deregulation has been suggested by the Swart 
Commission (1983) as a means of encouraging informal 
activity. That is laws that affect agriculture and 
the production, processing and distribution of 
foodstuffs? 'building regulation's (methods of 
construction and design); town planning laws 
affecting the zoning of premises; the granting of 
licences and permits to small businesses? the 
regv. . ion of working hours? the regulation of 
commerce and industry in all its aspects, and the 
enforcement of minimum wages needs to be 
deregulated.
DECENTRALIZING DECISION-MAKING IN SOUTH AFRICA;
IMPLICATIONS FOR TRANSKEI
A major arguement put forward by the bottom-up 
theorists, including Weaver (1981), Stohr and
Todtling (1978), Stohr (1981), Almeyra (1983), Wu 
and Ip (1981) and Mira and Natraj (1981), was for 
the decentralization decision-making down to the 
territorial or coaimunity based i = vel. Weaver (1981) 
argued that such local level decision-making would 
prevent exploitation by the core, since local
communities would control the use o£ local 
resources. These two factors would result in a 
greater investment of profits generated from rural
surplusses back into the local rural economies.
This would have, in theory, the impact of improving 
the conditions in che rural areas and resultant 
greater regional equity.
There has, however, been severe criticism of the 
bottom-up school's advocation of decentralized 
decision-making. The criticism concentrates not as 
much on the desirability of decentralizing decision­
making, but rather on the utopian approach adopted 
by bottom-up . prqt;.agonists. .It h&s been argued 
(Hebbert, 1984) that insufficient consideration has 
been given to costs incurred from the promotion of a 
number of mini-governments. Douglass (1981) argues 
that the small community approach is no guarantee 
that existing inequalities will not persist. Haddad 
(1981) supports Douglass contention and emphasises 
that decentralization of decision making, especially 
when seen in terms of 1 spatial closure', can result 
in conflict between regions. That is, where 
differences in physical and human resources exist 
between regions, selective closure may in fact
favour the existing 1 have1 regions at the expense of 
'have nots', as has been the case in Yugoslavia. 
Hebbert ,(1984) argues that historically, 
decentralized models of government have not been 
particularly notable in their rural or 
redistributive bias. Similarly Blaikie (1981) 
argues that territorial decision making can in fact 
help the stronger (politically and economically) 
classes to preserve their power.
However, the debate on centralized versus 
decentralized decision-making is far from resolved. 
Rondinelli (1986) argues convincingly that the 
success of rural development strategies depends on 
the decentralization of decision making, although 
his approach is somewhat removed from that of 
Friedmann and Weaver (1979) who suggested that the 
nation state was in long term decline as a political 
institution. Stohr and Taylor (1981) somewhat 
begrudgingly, concede that botton-up theorists will 
have to accept a compromise in terms ot erritorial 
control. Penouil (1981) supports to an extent Stohr 
and Taylor's (1981) concession and emphasises that 
one of the greatest errors of regional approaches 
over .the ..last decade .has been the ..viewing of 
centralized and decentralized institutions as being 
in direct opposition to one another. Certainly, 
according to Hebbert (1984, 146) historical evidence 
suggests that any move toward increased territorial 
decision-making is a gradual step-by-step process. 
Rondinelli (1986) supports Hebbert by emphasising 
that the decentralization of decision making is a 
slow, halting process. McCullum (1980) states that 
in Korea, the Central Government had an important 
part in the promotion of local level decision­
making.
Initiative and planning started from the village level ... however, the movement could not have succeeded had it not been for the well-co­ordinated government support across all departments (1980, 38).
CRITICAL CRITERIA FOR THE DECENTRALIZATION OF 
DECISION MAKING
From the substantial body o£ literature relating to 
the decentralization of decision making, and the 
promotion of grass roots development a number of 
critical criteria are consistently mentioned. The 
devolution of fiiscal control has .been emphasised by 
Aremo (1983) and is considered by Rondinelli and 
Nellis (1986, 17) as being "the core of the concept 
of decentralization". Greater emphasis needs to be 
placed on the promotion of local organisations, self 
help organisations and co-operative societies. 
(Ayazi et al, 1978: Rondinelli, 1986). Aremo
(1983, 18) stresses that the role of public
participation must be clearly understood.
In many of the so-called successful self-help projects or co-operatives, the peoples participation is restricted to physical labour and is excluded from planning and determination of priorities. In most cases, government authorities act on behalf of the people as if the people had no ideas of their own. This is quite wrong.
McCullum (1980) and Ayazi et al (1978) support the 
above viewpoint and emphasise that the success of 
public participation is contingent to a large degree 
on the governments acceptance of the cole of local 
organisations.
An issue that receives considerable attention in the 
literature is that of targetting. That is not only 
targetting in terms of project type investment, but 
also in ensuring that local elites do not gain 
control of power to the detriment of weaker classes 
{Hakin, 1981? Boisier, 1981; Aremo, 1983; Blaike, 
1981, Haddad, 1981).
Firtally, Mu and Ip (1981) and Aremo (1983), to 
mention only a few, highlight the importance of 
central government policy in ensuring the promotion, 
over a long period of time, o£ rural development and 
involvement in decision-making.
TRANSKEI: DECENTRALIZED DECISION-MAKING
It is important to briefly reiterate on the findings 
of the case scudy as regards the type of decision­
making that occurs in Transkei. Such an evaluation 
can occur at two levels. Firstly, the question must 
be asked whether or not Transkei and the other 
homelands do not in fact represent decentralized 
government within the South African context. 
Secondly, the decision making structures in the 
Transkei are -evaluated.
As regards the notion that the homelands be regarded 
as examples of decentralized governments within the 
South African context Tomlinson (1983, 1984) is
emphatic that this is not the case. Tomlinson
(1984) argues that the homelands are merely a means 
for the South African Government to ensure separate 
development or 'grand apartheid1. Furthermore, 
Tomlinson (1983, 1984) highlights the financial
dependence of the homelands on South Africa - indeed 
he is very critical of the manner in which the South
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